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ABSTRACT
This study is devoted to the development of a theory which fits
the nature of transportation operations management. A dual-system
paradigm is postulated. Following that paradigm, a transportation
operating system is conceived of as a control system which
consists of two complementary parts: 1) the controlling sub-system
- the organizational aspects of the system which possesses the
controlling capacity, and 2) the sub-system being controlled - the
technological aspects of the system which defines the tasks to be
controlled and their interrelationships. The performance of the
total system is then determined by how well the controlling
capacity of the organization units is matched with the
characteristics of the tasks to be controlled stemmed from the
underlying technological processes.
The key theme of this study is the development of theories and
operational techniques which collectively enable us to 1)
understand and describe the nature of both the controlling and
controlled systems in the context of transportation operations
management, 2) diagnose and analyze the strengths and weaknesses,
and problems of total system, and 3) identify the desired
directions of change and develop alternative change plans for
improving the total system's performance.
To test the theories and methodologies, the management of the
operations of railroad motive power - locomotive - is adopted as
an empirical case. The data are collected from three major U. S.
Railroads.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Marvin Lee Manheim
Title: Professor of Civil Engineering Department
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The. history of science is the history of a human endeavor to
describe the world in more precise terms and to improve it in a
systematic way. Due to the fact that a coherent theory for the
management of service operations in general and transportation
operations in specific has not yet been developed, the need to conduct
some substantive research in this field has emerged for a long time.
This study is devoted to the development of a theory which fits the
particular nature of transportation operations management.
1.1.1 Traditional Approach to Operations Management and Its Limitations
Until quite recently, operations / production management had been
associated almost exclusively with manufacturing processes. Exhibit
1-1-1 summarizes some typical contents covered in most of production /
operations management textbooks today. Briefly, in those books the
subjects are basically structured along either of the following three
key dimensions (or some combination of them):
1) decision categories - usually divided into three categories: input
(human resource, materials, etc.), transform systems (process,
facilities and equipment, etc.) and output (products), for instance,
Starr [1972], Garrett and Silver [1973], Marshall, et al [19751, and
Fitzsimmons and Sullivan [1982].
2) phases of decision process - including planning and design,
operating control, and performance evaluations, for instance, Riggs
Exhibit 1-1-1 TRADITIONAL CONTENTS OF PRODUCTION/OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
Task Phases
Methodologies
Decision Categories
OUTPUT
Product:
Product Portfolio
Demand Analysis
Product Specification
Engineering Design
Product Logistics
Life-cycle Management
TRANSFORM SYSTEMS
Process:
Technology Planning:
Method Analysis
Job Design
Performance Standards:
Work Measurement
Cost Standard
Quality Management:
Quality Control
Quality Assurance
Resource Scheduling
& Dispatching:
Manpower, Material
Cost Responsibility
Facility & Equipment:
Plant & Equipment Investment
Location of Plant
Layout of Facility
Utilization & Cost Control
Maintenance & Reliability
Information Systems
INPUT
Human Resource:
Manpower Level
Ability and Training
Labor Standard
Human Factor in Job Design:
Labor Performance
& Work Condition
Payment System & Job Evaluation
Employee Relation
Material:
Requirement Forecasting
Logistic Systems
Procument
Inventory Control
Material Handling
PLANNING,
DESIGN
OPERATING
CONTROL
PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
METHODOLOGIES AND TECHNIQUES:
Schematic Models:
Flow Chart, Assmebly Diagram,
Routine Sequence Diagram,
Gantt Chart, CPM,
Organization Chart,
Block Diagram, etc.
Statistics & Probability:
Statistic Testing, Sampling,
Industrial Experiment,
Regression Analysis,
Reliability Theory, etc.
Systems Analysis:
Simulation Model,
Analytical' Models (LP, DP,
Sequencing Model, Queuing),
Inventory Control Theory,
Decision Analysis (Expected
Value, Utility,
Probability Assessmet),
Control Theory (Standards,
Feedback, Corrective
Actions), etc.
Financial & Economic Analysis:
Portfolio Planning,
Capital Bugeting,
Cash Flow Management,
Make-Buy-Lease Analysis,
Break-Even Analysis,
Value Analysis,
Spatial Economics, etc.
Information-Processing
Technology:
Information Systems Theory,
CAD, CAM, etc.
"""
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"""
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[1970], and Buffer [1980].
3) methodology and techniques - various decision-aid tools which
include schematic models, statistic and probability techniques, systems
analysis, financial and economic analysis, and information technology,
for instance, Bowman and Fetter [1967], Starr [1972], Groff and Muth
[19721, and Constable and New [1976].
However, no matter which of the above frameworks was adopted, the
prevailing emphasis was on techniques of analysis. Starr [1964]
defended that "the study of production management is mainly concerned
with questions of how to employ methodology to operate and administer
[production] transformation systems with effectiveness." He even further
argued that much of the uniqueness of the diverse domains of production
endeavor "resides in their technology, suprisingly little in their
methodology." Nontheless, the above arguement becomes highly
questionable beyond the domain of manufacturing oriented processes,
e.g., the service operations.
A. Transferability of Traditional Approach
The first critical problem encountered in the application of the
traditional approach of operations management to the transportation
context is the problem of transferability. Since the traditional
approach is primarily manufacturing process oriented in substance, many
issues which are both unique and essential to the transportation
process, such as vehicle (or resources) cycling and geographically
dispersed but interconnected operations, cannot be properly addressed'by
such an approach. In other words, the transferability of the theories
and techniques from one context to another is limited; therefore, to
satisfy the specific requirements of transportation operations
management, we must develop a set of dedicated theories to deal with
them. To elaborate on the above argument, in the outset of Chapter 2 of
this study we present a synthesis of the general features of the service
operations as well as specific characteristics of transportation
operations.
B. Methodological Drawbacks of the Traditional Approach
The second problem with the traditional approach is methodological.
As exemplified in Exhibit 1-1-1, the typical treatment of current
operations management study bears technocratic bias, i.e., focusing
chiefly on the modelling of the physical or technological processes but
paying little attention to the organizational factors which in fact
embody the performance of the physical systems. Moreover along such a
line of thought, one usually tends to have a predisposition to fragment
most problems into particular fields which are characterized by certain
specific quantitative solution techniques, e.g., facility location,
inventory control, project management, mathematical programming, etc.
Processes such as description and diagnosis of problems receive little
formal treatment. In effect, the constraints of the quantitative media
usually force unfortunate compromises upon the models to oversimplify
complex situations and reduce their ability to provide sufficient
insights. Moreover, because of the solution's technique-oriented
attitude, there is always a danger of solving wrong problems for such an
approach.
1.1.2 Technology Determinism Approach and Its Limitations
Methodologically, an alternative to the above approach is the so
called technology determinism found in the literature of organization
study (e.g., Woodward [1965]), which emphasizes the importance of
relating the organization structure to the underlying technology of the
system. However, in this approach the nature of the technology is
usually defined too generally and abstractly to have any practical
meaning to transportaion operating managers. To amplify, technology
often means different things to different people; for instance, the
concept of technology has been operationalized in terms of the extent of
task interdependence [Hickson, et al, 1969], automation of equipments
[Blau and Schoenherr, 19711, uniformity or complexity of materials used
[Mohr, 1971], the degree of uncertainty in the task environment
[Lawrence and Lorch, 1967], and degree of routineness of work [Hage and
Aiken, 1969; Hickson, Pugh and Pheysey, 1969; Perrow, 1970], to name a
few. Exhibit 1-1-2 is a summary of some researches in this school
[Steers, 1977, pp.80-81]. The list can be expanded to include more
recent studies, e.g., Poole [1977], Tushman [1979], Kiggundu [19811, and
Randolph [19811.
The major drawback of this approach is that it is trapped in an
attempt to find correlations between two sets of aggregated and
oversimplified typologies: one concerns the nature of organization (in
terms of centralization, decentralization and the likes) and the other
concerns the nature of technology. In consequence: 1) due to the lack
of unified definition of terms, the empirical findings are sometimes
confusion [Reimam and Inzerilli, 1981, p.266], and 2) the opportunity to
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Exhibit 1-1-2 Studies Relating Structure Variables to Technology
Source: Steers [1977, pp. 80-81]
Dependent Variable(s)
teegao(s) Mesure of Technology under Study Fndings
Woodward (1950. Firms classeed into smas Structural v nables ( pan of (I Levels authority & rate or managers to
1965) blch (unit). mass producan. control. levels of authority. personnel increased withn echnroloca
100 British or connus process, ratio o managers to other compleity: (2) labor costs decreaed with
manufacturing firm accordng to production personn el); ffectivenes teccnological compleaty. (3) soDn ol control
process. measure (geral level of wa related 10to technological complesity as an
organiatona partormance Srted U.nctlon: (4) success fims latended
and Success -see text for to cluster at the midoints on varous structural
details). continua ( g . span of control). tss successful
firms clustered at the end points on such
Continua. n Snort. d argued that effctive
firms employ structures trial conform to theer
technologies
Lawrence & Lorach Technical rate ot change. Amount of differentalin & Results interpreted as supporting a strong
(1967) informaton uncertanty. & integraton between relaton between technological varation
10 industrnal frms feedback Imrpan. deparmenta. increased dfferenation between deartments.
Harvey (1968) Firrm placed on continuum d Measures o internal Organization with more stable (i a. less
43 indusatal frma "'1tecfnlogacal diffusenes "structure": (1) degree of changing) technologis eabited higher(number of product changes spectalizaion: degrees of structuring on al four dependent
number of products (2)C•ntralizalon: (3) span of varables. Findings hld with organization size
produced). "Controh. & (4) program and oler variables held constant.
spercation.
Myer ( 968) Introduction o automated Number of levels in heraifchy. Introdution of automated equipment led to
State &local equipment. spen of control. increased number of levels & span of control.
de% rtiments ol finance
Hage & Aiken (1969) Routinene of t. Structural varbles of degree Significant ngative correlation between routine
16 social weare of partcipation decin technology & partcipation in dec.son makung;
agences maing. anount of autornoty. positive relation between routineness and
measures at act & dWAnce formalizatin; no relatn between routinenese
between superviar & •ad omter structural varieM
subordinates. A tormoraon.
Hckson at a Automation of equgelir. Structural vanables of span dr WH relnsnip IeMwen eomology end
(1969) rgldily of wortlofw control. ratio of managers o. sicure lound. Data suggeal theat lePnoogy
46 servce a sequences interdepndence total peronnel, spefastrlon. may ect structure ellcene in small
manutacturing fms of wornttow segments. & standardzaibn of procedures. orgarmz na: n large firms. technological -
specificity of evaluation. tormatZan. centralization. influence wi be confined solely to production
units & shoul not affect other units.
Fuftn (1970) Firms classted into craft. Amount of perceived worke Workers in continuous process technology tni
3 Canadin firms mass production. & integration (i... Co-worker & highes degree of worker integraton. followed
(pnnting, auto, & oil): continuous process (after supervisory relations: by craft work; mass production workers tfel
N - 149 sublecIS Woodward. 1956). Iabor•management harmony least integration.
company dentification).
Zwerman (1970) Frms classied into Span of control. level of (1) NO ple struclual correlates of operating
55 U S. manulacturing bacn. mass production. or autholiy. size & other success (2) repcated Woodwaro's linandng
firms continuous rocess (after structural variables. Firms concerning relation of technology 6 structural
woodward. 1958). classified according to craracterscs. except founa no relation
SucceSS levels. between Itechnology & Soan ot control (in
contrast to Woodwara) General conclusion
that production technology closely related to
structural CharactertisCS
Monrt (1971) Unidormay. complexily. & Structural variable (degree o Moderate relatln found between task
144 work groups in anlyzaDutity of tasks supervisory participativenesa m.anageailky and oartcatlveriess However
13 local nealtlh effectiveness variables 1 is argue D ased on tare •odings atl no
departments (attitudes. inrnovatveness. relation exists etween the degree of
work output) congruence between fecnnoxgy & struCture &
resultang alectiveness
HrIOnslgk 1 19741) Jobs classfied according to Structural vari•bles (io No clear reation between technology a
0 subects in various operations & materials autonomy. participation. structure. although Certain tecnnoioqgca
jP.rlmIents of a major technology (ickson et at closenss of supervision. vnaoleswere found to · signirulcantly relatedhontal 1969). task predictability, task formalization. unity a controal) to somnestructural variables when SupervOlry
nlterdependence. & task & superveory Dehavior behavior was Nhed constant
manageaiitly
Ataurniv & Frost UnitS ciaSSin into 14 tfacets of effectiveness NO direct relatontanig between tecnnoloqv 6
i 1t/4) long-lni•ed mediating. & ae. performance Dplanng. effectiveness Itowever regression arn s
.JV r ~- ,. I• .1i ntens'r•%t Irchnologles fr reliabily. coorcdnaion •Mlcnled lcfferent tfcnnl ogqla cere reialerl to
,,ilils tl I .u •ins. Thompson 1961 aevelopinenl etc see tent agilterer taelrs t or ect•veness Aulnors
hrM 1or detalds, suggqqeslt rent mnrrees o eitec! erkias• DIaed
ln rvoe ol eoartlm"il 'a ec"-nu.ly
establish more delicate linkages between the detailed technological
processes and the profound organizational and human behavioral theories
is lost.
1.1.3 Three Propositions
In response to the limitations of transferability and the
methodological drawbacks of the traditional approaches, this study is
aimed at the integration of both the tchnological and orgnizational
perspectives and the development of a coherent theoretical construct
which can be used in the conceptualization, diagnosis and performance
improvement of transportation operations management. Specifically, this
study adopts the following three general propositions: 1) production
technology of a system can and should be studied in a more detailed and
practical way than that conducted by the followers of the tchnology
determinism school of method mentioned above, 2) organizational and
human variables should be an inherent part:of the theories of operations
management, and 3) explicit linkages between the technological system
and organizational system can be established and should be more delicate
than a set of correlative relationships between two families of
typologies.
1.2 Research Paradigm and Methodological Framework
Kuhn [19631 argues that science proceeds with a governing set of
assumptions on the basis of which theories and models are developed; he
uses the word "paradigm" to refer to these assumptions collectively. In
response to the emerging research needs addressed above, the first step
is to adopt a new paradigm to govern our conduct of inquiry.
1.2.1 Dual-System Control Paradigm
This study postulates that an organization is a goal-seeking
mechanism which develops instrumental ends and means to pursue a certain
tangible or intangible rationality of the organization. Using a
two-subsystem notion, Simon [1981, p.1411 explained the nature of a
goal-directed total system as below:
Ability to attain goals depends on building up associations ...
between particular changes in states of the world [system] and
particular actions that will bring these changes about. ...
goal-directed action depends on building this kind of bridge
between the afferent [i.e., controlling] and efferent [i.e.,
controlled] worlds [systems]. [remarks added]
The rationale which underlies the above statement is the control
cybernatics; therefore, what Simon was suggesting is a dual-system
control paradigm. In such a paradigm, a control system is conceived of
as being constituted of two complementary parts: 1) the controlling
sub-system - organizational aspect of the system which possesses the
controlling capacity, and 2) the sub-system being controlled -
technological aspect of the system which defines the tasks to- be
controlled and their interrelationships. The performance of the total
system then is determined by how well the controlling capacity is
matched with the characteristics of the underlying controlled tasks.
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The notion of control also suggests that we seek two-way linkages -
action and feedback - between the elements of the controlling and the
controlled sub-systems (or, in short, systems) (Exhibit 1-2-1) [*].
Compared with the traditional paradigms, the dual-system control
framework provides us with the desired analytical instrumentality.
Specifically, it indicates the specific focus of inquiry in order that
we can understand the nature of the total system, i.e., to explicate the
relationships between the controlling action and the state of the
controlled system. Moreover, it is also flexible in accommodating the
above inquiry at various levels of details - system-wide level,
sub-system level and individual level, and allows us to integrate a
variety of control-relevant theories (organizational, individual
behavioral and system analysis) into a cohenrent construct[**].
1.2.2 Organizational Intervention Framework
The analysis of the transportation operations management system
(which consists of both the controlling and the controlled systems) in
this study is aimed at improving the performance of the total system.
The endeavor of improving both the organizational and technological
systems' performance can be put into an organization intervention
framework which, according to Philip [1980, pp. 20-21], consists of
*: Also after M. L. Manheim, "Lecture Notes for the Seminar on
Transportation Systems and Management", Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of
China, January, 1982.
**: The notion of control here does not necessarily imply that the
system under study is a closed system. Details see Chapter 2.
A DUAL-SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE OF OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
TROLLIN&r
TY)
Iage
OCATE CAPACITY
TASK)'
em Being Controlled
GIN OF THE
4TROL TASK)*
Total Operations Management System
*: The structure of the decision tasks in principle is
also in hierarchical form; for simpltfication reason,.
it is represented as one dimensional.
Indi
Work
Exhibit 1-12-1
three major intervention steps: 1) diagnosis and problem definition (a
diagnosis stage), 2) unfreezing existing relationships, setting change
objectives, and developing change plans (a prescription stage), and 3)
implementation and institutionalization of change (an action stage).
However to be more precise, Philip's framework can be further divided
into two sets of interrelated activities [Exhibit 1-2-2] - one concerned
with the substance of change or the technical dimension of intervention
(defining the problems encountered and designing solutions, i.e., the
tasks of 1, T-2 through T-7, and 8 in Exhibit 1-2-2), and the other the
procedures of change or the behavioral dimension of intervention
(identifying resistance of change, and designing and implementing
strategies to overcome the resistance, i.e., the tasks of 1, B-2 through
B-7, and 8 in the Exhibit). Successful organizational intervention must
proceed back and forth between the above two sets of activities -
substantive and procedural[*]. This study emphasizes mainly on the
intervention activities regarding change substance [**], or more
specifically, on the diagnosis and prescription stages and on the
technical dimension's activities.
A. Key Themes of the Study
To accomplish a diagnosis and presription task, Simon [1981, p.
110] argued that two sets of knowledge are required: a large body
substantive knowledge and a few general processes - "the knowledge as
*: The potential feedback relationships among the activities shown in
the Exhibit are omitted to simplify the representation. However, in
practice feedback and iterations do exist.
**: Philip's major focus was on the change procedures (i.e., the
management of change process).
Exhibit 1-2-2
GENERAL ORGANIZATION INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK
(Refined from Philip, 1980, pp. 20-21)
.Substantive Activities
(Technical Dimension)
DIAGNOSIS
STAGE
PRESCRtP-
TION
STAGE
ACTION'
STAGE
Procedural Activities
(Behavioral Dimension)'
OBSERVATION, DATA ORGANIZATION and DESCRIPTION
1) Observe, identify and describe technological # *
and organizational factors relevant to problem areas
DIAGNOSIS AND ANALYSIS I DIAGNOSIS AND ANALYSIS
T-21 diagnode strengths and B-2) identify impacted
weaknesses of .systems * organization systems #
8-3) assess each
T-3) Explain causes of * system's readiness
symptoms k Define oroblems k capacity for change
PRESCRIPTION - DESIGN L UNFREEZING EXISTING
CHOICE FOR SOLUTIONS RELATIONSHIPS, SETTING
CHAGE OBJECTIVES L
t-4) Identify the ideal DEVELOPING PROCEDURAL
directions for change %STRATEGIES
T-5) Develop feasible *# B3-4) Develop mechanism to #
& evolutionary design communicate diagnosis results
specifications
B-5)Create a *+elt" need w/i#
T-6) Develop alternative * impacted organization systems
solutions to problems
defined above B-6) Determine preliminary N
change priority and objectives
T-7) Assess 1L choose * B-7) Evaluate 1 choose
alternative substantive alternative procedural
:hange plans. strategies #
TMPLFMENTATION and INSTITUTIONALIZATION
8) Administer both the substantive & procedural change
plans to improve total system's performance
*: treated in this study.
#: mentioned in Philip's Framework
organized in processes, instructing the expert how to proceed with the
diagnosis." Following Simon's notion, in this study we first develop
some theories which enable us to put the functions of both the
controlling and the controlled systems into perspective and provide us
with the substantive knowledge (conceptual) frame needed in an
organization intervention process. Secondly, we develop a set of
general procedures associated with certain operational techniques which
can be applied , under the guidance of the conceptual framework, to the
diagnosis of transportation operations management systems. In other
words, the specific objective of this study is the development of
theories and operational methodologies which collectively enable us to
1) understand and describe the nature of both the controlling and the
controlled systems in the context of transportation operations
management, 2) diagnose and analyze the strengths and weaknesses, and
problems of the total system, and 3) identify the desired directions of
change for improving the total system's performance, and develop
alternative change plans.
B. Empirical Example
To test the theories and the analytical methods developed in this
study, the management of railroad motive power (i.e., locomotive)
operations is adopted as an empirical case. Three major U. S.
railroads, disguised as Railroads A, B and C, were involved in the
study. Due to the varying degree of details of the data, our -analysis
is primarily based on Railroad A, while Railroads B and C's data are
used for reference purpose or as supplementary information.
1.3 Outline of Dissertation
This study consists of eight chapters. Except for Chapter 1, the
relationships among the remaining chapters are as follows. Chapater 2
is devoted to the conceptuallization of the dual systems; the theories
and frameworks constructed in this chapter will govern the inquiry
process in the rest of the study. Chapter 3 contributes to the
developement of operational diagnosis procedures and techniques so as to
operationalize the key notions developed in the previous chapter; it
also serves as a set of organized information collection strategies and
tools which can be used to identify the state of the dual systems, to
highlight their problematic symptoms, as well as to facilitate the
design of improvement plans.
Chapters 4 through 6 are the application of the dual-system
theories and diagnosis methodologies to the context of rail motive power
operations management. These chapters provide background information
about the dual systems in study, as well as pave way to the later
stage's assessment of the systems' strengths and weaknesses.
Specifically, Chapter 4 deals with the diagnosis and analysis of the
task of rail power management as a whole. Chapter 5 concerns with one
major functional area of power management: maintenance; this chapter
also provides us with opportunities to observe the processes of
interfunctional coordination. Chapter 6 focuses on the steering control
of the motive power-related rail transportation function.
Given the above three sets of data, Chapter 7 gives the general
assessment regarding the performance of the motive power operations
management of the host railroads and outlines the recommended
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improvement plans corresponding to some selected symptoms identified at
various levels of the total management system. The methodological and
empirical implications of the study and the areas for further research
are summaried in Chapter 8.

THEORIES AND METHODOLOGIES
In the following two chapters (2 and 3), based on the dual-system
paradigm as well as the organization intervention framework, theories
(Chapter 2) and methodlogies (Chapter 3) applicable to the analysis,
diagnosis and synthesis of the characteristics of the technological and
organizational components of transportation systems are developed.

Chapter 2
THE STRUCTURE OF TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
In Chapter 1 we argued that the transportation process, as other
processes in the service industry, are: different in character from the
manufacturing processes, and it is this difference which demands a new
analytical framework for the study of transportation operations
management. In this chapter, we shall elaborate on this argument from
the dual-system perspective.
2.1. The System Being Controlled
2.1.1 The Characteristics of the Transportation Operating Systems
Following the dual-system paradigm, because the nature of the
controlling decisions and the control tasks is derived from the
characteristics of the underlying physical processes, to start our
analysis we first discuss certain key common features of the service
operations in general, and then proceed to the more specific
characteristics of transportation operations.
-. Some Common Features of the Service Operating Systems
Transportation is a service in which the system utilizes its
resources primarily to change the place utility of customers or
customers' belongings (i.e., cargoes). In such a transportation
operation, as in other service processes, the resources used are not
normally substantially changed physically [Morlok, 1976, p.32]. More
specifically, a key aspect which distinguishes a service process from
the classical manufacturing process is the nature of the input and
output of its productive operations.
Service Output. In a service system, the output or the service is
normally characterized by multiple intangible attributes. As suggested
by Manheim [1979, Chapter 2], Fitzsimmons and Sullivan [1982, p.161, the
service product is, in fact, a package of which the attributes are
collectively determined by the supporting facilities (e.g., the vehicle
in transportation service), the facilitating good (tickets, waybills,
meals), the explicit service (e.g., the transit time and reliability of
the intrinsic O-D movement), and the implicit service (the perceived
psychological benefits such as privacy and a sense of status). The
intangibility of the service output usually causes a serious measurement
problem [Sasser, et al, 1978].
Service Input. In a service process, the presence of the customer or
customer's belongings is essential. For instance, without the
attendance of the passenger or cargo, a transportation function is
actually not performed. In other words, in addition to the conventional
input of an operator's resource, the service object or the user is also
a necessary input for the accomplishment of a service process. Wild
[1977, p.32] argues that the service process is activated by a user
input (the customer exerts some push on the system), while in
manufacturing, the customer acts directly upon output (he pulls the
system). The presence of the user input further distinguishes service
operations from manufacturing by two characteristics, that is, the
simultaneity of the production and consumption processes and the
perishability of the product, i.e., the service cannot be invedntoried
[Sasser, et al, 1978, p.17]. There are at least three vital and
interrelated consequences resulted from the above characteristics: 1)
the inability to inventory services precludes the use of the traditional
manufacturing strategy - in which the output inventory is established to
serve as a buffer to absorb the fluctuation in demand - so as to
maintain the production system at some optimal constant output level
which maximizes the utilization of the capacity, 2) the
uncontrollability of the user-input, incorporated with the perishability
of the product, normally creates a serious capacity management problem
in the service industry, i.e., due to the cyclic pattern of demand, the
system is usually congested during the peaks and idled during the
off-peaks, and 3) the simultaneity causes a difficul in quality control
and this difficulty is usually further magnified due to the lack of
proper measures of service quality as well as the labor intensive nature
of the operation.
System Structure. In addition to the distinctive input/output
properties, the structure of the service system is usually dictated by
the location economy, i.e., the service must be produced where
prospective user-input is generated. As a result, a service system is
normally comprised of a large number of geographically dispersed local
stations, and the scale economy through the centralization of production
facilities usually cannot be enjoyed by such a system.
B. Specific Features of the Transportation Operating Systems
A key character which further distinguishes the transportation
operation from other service processes is the circulation of the service
objects and the resources in the system. In other words, the
transportation operating system is a system of circulatory channels in
which customers and/or cargos flow from one point to another, or more
simply, the transportation operating system is a system of flows.
Associated with the flow of resources and service objects in such a
system, a number of outstanding features can be observed.
Cyclicity and Directionality of Demand. Cyclic fluctuation is the
common nature of any market. As addressed above, this cyclic pattern of
demand usually cuases great trouble in the management of a service
system's capacity. However, in a transportation system, the demand is
further characterized by strong directionality - for instance, the
outward movement of the grains from the agricultural states during the
harvest season, and the morning inbound traffic and evening outbound
traffic of an urban highway - which escalates the difficulties to the
management of system capacity in at least two ways. The first concerns
the utilization of the infrastructure. That is, during the peaks, on
the same route, the co-existence of under-utilization (in one direction)
and the over-saturation (in the other direction) of the infrastructure.
Special operating control devices are usuaully required so as to resolve
this rather ironic situation and to increase the utilization of the
capacity of the infrastructue, e.g., the reversible traffic lanes.
The second problem concerns the operator's rolling stocks. The
directionality of demand usually creates considerable imbalanced
distribution of transportation vehicles. This effect taking place in
the normally geographically dispersed transportation network results in
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a particular operating control issue in the transportation context -
vehicle backhaul economy. More specifically, the problems involved in
this issue include: 1) How to identify the surplus locations, 2) How to
balance the vehicle flows, 3) How to minimize the empty mileages, and 4)
How to use the vehicle backhaul movement more productively. The real
challenge of this issue, in many cases, is that it occurs right during
the peaks, and must be resolved during the peaks.
Joint Production Operations. In a transportation system, the movement
of a service object between one particular O-D pair usually involves
multiple facilities (e.g., terminals and roadways) and multiple
processes (e.g., loading, unloading, etc.). Meanwhile, in most
non-individual modes, one vehicle usually carries more than one service
object with different O-Ds; and one facility normally serves more than
one vehicle flow at the same time. Due to the above complicated
operations, several rather unique problems are exhibited in the
transportation sector. First, the system capacity can only be defined
by associating it with a level of service quality [Manheim, 1979,
p.2711, or in economic term [Henderson and Quant, 1971, p.891, the
amount of service objects handled by the system and the quality of the
service are the joint products which can be produced in varying
proportion by a single transportation process. Second, the interactions
among the service objects which flow through the system at the same time
usually result in .an undesirable externality in service quality; in
other words, in the joint production of service capacity and quality,
the relationship of these two products is always an inverse one in a
given transportation system. Third, the multiple facilities involved in
the process of servicing an O-D movement - which can be categorized as a
typical long-linked production technology defined by Thompson [1967,
p.15] - create a particular control issue, that is, the traditional
responsibility center concept [Anthony and Reece, 1979, p.755] based on
clear-cut local cost, revenue or profit responsibilities, is difficult
to apply in the transportation industry, due to its high
mutual-dependence among the local operating units. As a result, the
decentralization strategy, which is usually advocated by the management
control theorists, is normally not a practical solution for the
improvement of a large transportation system's performance. This is
also the reason why Drucker [1977, p.515] claimed that "there are ...
service institutions for which we do not possess an adequate principle
of organization." Fourth, in many transportation systems, due to the
uncontrollability of demand as well as the potential chain-effect of the
network-wide interdependence of operations, there is a general tendency
to yield considerable variances between the planned and the actual
performance. To cope with this largely intrinsic variability and to
prevent chaos, in some transportation systems, the control of the
real-time operations becomes a critical managerial activity.
Work Rules. The need to circulate resources to accomplish service makes
the transportation industry a unique system in which a majority of its
employees are working on a mobile work place (i.e., the vehicles). In
consequence, because the predominant employees are working away from
their supervisor, a complex of special rules not normally involved at
the fixed work place are thus required, such as those concerning vehicle
speed, route, manning, safety and emergencies [Dunlop, 1958, p.36].
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These work rules represent a set of standard operating procedures which
direct and confine the allowable discretion during the execution of the
first-line operations that cannot be specified by predetermined
operating plans but must be taken care of on a contingency basis.
In addition to the supervisory issues resulting from the mobility
of the employees' work place, there is another set of work rules which
imposes constraints on the management's utilization of labor force. Due
to the variable demand and the geographically dispersed network, the
nature of transportation operations is inherently heterogeneous, i.e.,
it is difficult to regularly assign all employees to specific runs or
assignments. Therefore, to prevent personal discrimination and
favoritism from occurring and to bring about a fair distribution of
work, various work rules are developed, particularly in the unionized
systems [Kaufman, 1981].
The problems concerning these work rules are the same as any other
formal regulations: once they are established, certain rigidities
develop. For instance, in the rail industry many obsolete rules
actually become barriers to the improvement of productivity. However,
in this study we are aware of the existence of this issue, but put no
emphasis on it.
2.1.2 Conceptualization of the Transportation Process
Understanding the characteristics of the transportation operating
system is the first step toward the conceptualization of the underlying
transportation process, which in turn enables us to specify the tasks to
be controlled and their managerial implications. This section (2.1.2)
is devoted to the development of a conceptual framework for the
transportation technological process, and in the next section (2.1.3),
we shall discuss the managerial implications which can be inferred from
the conceptual framework.
A. Emerging Operational Concepts
A key notion in the discussion of the above section (2.1.1) is that
the delivery of transportation service relies primarily on the cycling
of a number of resources (such as vehicles and crew) on some supporting
facilities (e.g., guideways and terminals) [Manheim, 19791. To
translate the notion of resource cycle into a concept directly useful to
the transportation operations managers, we need to further elaborate on
the above notion and explicitly identify the fundamental elements to be
controlled and their interrelationships in the transportation delivery
process.
Resource Cycling and Flows of Work
A transportation operating system is primarily structured in
accordance with the flois of work [Mintzberg, 1979, p.38; Steers, 1977,
p.731, in which any act (operation) can be performed only after a
successful execution of some upstream acts (operations), e.g., before
the completion of car switching and assembling operations, no train can
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be dispatched from the terminal. Following this line of thought, one
operational scheme for analyzing the transportation operating system is,
going one step further from the notion of resource cycle, to identify
and differentiate between the various core operations and their
interface buffers involved in the resource cycles which embody the flow
of work [*]. More specifically, because there are natural orders of
operations, which are dictated by the nature of the technology adopted
by a transportation operating system, the resource cycles can usually be
systematically fragmented into distinct status or time phases.
Furthermore, these status or time phases can normally be related either
directly to 1) the activities - core operations - which are essential to
the delivery of transportation service, e.g., the loading, unloading,
linehaul, maintenance, etc., or to 2) a function - interface buffer - of
which the primary purpose is to provide a smooth connection between two
interrelated activities, e.g., the schedule slack between two
consecutive linehaul operations. In short, we argue that, from the
operations management perspective, most transportation processes can be
thought of as the transitions of various phases of resource cycles.
Before going any further, because the notion of interface buffers is
less obvious than that of core operations, we shall elaborate on it as
follows.
[*] The resource cycle concept in fact can serve as a device for
comprehending and specifying the distinct work flows engaged, in the
transportation process. Manheim [1979] identified functional components
of vehicle cycle, given the fact that vehicle is one of the key resource
engaged in the transportation processes.
Buffering Mechanism.
Uncertainty and interdependence are two essential factors which
receive the common concerns of many organization theorists: March and
Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1977, to
name a few. In the transporation context, the consequences of these two
factors are vital. For instance, the times when demand for service
arrive, as well as the volume of the demand per se are normally
uncertain in a transporation system. The uncertainty of demand
incorporated with the variability of the service-delivery procedures
usually causes performance variation in each componential process.
Moreover, the ultimate effect of performance variations in one process
could be far-reaching across the network due to the chain-effect of
operational interdependence.
In order to 1) cope with (i.e., reduce, absorb or avoid) task
uncertainty and provide an "as if" certainty basis for action [Stout,
1980, p.17], 2) decouple the interdependence among operations so as to
minimize the effort of coordination and the likelihood of conflict
[Pfeffer, 1978, p.157], and 3) localize the chain-effect resulting from
interdependence [Thompson, 1967, p.57], one effective strategy is to
create various buffering mechanisms at the interface of two interacting
processes.
In the context of transportation operations management, four types
of buffers are of particular interests. The first is the physical
buffer, i.e., the resources inventory created to absorb the uncertainty
produced from adjacent processes. For instance, stand-by vehicles that
are purposely deployed at certain strategic locations waiting to serve
28
unpredictable traffic generated in the neighboring area, represent the
typical physical resources buffer. A key point here is that, although
the transportation operating managers cannot stock their output service,
they do inventory the input resources (empty freight cars, stand-by
locomotives, extra-board crew) to protect the unpredictable fluctuation
of traffic and to cope with the uncertain supply of resouces due to
operational variation. The second type of buffer is an informational
one, e.g., the schedule slack time built into a transporation operating
schedule. When taking a broad view, we may even conceive of the
operating schedule, as a whole, as an informational buffering mechanism,
because such a schedule provides a common guideline to a series of
interrelated processes, and to a large extent these processes can act
independently within that guideline. The third type may be called the
procedural buffer. A typical example is the practice of the preventive
maintenance. The purpose of such a buffer is to prevent the potential
operating contingence (e.g., vehicle failure) from upsetting the smooth
function of the transportation process [Miles, 1980, p.295]. Indeed,
for certain controlling units, these procedural buffers are their core
operations, such as preventive maintenance to the mechanical personnel.
The fourth type concerns the interface between the organization as a
whole and the environment. For instance, if we view the activities
conducted by the operating department as the core operations, then the
marketing activities becomes a system-environment buffer which is
specialized to deal with the external uncertainty and enables the
operations department to concentrate on the internal operating issues.
In short, the buffering mechanism is a device for coping with task
uncertainty and interdependence. Among the four types of buffers
specified above, the first two are identifiable by the physical
transportation process, while the last two are rather abstract. In the
following analysis, we shall concern primarily with the first two types
of buffers - physical and informational.
Elementary System Modules
From the preceding discussion, we can summarize that the delivery
of transporation service relies primarily on the cycling of various
resources, and these resource cycles can be generally factored into
status or time phases. These cycle components either function as core
operations which directly or supportively contribute to the delivery of
transportation, or serve as buffering mechanism to cope with task
interdependence and uncertainty.
Given the above conception, and following Ray Wild's suggestions
[1977, p.341, we argue that a transportation operating system is
comprised of three elementary types of modules [*] as shown in Exhibit
2-1-1. Each type of module represents a different arrangement of the
core operations and the buffering mechanisms. The first one utilizes a
resource inventory to provide timely service as soon as the service
object arrives. The second one reverses the structure and lets the
service object await the arrival of the resource, while the third
*: Starr [1964] once argued that "there is an underlying pattern [for
the input-output production system] that is divisible into some kind of
modulaar units. These can be joined in different ways to form varying
configurations of input-out systems."
Exhibit 2-1-1 ELEMENTARY MODULES OF TRANSPORTATION OPERATING SYSTEM
(After Wild, 1977, P.34)
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one combines the above two structures and establishes two buffers in
around of the core operations.
Two points must be noted. First, the service object mentioned
above not only refers to the outside customers but also to resources of
different categories. For instance, when the maintenance crew is viewed
as the resource of concern, the vehicle to be maintained is the
service object. This broader definition is necessary to make the above
notion of elementary structural modules applicable to a more operational
level. Second, a different type of module has inherent implications in
its performance, in terms of the resource consumption and service
quality. For instance, for a given operation, the first type generally
consumes more resources than the second but provides better service
quality, while the third type usually achieves more balanced
performance, which is something in between the above two types. In
short, each type of module may involve distinct technology and is
suitable for certain specific operating contexts with different
managerial emphasis. We shall return to this issue in Section 2.1.3.
Example of Resource Cycle - Vehicle Cycle
To gain. more insights into the concept of resource cycle, an
illustration of the application.of this concept should be worthwhile.
In the following, we choose the vehicle, among other resources employed
by transportation carriers, to demonstrate how to construct an analysis
framework based on the resource cycle concept.
The derivation starts from the identification of the types of
cycles in which a vehicle is engaged. By categorizing the time-phases
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involved in the annual activities of a general vehicle, Manheim observed
three types of vehicle cycles - the operating cycle, the service cycle
and the annual cycle [1979, p.220]:
The operating cycle begins and ends at the operational base and
includes positioning time, travel time while loaded and unloaded,
load/unload time, operational servicing time, scheduled slack, and
movement processing time. The service cycle begins and ends at a major
maintenance base and includes one or more operating cycles as well as
positioning time from and to the maintenance base. The annual cycle
ihcludes the service cycle, time spent in periodic maintenance, and time
spent in idle status.
It is important to note that these cycles are hierarchically
interrelated as shown in Exhibit 2-1-2. Several observations can be
made from the above example.
1) The resource cycle can be specified in varying degrees of detail.
However, their fundamental components are either core operation or
operational buffer, or some collection of these two elements.
2) Within any particular level of the hierarchy, the cycle components
specified above satisfy the mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive criteria (although some of the components can be further
factored into more detailed elements). In other words, to specify a set
of cycle components which satisfy the above criteria along a particular
resource dimension is not infeasible.
3) The interdependence of the components of a resource cycle can be
specified through the analysis of the underlying cycling process.
4) Different cycle components involved in a resource cycle demand
different analytical methods and measures for assessing the process, and
different management skill and talent are required accordingly. For
instance, the elements under the in-motion category (core operations)
can be appropriately analyzed through the classical engineering approach
Exhibit 2-1-2 7 %iTCLE CYCLE HIERARCHY
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- vehicle motion mechanics; while the analysis of schedule slack (an
operational buffer) requires another set of knowledge, such as system
operating reliability, trade-off between service level and resource
consumed.
5) Because some of the components of a resource cycle may also be the
common elements of other resource cycles (e.g., schedule slack could be
a common components for both the vehicle cycle and crew cycle when the
crew is assigned to the vehicle), it is possible to augment the scope of
the analytical framework embodied on a elected resource cycle as needed
by associating additional elements to the appropriate components (in the
original cycle) which are a) also the cycle components of other resource
of concern, or b) directly related to some other concerned issues. For
instance, to address energy issues, some fuel consumption elements may
be associated to the elements under the original in-motion category in
Exhibit 2-1-2.
6) To predict the performance for a set of resources, one could predict
the characteristics of the cycles for all resources of concern. Exhibit
2-1-3 depicts such an image - one may notice that the issues of
interdependence among different resources cycles can be addressed
through the analysis of the activities (i.e. blocks in the exhibit)
where they intersect.
Exhibit 2-1-3 RESOURCE CYCLES AS ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK (RAIL CASE)
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B. Defining the Object to be Controlled
Putting the preceding disscussions into a control perspective, our
concern is to translate the various conceptions specified above into a
coherent framework which characterizes the control tasks underlying the
system being controlled. In other words, we must define, in the
controlled system, the object to be controlled which is assignable to
some identifiable elements in the controlling system which have or
should have the capacity to control the performance of the task. To do
this, we should first examine the general managerial activities involved
in the control of a resource cycle component.
Management Cycle
The management of a resource cycle component encompasses a wide
array of activities which in principle constitute a cyclic process
[Rathe, 1959, Anthony, 1965]. Such a cycle can be called management
cycle which contains the following three distinctive but interrelated
phases.
Planning - determinning objectives as well as media such as
operating goals, work programs and procedures, quality standards,
and the like.
Execution - exercising control over specific tasks within the
framework defined at the planning phase to assure the actions are
carried out properly.
Review - measuring and appraising the performace, interpreting the
effects and causes, as well as feeding back distilled conclusions
for further planning.
One must note that, the management cycle comprised of the above three
elements is not a closed loop. Successful implementation of the
planning and review functions usually involves certain analysis efforts
characterized by 1) to which external information is an essential input
[Anthony and Dearden, 1976, Chapter 11], and 2) of which the activity is
usually conducted separately from the regular managerial routines
[Rathe, 19591. We consider both (above) types of efforts an auxiliary
to the basic management cycle. To amplify, the purpose of this
auxiliary is the feed-in of additional intelligence, i. e.,
1) procuring supplementary information (external or internal)
through surveys, etc.
2) processing existing data by enlisting the potential of
statistical, mathematical and other information-processing
tecnniques to gain more insights into a problem, and
3) searching for new knowledge which make it possible to crake old
problems, to find new alternative solutions, and to discover
reasons for previous failures.
In this study we call the above function off-line analysis. The notion
of management cycle can than be summarized as shown in Exhibit 2-1-4.
Work Unit.
Given the notion of management cycle, we can then define the
fundamental object to be controlled in the transportation system. In
this study such an object is called work units. Because the management
of any resource cycle component involves all three phases of the
management cycle, we argue that each component of a selected resource
cycle will generate three work units which represent the planning,
execution and review tasks associated with the concerned component,
respectively. Therefore, the work units generated from each cycle
component of a selected resource collectively define the totality of the
tasks to be controlled associated with the resource. Once the work
units have been specified, they can then be related to the elements in
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Exhibit 2-1-4 The Notion of MANAGEMENT CYCLE
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the controlling system. By this token, organization diagnosis can be
conducted concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the control
function of the total system, according to the characteristics of the
linkages between the work units and organization units.
Three points are worth noting: 1) The elementary work unit thus
specified may vary in their degree of detail, depending on how detail we
disaggregate the resource cycle; 2) Depending on the issues, analysis
perspectives and the structure of the controlling system, the work unit
actually assigned to the controlling organization unit may consist of
one or more than one elementary units; 3) The work units are
interrelated in two ways - one is the technological interdependence
resulting from the underlying resource cycling process, and the other is
the administrative interdependence resulting from the procedures of
management cycle.
2.1.3 Totality of the Control Tasks
To conclude our conceptualization of the system being controlled,
in the following sections, we like to put the notion of work unit into
perspective and develop a typology of control tasks which embodies the
nature of the system being controlled. However, before getting into the
key theme, it is appropriate as a premise to first clarify the role of
transportation operations management.
A. The Role of Transportation Operations Management
Conflicting Goals. The performance of a transportation system can be
comprehended through two general perspectives - user's and operator's
[Manheim, 1979, Chapter 51. From the user's perspectives, one puts the
focus on the service level experienced by each individual load from
origin to destination. The importance of understanding the service
level is that it enables the management to predict how customers may
respond to changes in the system performance; whereas, from the
operator's perspective, one needs to care about the resources consumed
and revenues from all services provided by the transportation enterprise
simply because the financial viability of the system is determined by
the costs associated with resources consumed together with the revenues
generated from system users.
However, because higher quality service can normally be achieved
only through larger amount of resources consumption, there is an
inherent conflict between the service goal - which prefers higher
quality, and the resource goal - which prefers lower consumption. In
addition, it is not unusual that the goals of several resources may also
conflict due to the potential trade-offs resulting from the complicated
interactions among the resources or due to their inherent substitution
relationships.
Management Roles. The need for transportation operations management
stems from the fact that the operating system must contend with multiple
objectives - satifactory service must be delivered simultaneously with
the achievement of efficient operations; either inefficient use of
resources or inadequate service quality is sufficient to give rise to
the failure of the operating system. Transportation operations
management is concerned with the provision of both satisfactory service
and resources productivity; one must be balanced against the other since
an improvement in one may cause a deterioration in some aspect of the
other.
Inconsistency among goals - either service vs. resource, or
resource vs. resource - exists usually because of a lack of clarity
about how behavior in one subsystem affects that in others. In a
transportation system, both service levels and resources consumed vary
as the options specifying the system are varied and/or as the volume
using the system is varied. To analyze system performance, one must be
able to trace out how both vary[*]. The transportation delivery process
itself involves not only the application of technology but also the
adequate management of all the variables that can be controlled - these
include the options open to both the controlled system and the
controlling system. In short, the essence of effective operations
management is seeing the interrelationships of all the variables and
viewing the entire transportation delivering process as an integrated
system.
*: In other words, the notion of balancing service level with resource
consumed is vital to the design and application of the performance
indices of transportation system.
B. A Typology of Control Tasks
As demonstrated by the example of vehicle cycle cited in Section
2.1.2A, the components of a specific resource cycle are normally
hierarchically interrelated. Manheim argues that a hierarchy of
decisions for transportation operations management can usually be
specified [1981]. For example, it may begin with the short-range
operations planning and control problem - effective utilization of
vehicles, given fixed facilities and technologies - this includes
service planning, producing an operating plan, determining maintenance
policies, effective utilization of manpower and other resources within
work rules and other constraints, etc.; then is the mid-range options of
vehicle fleet acquisition or divestment; finally follows by the
long-term options of major changes in facilities, including guideways,
terminals, maintenance, and the like.
Putting the notion of work unit into a time perspective as
suggested above and by taking into account the structure of the
controlling system (which will be discussed in part 2 of this Chapter),
we can categorize the work units (including both of those associated
with the cycling resource and with the fixed resource) into
three levels: steering control task, functional control task, and
meta-control task [modified from Anthony, 1965; Mesarovic, et al, 1970;
Newman, 1975; Kirkert, 1980]. By integrating these three levels tasks
into one framework, a hierarchy of control tasks is constituted.
Steering Control Tasks. The steering control task, following Newman
[1975], is simply the control of the operating schedule of a variety of
resource cycle components at various locations of a transportation
network. The objects to be controlled at this level are 1) the amount
of the physical throughput (e.g., resources, and/or traffic) which flows
through the system, and 2) the timing of occurance for the process.
Referring to the vehicle cycle example, the sterring control task is
mainly concerning with the execution phase of the operating cycle, and
the execution of the core operations or bufferring functions of higher
level cycle (e.g., maintenance operations). Indeed,the discharge of a
steering control task may itself constitute a sub-management cycle and
in this study we call such a cycle steering control cycle [more
discussion see Section 2.2.1].
The nature of the decisions involved at this level's control tasks
is usually routine, repetitive and well-defined. Nevertheless, as
argued earlier, these tasks are not necessarily a straightforward
implementation of some fixed blue-print; continual judgement is
regularly required due to the ever changing operating contingencies, and
timing is critical because these tasks are performed on a real-time
basis. Due to the long-chained interdependence [Section 2.1.1B),
on-line communication is essential to perform the task; however, the
final decision is normally reached at the discretion of the individual
who is in charge of the work unit. In other words, in real-time
context, due to the mutual-dependence with rest of the system, the
discharge of a single work unit demands information on a large amount of
variables, and most of these variables are uncontrollables from the work
unit's viewpoint; it is communication which renders the uncontrollable
variables more certain and leaves the controllables at the responsible
individual's discretion.
Functional Control Tasks. Steering control is performed within a
context defined by higher level control tasks. The planning as well as
review (which provides information for replanning) of various operating
schedules in a transportation enterprise are typical control tasks at
this level. Because the physical flow is influenced significantly by
the number of stages as well as the location of buffers involved in a
system, changing the arrangement of operational buffers, in effect, is
changing the arrangement of control points, and it is an effective way
to intervene in the real-time performance. The Work units at this level
at least contain the following two types of tasks: 1) specifying the
timing of arrival/departure of physical flows (resource and/or traffic)
to/from various core operations and operational buffers under some
presumed operating situations; and 2) creating or eliminating
operational buffers or even core operations without changing the
infrastructure of the system.
Referring to the vehicle cycle example, the functional control
tasks concern with both the planning and review phases of the operating
cycle, the service cycle and the annual cycle. The work units at this
level together with the steering control tasks complete a functional
control cycle.
Decisions at this level are made less frequently than that at the
previous level. A much larger array of controllables are included in
the task at this level than in any steering control task; such an array
usually contains the elements of a whole resource cycle (e.g., freight
car management), a whole work flow (e.g., rail piggy-back service) or a
particular operating function (equipment maintenance). The
uncontrollables, caused by task interdependence, are not as
well-specified at this level as at the steering-control level. To deal
with them, coordination and some form of collective decision are usually
required so as to produce mutually consistent operating guidelines for
the steering control tasks. The decision problems raised at this level
are normally less well-structured than those encountered in the
real-time context. Off-line analysis is usually essential to the
successful discharge of this level's tasks.
Meta Control Tasks. According to our definition, both the functional
and steering control tasks are performed in a framework with a given
amount of total resources available, i.e., within the limit of a given
capacity. Therefore, a natural level above the previous two is
system-wide meta control tasks [Kickert, 19801 taking care of the
capacity of the system. A general objective for this level's tasks is
to match the system capacity with long-term demand. From such a
capacity control point of view, the two lower levels' tasks are
complementary, since their objectives are mainly to accommodate
short-term and real-time imbalance between system capacity and demand
volume. Meta control tasks provide both the procedural and structural
operating contexts for the functional and steeering control tasks. Not
only the resources in cycling but also the non-circulatory (fixed)
resources, such as terminals, plants, etc., are of concern at this
level. In other words, it is this level's tasks to control the most
appropriate combination of all options available to operations
management in response to the changing environment. With more options
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to explore and greater flexibility in finding a solution, the challenge
is not simply to coordinate or to implement, but to develop in a manner
that supports and enhances the ultimate goal of the system.
In terms of vehicle cycle, at this level the key issue is concerned
with vehicle's life cycle, or more specifically the planning and review
of vehicle life cycle as well as the vehicle fleet size. The work units
at this level incorporated with the lower level control cycles form a
meta control cycle.
The decisions involved at this level are generally novel and
ill-structured in nature, and most of the uncontrollables are
external-oriented. The problem concerns not only the technical
uncertainty which can be dealt with through fact finding, but also
political uncertainty which relates to the value consensus on the
system's goals [Brightman, 1982, p.6; Stout, 1980, p.151; Thompson,
1967, p.134]. Because the problems to be dealt with are ill-defined,
the source of information becomes an issue. The use of the conventional
formal management information is usually very limited at this level,
informal communication systems become more effective and in many cases
ad-hoc information inquiry effort is required [Soelberg, 1967; Tuggle,
et al, 1975; Mintzberg,et al, 19761. In other words, off-line analysis
must be conducted extensively and intensively so as to discharge this
level's tasks successfully.
Hierarchy of the Control Tasks.
In summary, the control tasks derived from the nature of the system
being controlled are hierarchical in character [*], ranging from the
lowest well-programmed stimulus-response type of steering control tasks
geared closely to the process of physical transportation flow, to the
ill-defined system-wide meta-control tasks dealing with the design and
redesign of the transportation system in response to the long-term trend
of the external operating environment, with a level of functional
control tasks in between to mediate the two extremes. The underlying
mechanism which integrates these three-level control tasks is the
cause-effect and ends-means interrelationship existing among the
decisions involved at various levels' tasks.
In this study we argue that, in order to specify the
characteristics of the transportation system being controlled, it is
essential to specify the hierarchy of the control tasks, and only in
this manner can the required controlling function - which provides a
solid reference line for the diagnosis of the performance of the
controlling system - be identified.
*: We follow Philip's term - hierarchy of control tasks [1980, p. 77],
and further refine it.
2.2 The Controlling System
The controlling system in this study is primarily defined as the
organization of a transportation emterprise. However, the knowledge of
the static formal organization structure of a transportation enterprise
does not allow us to understand how the organization structure works in
practice. To attack this problem, some organization theorists propose
to take a functional approach which "would first select appropriate
components or sub-systems (e.g., decision areas), then show how the
characteristics of these components (e.g.,the way decisions are made)
bring about some state of the system" [O'Shaughnessy, 1972, p.12 1). As
to the problem of how to specify the system components, there seems to
be no standardized practice: different analysts may adopt different
specification for different purposes. For instance, in one article
[19731, Simon emphasized the importance of examining the information
system in abstraction from the formal organization departmental
structure; whereas after the review of various schools of thoughts,
Galbraith [1977, p.311 summarized the following five variables as the
key to the design of an organization: task, structure, information and
decision processes, reward systems, and people. In a recent study on
several transportation organizations' performance, Philip [19801
advocated the concept of seeking congruence among three elements -
organization structure, information systems, and decision process - so
as to appropriately support the transportation activities.
In this study, a comparison with Galbraith's framework, the task
variable has been elaborated and expanded into the system being
controlled as discussed in the preceding part of this chapter, and as a
first approximation, both the reward systems and people are considered
as an integral part of the organization decision mechanism. Given these
two premises, we are allowed to reduce our focus chiefly on the three
dimensions as suggested by Philip in the study of the transportation
controlling system. In fact, this reduced construct is consistent with
Simon's proposal in which the key theme is arguing the importance of
designing an organization in accordance with its underlying information
processing structure - the essence of such a structure is determined by
organization structure, decision process and information systems. To
further operationalize the above concept, this study adopts a
hierarchical analysis approach, i.e., the behaviors of a transportation
controlling system are probed alone the following three dimensions:
1) How the system as a whole behaves in response to an
organization-wide problem?
2) How a group of organization units works together as a team to
carry out a decision-making process?
3) How an individual behaves when he encounters a decision
problem?
Our hypothesis is that, through such a segmented analysis[*], the
results can collectively provide us with a sufficiently rich descriptive
and analytical data to enable us to put the function of the controlling
system into perspective, to conduct insightful diagnosis
[*]: The three levels of diagnosis, in practice, could be a
multi-faceted iterative process with a variety of depth in each level.
Detailed discussions see Chapter 3.
concerning the actual system performance, as well as to develop norms
for organization change if needed. The following is the summary of our
conceptualization of a transportation controlling system regarding 1)
the macro-function of the organization structure as a whole, 2) the
group decision-making process, and 3) the individual decision-making
behavior.
2.2.1 Organization Sturcture - A Macro Problem-Solving Perspective
Organization is a mechanism developed to solve complex problems
through organized effort to achieve some shared purposes. To put the
function of an organization into perspective, in this study we conceive
of an organization primarily as a problem-solving mechanism. In the
following, we first elaborate on the above notion from two distinct
viewpoints, i.e., mechanistic and open system (or organic) [Burns,
19631, and then integrate both viewpoints into a broader frame.
A. Mechanistic View
Means-ends Hierarchy and Work Division
March and Simon [1958, p.169] argued that the basic features of an
organization structure and function are derived from the characteristics
of human problem-solving processes. It is observed that when faced with
a complicated issue, managers usually attempt to simplify the issue by
decomposing one decision into many smaller sub-decisions and by trying
to use standardized programs to deal with each problem [Alexander and
Manheim, 1965]. The principal way to decompse a problem is to conduct
a means-ends analysis [March and Simon, p.152]. Manheim [1966] has
illustrated how to solve a complicated problem by specifying a solution
progressively from the level of very general plans down to determining
the very detailed step-by-step execution tasks.
The decomposition of a large task into parts, according to March
and Simon [1958, p.152], can be more elaborate for an organization than
for an individual person, because in an organization context the means
specified in the problem-decomposition process become subgoals which may
be assigned to lower level organization units. In March and Simon's
view the division of work can be explained by the cognitive limit of the
human mind (an individual can attend to only a limited number of things
at a time) [also see Section 2.2.3 of this study]; therefore, various
aspects of the whole complex problem are being handled by different
individuals and different groups of individuals in an organization, so
that each organization unit only needs to take care of a manageable part
of the whole problem and omits the others [March and Simon, 1958,
p.151]; the resulting departmentation can be mapped to a means-ends
hierarchy which relates the individual tasks to the organization purpose
[ibid, p.31]. Along the same line of thought, Williamson [1979,
pp.27-31] even specified a formula which equates the number of
organization levels to a function of control span.
Mechanistic Bureaucracy
The image of the organization as a means-ends hierarchy allows us
to gain insights into the classical bureaucracy, which is characterized
by vertical and horizontal job specification, a proliferation of rules
and regulations, formalized communication through the organization, as
well as by the decision-making process following the formal chain of
authority [Mintzberg, 1979, Chapter 18). In the context of operations
management, when the operative end of an organization is to produce
certain fixed outputs, such an end can usually be systematically
factored into a family of simple, repetitive tasks - which stands for a
set of empirically proven means to the intended operative end - and the
mechanistic bureaucracy becomes a rational organization structure that
maximizes production efficiency through the precise execution of various
standard operating procedures (SOPs) associated with the individual
tasks specified above. In other words, a classical mechanistic
organization is an instrument or tool for achieving a given end through
the functioning of the built-in hierarchical means-ends mechanism.
It is clear that the premise which determines the validity of a
bureaucratic machine is the validity of the ultimate operative end - in
terms of some effectiveness measures, such as the long-term survival of
the organization. This argument highlights a major issue [*] faced by
business bureaucracy, that is, an efficient instrument is not
necessarily always effective in all situations and for all problems. In
a stable and deterministic environment, a fixed operative end may remain
valid and effective, as does the end-specific bureaucracy; while in an
ever changing external and internal environment, the validity of any
established operative end becomes an issue subject to review from time
to time to the organization, so does the business bureaucracy which
embodies the operative end.
[*] Specialization, a key characteristic of the bureaucratic
organization, has recently come under attack by the proponents of job
enlargement. They believe that the concern with task specialization has
dealt only with the cognitive but not the motivational aspects of work.
However, this is not the major emphasis of this study.
However, the need for organizational change should not make an
organization as vulnerable if the signal of change from both internal
and external environments can be well received by the organization. The
key source of trouble stems maily from the inward-oriented management
attitude associated with the mechanistic organization. As argued by
Mintzberg [1979, p.3211: "the managers at the strategic apex of these
organizations are concerned in large part with the fine tuning of their
bureaucratic machines ... just keeping the structure together in the
face of its conflicts [usually] consumes a good deal of the energy of
top management." As a result, they become insensitive to the change of
environment and fail to respond to it in an entrepreneurial way.
B. Open-System View
Environmental Determinism
The mechanistic organization can only be trouble-free in a closed
system with a highly predictable environment. However, the market and
the internal constituencies of any business are normally in a constant
state of flux; in response to this reality, there is a school of
thought, i.e., environmental determinism [Steers, 1977, p.90], which
argues that organizational rationality never conforms to close-system
logic but demands the logic of an open-system, or more specifically,
most effective organization design is determined as a function of
external factors. For instance, Lawrence and Lorch [19671 emphasized
the need for an organization to understand its environment and to
structure itself accordingly. They concluded from their study that
environment does play an important role in the relation between
structuring activities and organizational success. Moreover, Alfred
Chandler suggested that there is a relationship among environment,
strategy, organization structure and its success: "strategic growth
resulted from an awareness of the opportunities and needs to employ
existing or expanding resources more profitablly. A new strategy
required a new or at least refashioned structure if the enterprise was
to be operated effectively" [1962, pp.18-19]. In short, environment
determinism advocates that an effective organization must be structured
organically with high flexibility and adaptability in response to
environmental changes.
Structural Dilemma
The preceding discussion uncovers a structural dilemma faced by the
operations management: on the one hand, to gain production efficiency,
the organization should be maintained as a stable closed system and
structured principally by following the chosen production technology; on
the other hand, to cope with environmental uncertainty and to achieve
system effectiveness, the organization structure must remain flexible
and adaptive. The key issue is whether it is possible to design a
single organization to satisfy both seemingly conflicting criteria.
Thompson [1967, p.20] attacked this problem explicitly. He argued
that:
Since the technological activities are embedded in and
interdependent with activities which are open to the
environment, the closed system can never be attained for the
technological component...[yet] the technical core must be
able to operate as if the market will absorb the product at a
continuous rate and as if inputs flowed continuously at a
steady rate and with specific quality. ... organizations
reveal a variety of devices for approximating these "as if"
assumptions, with input and output components meeting
fluctuating environments and converting them into steady
conditions for the technological core.
Vertical Qualitative Differentiation and Three-level Concept
In other words, in order to operate smoothly without interruption,
the technical level cannot tolerate much uncertainty, therefore a
necessary buffer must be provided to separate the technical core from
direct exposure to the external unpredictable environment. Steers
[1977, Chapter 5] emphasizes the need to set aside and invest some
resources in activities that will enhance the net worth of the
organization in the future, because without such renewal efforts,
organizational survival is easily threatened by short-term shifts in
demands, resources and so on. Following Parsons' [1960] three-level
system notion, Thompson suggested that such an organizational renewal
effort is best accomplished by the senior management: "If the
closed-system aspects of organizations are seen most clearly at the
technical level (i.e., the bottom level of an organization), and the
open-system qualities appear most vividly at institutional level [i.e.,
the top level of an organization] [1967, p.12]. The remaining issue is
how to mediate between the above two extremes. Thompson went on
suggesting [ibid]: "If the organization must approach certainty at the
technical level to satisfy its rationality criteria, but must remain
flexible and adaptive to satisfy environment requirements, we might
expect the managerial level to mediate between them, ironing out some
irregularities stemming from external sources, but also pressing the
technical core for modifications as conditions alter."
In summary, to appropriately balance the efficiency and
effectiveness criteria, the controlling organization of an operating
system should function like a three-level system[*], each level dealing
with tasks which are qualitatively different - the low-level for
physical process, the top-level for system-wide adaptation, and the
middle-level for mediation and coordination. In other words, in the
conventional business bureaucracy, the hierarchy of the organizaiton is
primarily a result of work division - the managerial energy at all
levels is oriented toward the same instrumental (operative) end, i.e.,
looking into the procedures and processes of a given production
technology. However, a properly functioning organization demands a
qualitative break along the vertical dimension of hierarchy in terms of
the orientation of managerial attention, particularly for the top level:
its attention should focus not only on the achievement of the
instrumental end but also on the validity of the instrumental end with
respect to some effectiveness measures of the organization.
*: Parsons and Thompson's three-level notion is derived from a
conception of an organization's structure and its function. Anthony's
three-level notion, the notions of management cycle, as well as of the
hierarchy of control tasks (Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3) are derived to
conceptualize the characteristics of general management activities.
The relationships between these two group of typologies are discussed
in the next subsection (2.2.1C).
C. Meta-Control View
To conclude the above discussion, the mechanistic system embodied
in a specific means-ends hierarchy is an efficient structure for
achieving production efficiency; however, it suffers from the drawback
that, in time of change, the underlying operative end may no longer
serve the goal of the organization, nor will the organizational
structure; whereas the organic (open) system is effective in response to
the environmental change, but has trouble in providing a stable
operating context demanded by production efficiency. To resolve the
above structural dilemma, a qualitative differentiation of the
organization hierarchy is required, and in effect this leads to the
notion of a three-level organization system as cited in the foregoing
section. In the following, we shall illustrate the relationships
between the three-level system and the organizational problem-solving
processes, and then put them into a unified framework which
characterizes the function of the organization structure as a whole.
Organization Problem-Solving Cycle
Generally speaking, problem-solving is a conversion process which
transfers an open problem with unspecified ends and means into a closed
problem with specific step-by-step action procudures (solution) which
lead to a given end [Ponds, 1969; Lang, et al, 19781. Associating this
problem-conversion notion with the Parsons and Thompson's three-level
system concept, we argue that, in an organizational context, the general
responsibility of top management is to define and re-define
organizational problems through the specification of either their ends
or means; for first-line management, is to execute the solutions, while
for middle management, is to transfer the semi-open problems with
unspecified means or ends into closed problems [see Exhibit 2-2-1)].
Comparing the above three-level organizational problem-conversion
system with the means-ends hierarchy implied by the classic mechanistic
organization, one finds that the latter is only a partial structure of
the former as indicated in Exhibit 2-2-1. Specifically, the classical
bureaucratic system constantly defaults the first phase of the
conversion process, i.e., defining problems; as a result, their
problem-solving machines easily become obsolete when the predefined
problems change.
Nevertheless, imposing a problem-definition element on top of the
classical bureaucratic machine will not necessarily turn the system into
an adaptive one. Although the problem-conversion phases commonly
proceed downward from the open-problem to closed-problem - a process
usually referred to as formalization or institutionalization [Tuggle,
1978, p.42]; for an adaptive system, the reverse process is equally
important. That is, in certain situations, the system should be able to
re-open the already institutionalized problem-solving machine - a
process usually referred to as organizational innovation or development
[Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, p.90]. In other words, problem-conversion
should function in a cyclic fashion, but not as a top-down linear
one-way process.
Meta-Control Structure - Organization as a Problem-Conversion Mechanism
- To conclude, from a functional perspective, an organization can be
viewed as a macro problem-conversion mechanism. By applying such a
notion, the principal roles (in terms of task authority and
accountability [Philip, 1980, pp. 82-85]) of an organization's various
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Exhibit 2-2-2 Meta-Control STRUCTURE
levels can be characterized by the relationships between the
problem-conversion cycle and the three major organization levels (see
Exhibit 2-2-2); and such relationships define the operational structure
of an organization in managing a particular task. In this study, we
call such a structure meta-control structure, which explicates the
authority and accountability of all the involved organization units[*].
Briefly, the management of any particular task starts from the
definition of the problem and development of planning premises, both of
which are usually the responsibility of top management at the
institutional level; then the problem is reduced to the planning phase:
the middle management, based on the given premises, develops operating
guidelines or action plans (schedules) for first line management at the
technical level; and finally, first-line management executes the
well-defined operating tasks, and based on immediate performance
feedback, takes necessary corrective actions to assure the smooth
operation of the controlled system. Moreover, over a certain period of
time (e.g., a week, a month or a season), middle management may review
the average performance of the controlled system and use the evaluation
results as input for replanning of the responsible functional lines;
while top management concerns itself with the performance of the system
as a whole - in terms of overall competitive position, the relative
strengths and weaknesses among various functional segments and so forth
[Lorange, 1980, p.18]. These appraisals feedback and direct
[*] In this study, we define authority as the input or effort aspect
roles of individual organization unit in accomplishing a specific task,
while accountability concerns with the output or result aspect of
individual roles.
the redefinition of the problem or the refinement of the total system
(both the controlling system and the controlled system)[*].
Therefore, in a properly functioning organization at least three
generic control cycles can be identified, which correspond exactly to
the levels of control task hierarchy associated with the system to be
controlled. To amplify, the first line manager is responsible for the
steering control cycle which streamlines the physical operations. The
middle management is responsible for the functional control cycle which
guides the technical level's operations, provides necessary buffers to
insulate the technical operations in a closed system, and exercises
incremental adjustments within certain bounded limits imposed by the top
level to enable the technical level operations to accommodate short-run
fluctuations. The top management is responsible for the meta-control
cycle which provides the ultimate buffer between the organization and
the external environment and controls the systemic structure of the
organization. It is the meta-control cycle which allows the organizaton
to behave as an open (organic) system and to pursue effectiveness. In
other words, the organization levels defined above are the most
aggregated organization units which can be identified to be responsible
for the performance of certain specific categories of work units in the
underlying technological system.
*: In fact, the notion of the problem-conversion cycle is, by and
large, compatible with and complementary to that of the classical
management cycle, i.e., plan-execution-review cycle [section 2.1.31.
The problem-conversion notion underscores that an essential step in any
updating of a present managerial practice is the re-examination of the
planning premises - concerning problem definition and redefinition
[Newman, 1975, p.1131, while the management cycle notion highlights the
cybernetic feature of the controlling mechanism - performance feedback
is specified as a key information source for re-planning - which
explicitly indicates that problem-conversion is a cyclic process.
2.2.2 Organizational Process - A Team Decision-Making Perspective
The conceptualization of the general function of an organization as
a whole is a necessary step for diagnosing an organization's macroscopic
controlling function. However, to gain more operational insights into
the underlying causality of an organizaton's performance and to
associate the work unit with the organization unit at more microscopic
level, we should further probe into the group level's and individual
level's behavior. In this section, we first focus on the group- (or
team-) based organization decision-making processes.
A. Organizational Decision Environment
From the preceding section's discussion, it is clear that, even in
a highly mechanistic organization, not all decisions are made at the
top; decision authority is generally distributed throughout the
organization [Simon, 1976, chapter 11]. More specifically, in an
organization as complex as a transportation enterprise, decision-making
is not an individualistic behavior but a process which usually involves
more than one participant[*].
[*]: Most of the research on decision has mainly focused on single
individual choice events, and is considered largely in isolation from
the organizational environment. Conolly [19771 cited that "a similar
isolation may be found in the literature on organizational
communication. A .... review of the.topic (Porter and Roberts, 1972]
lists only one source (out of more than 150 references) in whose title
the word 'decision' appears." The above assessment is generally agreed
with the author's own observation. In other words, the decision-making
process in a organizational context is currently a less than
well-developed research subject.
The consequence of a decision to an individual decision-maker [*]
depends upon both his own choice and the choices of others.
Organizational relationships primarily grow out of the division of work
and the delegation of responsibility and authority. The interdependence
among the decision-makers in an organization stems from the
interdependence of the underlying work units upon which the
decision-makers exercise their controlling authority. Therefore, in an
organization (such as a transportation enterprise) decision-making is
characterized as a highly diffused process [Connolly, 1977, p.208] along
various dimensions - multipersons, nontrivial physical distances,
multi-organizational levels, and multi-time periods.
Interdependence of Decisions and Indirect Decision Makers
When taking a close look at the interrelations among the
controlling decisions, one may find at least the following two
categories of interactions [Neuberger and Duffy, 1976, p.57]:
1) Two decisions are interrelated in action, if a) the choice of a
certain action in decision A eliminates the choice of some actions in
decision B, or b) some action in decision A must occur for an act in
decision B to be possible. The former type can commonly (but not only)
be observed along the vertical line authority as a result of formal or
informal regulation, while the latter one occurs commonly (but not only)
along the horizontal dimension due to the sequential nature of work
flow.
----------.- *--- 
*: The term decision-maker here refers to individual person or a group
of persons which can be viewed as a sigle unit to perform the decision
making function of concern.
2) Two decisions are interrelated in consequences if the act chosen by
one decision maker influences . the consequences of another
decision-maker's potential acts, either due to 1) the externality effect
(e.g., line congestion), or 2) the built-in trade-offs (e.g, resource
inventory cost and service quality), or 3) the effect of incentive
systems (e.g., certain type of behavior is rewarded formally or
informally).
From an individual decision perspective, the ultimate choice of a
decision is not only determined by the decision-maker who directly makes
the decision, but also influenced by some of indirect decision makers
(along both horizoantal and vertical dimensions of the organization
hierarchy) who control the interdependent (upstream or downstream)
activities or processes (e.g., the uncontrollables from the direct
decision-maker's point of view) and the outcomes.
The interdependence upon other decisions and the existence of
indirect decision-makers characterizes the decision environment of any
organizational decision-making process. This decision environment
constrains the search space of aternative solutions and manipulates the
evaluation process as well as the choice behavior. Exhibit 2-2-3
illustrates such a notion.
B. Decision Base and Decision Net
The notion of decision environment summarizes the general features
of organizational decision-making. Further insights can be obtained
through the observation of 1) How a group of interrelated organization
units are evoked to deal with a particular decision problem? and 2) What
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is the actual process which leads to a final actionable decision?
Decision Base
To answer the above two questions, we may start from the analysis
of the information required by a decision unit (organizational unit
evoked to play a decision maker role) in a decision process which is
presented as the blocks lined-up vertically at the middle of Exhibit
2-2-3. In this study, we call this set of information the decision
base: information required for making a decision including that related
to goals, alternative actions and potential consequences of the actions.
We argue that any decision unit in an organization must have a decision
base of its own, and part of the information contained in the base is a
result of organization design and is routinely received by the unit
through formal information channels [Exhibit 2-2-4]. However, to
accomplish a decision, the routinely received information is usually
insufficient and more information must be furnished into the decision
base of a decision unit. There are primarily two approaches to acquire
the additional information needed in a decision. The first is through
interpersonal communication, e.g., by way of decision-maker's active
search via various communication channels (forma or informal), or his
passive receival of information from other initiative (or advocative)
actors. The second is through decision-maker's intrapersonal mental
process (operations of his decision heuristics) to generate the needed
information. In other words, in an organizaeional context, a key to
understanding the decision-making process is to focus on the
input/output operations involved in the concerned decision bases. In
the following, we shall further elaborate on the characters of the
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interpersonal approach, and leave the intrapersonal approach to the next
section (2.2.3).
Decision Net: Paticipants and Role Set
An organization unit engaged in a team decision-making process can
be distinguished by its role or contribution to the accomplishment of
the decision task. Due to the functional departmentation, an
organization unit may either have prescribed official task role(s) in a
formal or well-structured decision net (e.g., train-dispatching
process), or have variable roles in a less formal or unstructured
decision net (e.g., ad hoc problem-solving meeting). In order to
understand the task responsibility and performance accountability
involved in the decision-net, in the analysis of task roles, we focus
our attention on a) who initiates the process, b) who is being
consulted, c) who is kept informed, d) who is authorized to make the
choice, e) who supervises the process, and f) who implements the
decision.
To accomplish a decision in an organizational context, a
decision-net [*] that links the following units together can usually be
identified:
1) direct decision-maker(s) - in case of collective decisions, the
direct decision-maker could be more than one party,
2) indirect decision-makers - particularly the units which are either
controlling the immediate upstream/downstream decisions (in terms of
work flow) or performing an immediate supervisory function,
[*]: Connolly [1977, p.2091 used a term "decision-specific
communication net" to stress two roles involved in a net: decisional and
informational. Other typology can be found in, for instance, Barker, et
al [1979, p. 1641, and Merrell [1981].
3) information units which provide information (due to the fact that
they have access to certain information that forms in part the decision
base of some decision units) but, in principle, perform no
decision-making function, and
4) action units which perform the decision-taker's role and implement
the decision when the outcome of the process is an actionable decision.
In short, the decision-net is a decision-specific team structure -
embedded in the mutual-dependence of the underlying work units as well
as the organization of the controlling system - which integrates several
individual-based microscopic decision-making processes into a team-based
macroscopic decision-making process.
Decison Net:Characters, Context and Integration Media
The nature of the decision net - in terms of the media which
actually link the individual units into an integral net as well as the
specific participants evoked in the macro-process - is basically
characterized by the nature of the decision problem.
As mentioned in the previous section (2.2.1), the decision problems
arising in an organization vary widely in nature, e.g., open problem,
semi-open problem, and closed problem. The procedural strategy which is
most appropriate for solving each of those problems also varies
accordingly. For instance, for problems with a principal consensus on
values (e.g., concerning the objectivs, criteria, or- outcome
preference), the primary decision-making strategy either follows certain
structured solution procedures (e.g., routine and repetitive tasks); or
through professional judgement based on some prediction data (e.g.,
longer range factually uncertain planning tasks); while for the problem
without agreement on the valuational premises, the solution must be
reached through negotiation and compromise [Thompson and Tuden, 1959,
Tuggle, 1978, p.78]. Another important dimension concerning the nature
of a decision problem is the extent of time-pressure, i.e., whether it
is a crisis problem awaiting an immediate response, or a routine
operating problem able to be solved at a regular pace, or an opportunity
exploring problem with no specific deadline [Brightman, 1982].
By and large, for the routine, repetitive operating problem, the
participants involved in a decision-net are normally standardized, and
formal information channels are developed as the integration media.
Specifically, for real-time tasks, telephone calls (for geographically
dispersed operations) and face-to-face conferences are essential, and
usually the chronological sequence of the dialogue is also standardized.
For daily routines, the morning report systems and daily operating
conference could be effective [Eilon, 19681. While for the crisis
problem, conceivably the actors which are evoked in the decision-net
depend on the decision issue encountered, and all available and most
effective media (but not necessarily efficient, Galbraith, 1977, p. 3)
will be employed in the communication process. As to the planning tasks
or negotiation problems, the primary participants to perform the
decision function are usually problem-specific, but the secondary
participants - who act in a facilitative capacity, i.e., to gain or
provide information, further technical expertise, or serve as a
connector linking to other groups - could vary from time to time
depending on the contingencies [Merrell, 1981, pp.297-3021. Effective
mechanisms for solving this category's problem (planning / negotiation)
could be an interdisciplinary task force [Bass, 19751, collective
bargaining meeting, etc. Finally, the opportunity-exploring type
problems, in our opinion, basically refer to two kinds of tasks: the
general R&D function, and the function of senior management's supporting
staff who perform as a think-tank performing an off-line analysis
function [section 2.1.3]. The decision-net for this type of problem is
least-restricted, and the major media could be project reports,
seminars, or result briefings.
C. Team Decision-Making Processes at Work
The utilization of the decision-net, from the individual decision
maker's (individual person or group of persons) standpoint, is as a
vehicle which facilitates its acquisition of information concerning
uncontrollables; while from the organization controlling function's
standpoint, the decision-net is an operational mechanism for achieving
coordination among mutually-dependent decision units, because in
principle through the functioning of the decision-net, each
decision-maker can determine whether his intended action will enhance
his contribution to the organizational goal, given the intended actions
of other decision-makers. In practice, the process of coordination can
be analyzed through two dimensions, i.e., 1) procedural - concerning the
implementation of the process, and 2) substantive - concerning the
rationale of the process. They are discussed in turn as follows.
Coordination: Role Influence
Simon [1976, p. 220] argued that "organizational behavior is a
complex network of decisional processes, all pointed toward their
influence upon the behaviors of the operatives - those who do the actual
... work of the organization." March and Simon [1958, p.181] mentioned
that a key effect of the group on the problem-solving process is the
modificaton in the problem solution produced by direct social influence.
Drucker [1977, chapter 30] pointed out that communication is subjective
and perceptual, or more specifically, in the process of communication
not only objective information is being transmitted, but also the
contextual factors such as mutual perceptions between the communicating
parties. Meyer [1978, p.44] summarized that interpersonal influence can
be exerted through at least five strategies: persuasion, coercion,
reward, personal authority (legitimate or referent), and expert power.
Emerging from the above arguments is the notion that the
decision-making process embodied in a decision-specific communication
net is in part a mutual influence process between the participants.
Each task-role taker exerts, implicitly or explicitly, influence over
others. This notion of role influence [Katz and Kuhn, 1978, Chapter 7;
Barker, et al, 1979, p.166] is particularly important to the analysis of
mutual intervention behavior across responsibility lines. To amplify,
March and Simon [1958, p.1791 pointed out that, if a decision-maker
cannot find a feasible solution within the search space under his
control, he tends to intervene in the uncontrollables so as to alter the
solution' constraint set, the decision criteria, or to redefine the
problem itself. In this kind of situations, the basis and strategies
available to the decision unit in question through which he can exert
influence on other actors in the decision-net become vital.
Coordination: Means Control and Ends Control
As to the rationale of the process which leads to the effect of
coordination, there are at least two principal alternatives: one is to
exercise influence to limit the feasible set of actions of the decision
unit concerned; the other is to exercise influence to alter the
consequences of certain given actions of the decision unit in concern
[Neuberger and Duffy, 1976, p.26; Ouchi and Maguire, 1975; Miler, 1980,
p.39]. The former can be called the means-control approach (relevant to
those tasks interrelated in actions), while the latter can be called the
ends-control approach (relevant to those tasks interrelated in
consequences) [refer to Section 2.2.2A].
Means Control. To elaborate, the means-control approach requires the
knowledge that reliably links the controlling activities to the
controlled performance, because without such knowledge, means-control
may fail to achieve the coordination goal. Operational practices in
this category include, for instance, 1) general policies, or regulatory
guidelines, 2) operating plans or schedules, 3) various standard
operation procedures (SOPs), 4) on-line process monitoring, and 5)
specific action orders [Miles, 1980, p.39; Hampton, et al, 1978, Chapter
9; Tuggle, 1978, p.42; Newman, 1975, p.61. The allowable extent of
discretion implied by the above means-control practices are different -
ranging from relatively broad (e.g., policy guidelines) to virtually
null (e.g., specific action order). A substantial amount of research
and theory suggests that the performance of relatively routine tasks,
with relatively mechanistic technology, is facilitated by comprehensive
means-control mechanisms that closely regulate the controlling behavior
[Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, Woodward, 1965, Perrow, 1970]. In a
transportation controlling system, the means-control mechanisms are
usually pervassive and comprehensive: higher level activities are
generally coordinated through policy guidelines, operating plans and
schedules, while lower level activities are closely coordinated through
SOPs, on-line monitoring and direct action orders.
Ends Control. As to the ends-control approach, it includes at least two
practical strategies: one is pre-action oriented, e.g., through the
application of some motivational mechanisms that deliberately affect the
intrinsic and extrinsic reward conditions of the person to be
coordinated, so as to encourage him to pursue certain ends in common
interest [Hampton, et al, p.539]; the other is post-action oriented,
e.g., through the installation of cybernetic mechanisms that collect and
feed back performance indices, so as to facilitate the self-correction
of the unit to be coordinated in order to accomplish certain
predetermined goals (which are represented in the same measures as the
performance indices used). Formal goal-setting procedures, such as the
MBO system, can be incorporated with this cybernetic mechanism, to
ensure the goal acceptability as well as to inspire the motivation in
achieving the goal [Tuggle, 1978, chapter 5]. In short, ends-control is
most suitable to the situation where exceptions and unanticipated events
are frequently encountered in the work process, or when a variety of
means may be used to reach a desired end [Miles, 1980, p.40], or when
creativity is critical to the success of the conduct.
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D. Team-Support Systems - An Emerging Concept
The practical purpose of studying the organizational
decision-making behavior is to improve the organization's controlling
function. Emerging from the above discussion are two fundamental design
issues: 1) how to better structure a task-team, and 2) how to enhance
the process of coordination among the team members to improve the
efficiency of the team decision process as well as the quality of the
interdependent decisions as a whole.
The notion of decision base [Section 2.2.2B] gives us important
clue to the issue, because conceptually the effect of communication can
be measured by the difference between the information required and the
information available (routinely received) in a decision-base. More
specifically, the conceivable difference between the decision before
communication and the decision after a specific stage of communication
indicates the effect of communication. Given a decision task, to
improve the efficiency of the decision process, one can 1) reduce the
need for communication by increasing the information available
(routinely received information) to the key decision unit to match the
difference defined above, or 2) reduce the information required by
re-arranging the relationships of the underlying work units to eliminate
some of the above -differences. By both tokens, the effective
decision-net will become smaller due to the removal of certain
information units or interdependent decision units in the net. However,
the application of the first strategy - increasing the available
information in a unit's decision base - should be handled with care
because it may involve the issue of information-overload (which is a
subject of the next section 2.2.3).
The Design of Team Support Systems. The second strategy mentioned above
is basically related to the design of decision net. More specifically,
as discussed in the preceding sections, the performance of a decision
net is a function of the following factors: 1) the organizational units
included in the net and the task roles they played, 2) the nature of the
integration media, 3) availability of mutual influence bases and
influence strategies among the team members, and 4) the substance of
information (means-related, ends-related, etc.) transmitted in the
communication channels. The key to the design of a decision net is to
match the performance of the net with the nature of the decision issue
(e.g., routine or novel, operating or strategic, etc.). The systems
with the capability to provide support for the above four factors so as
to advance the coordination effect of a team-based decision-making
process may be called team-support systems.
The structure of the lower level decision-nets is usually
well-defined by the nature of the physical work, and the need to operate
such decision-nets is usually well acknowledged. The issue left to this
class of team-support systems is the efficiency of the communication
media as well as the effectiveness of the interfunctional influence
bases and strategies. However, for high level control tasks, the task
per se is usually not well-defined; in consequence, the structure or
even the existence of the corresponding decision-net may become highly
questionable, not to mention the decison-net-specific communication
mechanism. Therefore, in the analysis of the high level control tasks,
the real challenge is how to identify the control tasks (work units) in
the first place, and how to specify the decision-making process as well
as the underlying decision-net. Only after these two problems have been
clarified can we then proceed to deal with issues concerning
team-support systems: the analysis of the participants and their role
sets, the associated communicaiton media, the involved influence basis,
and the information contents to be transmitted.
In conclusion, organizational process, to some extent, can be
characterized by the team-based decision process which is composed of,
but distinct from, the individual decision process. In a paper
discussing the research perspective of the decision support system, Keen
[1980, p.6] pointed out that compared with the personal support system,
the group and organizational support systems "require a very different
theoretical base which is so far lacking". This study, in part,
represents an endeavor in this direction. In this section, we have
analyzed the nature of organization decision-making process - in terms
of its underlying rationale (the notion of decision base), its structure
(decision-net, task roles), its function (mechnaism and process of
coordincation and communication) - as well as synthesize various
notions into a single construct, namely, the team-support systems, which
may serve as an integral conceptual framework to guide the diagnosis and
design of organizational decision-making processes. In Chapter 3, we
shall further discuss some operational techniques which can be used, in
association with the framework proposed above, to acquire specific data
for the diagnosis and design of team-based decision support systems.
2.2.3 Individual Decision-Making
An individual person is an organization's fundamental unit for
making decisions and exercising control over the performance of the
organization. Therefore, an essential element in the diagnosis of the
controlling function of an organization is to understand the individual
decision-making behavior. Because our interest in studying individual
decision behavior is with pragmatic aim of improving performance, the
approach we take is to consider individual manager as a human
information processor and to identify his strengths and weaknesses
through the analysis of the cognitive process involved in his
decision-making behavior. The eventual goal is to specify the
principles necessary to the design of individual-based decison-aid
systems for various decision issues and contexts.
A. Human Information Processing Systems
The notion of human information processor [Newell and Simon, 1972;
Lindsay and Norman, 1977; Mayer, 19811 assumes that all humans come
equipped with the same basic information processing systems. Based on
Mayer's synthesis (1981, p.24 1, the main components of the human
information processing systems (HIPS) include ( as shown in Exhibit
2-2-5):
Sensor Buffer (SB). Information coming from the outside world
impinges on our sense receptors and is first held (but fades very
rapidly) in its raw physical form in a sensory buffer.
Short-term Memory (STM). This component may convert the raw
sensory information into another modality (e.g., visually presented
letters into sound, etc.). The holding capacity of STM is limited
to about seven items. Items are lost from STM when they are bumped
out by new imcoming items (overloading) or when they are not
actively rehearsed. STM can be thought of as conscious memory - it
80
Exhibit 2-2-5
HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS
(Source: Mayer, 1981)
Response
STM LTM
Capacity: Large i Capacity: Limited to About Capacity: Unilmited
7 Chunks Mode! Organized & Mean-
Mode: Exeact & Sensory Mode: Echo ing ful
Duration: Brief Duration: Temporary Duration: Permanent
Loss: Time Decay Loss: Displacement or Fallure Loss: Retrieval Fallure or
to Rehearse Interference
holds all that a person can be aware of at one time - and as a
scratch pad on which we perform mental operations such as mental
arithmetic.
Long-term Memory (LTM). If information is held in short-term
memory, there are encoding processes that allow it to be
transferred to long-term memory. LTM is practically unlimited in
capacity, and does not fade with time. However, items may be lost
because new information blocks the routes for retrieval of
information from LTM. LTM can be thought of as an organized
storehouse of information, in which each item must be found by
following a search path.
Our interest is concentrated on the last two components: LTM ad
STM. In an analogy to the three-component machine information
processing system - memory, processing unit and input/out device - the
function of the STM is very much like the working storage space of the
processing unit, while the LTM is the main memory component [Newell and
Simon, 1972, p.808].
Limited Short-Term Memory
The practical implications associated with the notion of limited
human short-term memory are primarily twofold. One is concerning with
the principle of bounded rationality [Simon, 19551, the other is
relating to the notion of information overload [Miller, 1956; Miller,
1960; Driver and Streufert, 1969].
Bounded Rationality. The principle of bounded rationality suggests that
human is organisms of limited cognitive and computational capacity
(basically referring to the nature of STM). In response to these
limitations, simplificaiton (heuristics) is deliberatedly introduced
into the human search and choice mechanisms. To amplify, due to the
restriction imposed by the capacity of short-term memory, we cannot
generate all the admissible alternatives of a decision problem and
compare their relative merits within practical computational limits; and
because we cannot see all of the potential choices, there is no way for
us to recognize the best alternative. In effect, optimizing is replaced
by satisficing - we satisfice by looking for alternatives in such a way
that an acceptable solution can generally be found after moderate search
effort [*].
Information Overload. George Miller [1956] pointed out that the amount
of information which a human can hold in short-term memory and process
effectively has a common limit of seven chunks. James Miller [19601
indicated that, in case of overload of information input, many forms of
dysfunctional behavior may occur, such as 1) omission - failing to
process some of the information whose inputs are difficult to process
but are really critical, 2) error - processing informaiton incorrectly
due to misinterpretation and inappropriate selective perception, 3)
queueing or delaying the processing of information to ease the operation
of the individual receiver, or 4) escaping from the task. Driver and
Streufert [1969] observed that the relationship between the amount of
information input and the amount of information actually used is an
inverse U shape curve, i.e., beyond some maximum load point, the more
information is received by the decision-maker, the less information is
actually used in the decision [Exhibit 2-2-6]. Moreover, in an
overloading condition, decision-makers will usually use not only
[*]: M. L. Manheim [19661 argued that "optimal process" is not equal
to optimal action.
Exhibit 2-2-6
INFORMATION OVERLOAD PHENOMENON
(Source: Driver & Streufert, 1969)
Information
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Overloading
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less informaton, but will also lose their normal decision speed.
Ironically, Driver and Mock [1975, p. 492] cited that "users invariably
prefer more data even past the point of maximum level of information
processing and conceptual abstract. Thus users' capacity and preference
for information do not seem to coincide." Simon [1973, p.270 ] concluded
that, in an information-rich environment, "the scarce resource is not
information; it is processing capacity to attend to information."
Strategies to Break Through the Bottleneck. To summarize, we should
nevertheless clarify a point: The notions of bounded rationality and
satisficing behavior do not negate the desire to pursue a higher level
of quality in human decision; nor does the notion of information
overload preclude the possibility of using more complete information in
a given decision so as to improve its quality. The key question is: Do
we have any effective strategy to break through the bottleneck of human
information-processing imposed by the limited capacity of human
cognition? Fortunately, the answer is yes. There are at least three
strategies which can overcome the limits: 1) use of organized human
information-processing capacity through deliberate organization design
to breakthrough the individual limitation 2) exploitation of the
capacity and flexibility of human long-term memory, and 3) utilization
of external aids [Lindsay and Norman, 1977]. The first strategy has
been discussed in precededing sections [Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2]. The
second and the third strategies will be elaborated on in the rest of
this section.
Long-Term Memory: Structure and Function
Although there is an overload point of. information input in the
human decision process, the amount of information actually used in a
given decision differs from individual to individual [Driver and
Streufert, 1969; Driver and Mock, 1975; Libby, 1981]. More
specifically, if seven chunks [Miller, 1956] are the maximum amount of
information which can be accommodated by human STM, then the detailed
contents (e.g., in terms of the most fundamental information unit -
bite) in each chunk are different from person to person, i.e., some
individuals can use the limited STM more skillfully and efficiently than
others do. A key factor which causes the above difference is the degree
of sophistication of human LTM with respect to the decision problem in
question; in other words, this is the occasion where experience and
knowledge come into play [Libby, 1981, chapter 4]. Two notions are
essential to the understanding of the function and the role of LTM in
the human cognitive process: one concerns with the theory of knowledge
strucutre, and the other the process of cognition.
Knowledge Representation Frame. Minsky [19741 proposed a frame theory
for the representation of knowledge, or more specifically, for the
conceptualization of the general structure of LTM and its function in
human cognition process. He suggested:
"When one encounters a new situation ... , one selects from
memory a structure called a frame. A frame is a data-structure
for representing a stereotyped situation ... [A]ttached to each
frame are several kinds of information. Some of this
information is about how to use the frame. Some is about what
one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if
these expectations are not confirmed." [see Winston, 1977,
p.180]
Simon [1981, p.104] reinterpreted the same concept as follows:
"We can think of the memory as a large encyclopedia or library,
the information stored by topics (nodes), liberally
cross-referenced (association links), and with an elaborate
index (recognition capability) that gives a direct access
through multiple entries to the topics."
The practical utility of the frame theory is that it sheds light on
the mental process of an expert, e.g., an experienced manager. Our
interest is concerning with how he integrates his substantive knowledge
with a few general procedures to move the decision process from the
search for symptoms to the choice of alternative courses of action
[Simon, 1981, p.110; Miller, 1975, p.64],. To elaborate this point, we
can put the general knowledge-oriented frame theory into a managerial
context to examine an experienced manager's decision-specific cognitive
process, i.e., his decision heuristics.
Cognition Process. In this study, we conceive of decision heuristics as
a decision-maker's pattern of organizing information contained in his
decision base [Section 2.2.2B] and his process of transforming this
information into a decision. Given the notion of the knowledge
representation frame, we are allowed to investigate the intermediate
stages of the decision process. Experiments in many different
disciplinary areas [Gorry, 1967; Simon, 1981; Libby, 1981] suggest that
the hypothesis-driven information search is a key characteristic of
expert cognitive process. Based on Libby's synthesis [1981, Chapter 4],
the decision strategy of an expert usually bears the following general
characteristics:
1) He initiates the information search activities based on
some standard lists of questions which lead to the development
of a general overall picture of the problem.
2) Through training and experience, he has developed a large
complex associative memory (a well-developed frame of
substance-specific knowledge) which relates symptoms and
evidences (e.g., concerning sufficient or necessary
conditions) to prototype problems - these relationship may
take the form of models of causality between events and
consequences.
3) A small number (usually less than seven) of hypothetical
solutions - which most correspond to the prototypes formed
during the standard "work-up" - are retrieved from memory.
4) These hypothetical solutions drive further information
search which is aimed primarily at supporting and modifying
the more likely applicable solution and eliminating the less
likely ones. Such a hypothesis-directed search and adjustment
process will continue until a satisfactory solution is
reached.
In short, an expert's decision heuristics make complex tasks
cognitively tractable; more specifically, well-developed decision
heuristics enable the decision maker to reduce the information input as
the decision process proceeds as well as to restrict the information
seeking to promising areas. Both are essential characteristics of
efficient decision-making, because they utilize the limited STM more
productively and cope with the problem of information overload more
effectively. Inexperienced persons are normally unable to organize the
wide-ranging information into a coherent data structure, e.g., in terms
of predetermined prototypes, and are usually forced to chunk the
information into small portions which quickly lead to information
overload and consequently, in most cases, yield poor quality decisions.
Technically speaking, for a given information-processing task
(e.g., a decision), there is never a fixed rule as to what information
must be stored within the memory and what actionsmust be performed by
the processor. In general, there is a trade-off between 1) doing a lot
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of processing and requiring little information to be stored within the
memory, and 2) doing little processing but requiring a lot of informaton
to be stored within the memory [Lindsay and Norman, 1977, p.595]. The
application of the standard check list, prototypes and outstanding
hypothetical solution set in an expert's decision process represents a
strategy that uses the retrieval of processed or semi-processed
information from the well-developed knowledge frame of LTM so as to save
the otherwise demanded on-line processing effort as well as the huge
working storage space (in the STM) associated with the processing unit
in human mind. In this regard, Simon [1981, p.105] has made a comment
on experienced intuition. He argued that most intuitive leaps are acts
of recognition - when a familiar pattern is encountered, the expert
recognizes not only the situation which he is in, but also the action
which might be appropriate for dealing with it, because according to
Simon's hypothesis, the information associated with familiar patterns
(prototype problems) may include knowledge about what to do about them
(stereotype solutions). In summary, the hypothesis-driven behavior
exhibited in expert's problem-solving process is a strategy of applying
semi-processed information stored in LTM so as to save the real-time
information-processing effort.
The Limits of the Expert Decision Heuristics
However, an expert's decision heuristics are by no means
trouble-free. One basic principle underlying an expert's heuristics is
the retrieval of relevant patterns (prototype problems and the
corresponding solutions) he encounters in a decision event. A
conceivable problem is concerning the perceived availability of relevant
patterns. Many studies [summarized in Slovic, 1982, p.162] indicate
that intelligent individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood of the
occurance of imaginable and memorable events; in effect, many novel
events may easily be perceived invalidly. Therefore, there is normally
a systematic bias associated with a decision maker's perception of
availability of prototypes and outstanding solutions for the decision
task he is handling. This availability bias could yield retrieval
failure which results in a wrong diagnosis of a situation and
consequently an irrelevant solution to the problem. Conceivably, high
level, innovative-in-nature, ill-structured strategic problems are
particularly vulnerable to this type of bias.
Furthermore, after
it is valid to the
solution is started from
the retrieved pattern,
the implications of.addi
[summarized in Slovic,
typically a tendency
decision-maker's state
the retrieval of the relevant pattern (assuming
situation encountered), the search for a final
the set of hypothetical solutions anchored to
and this anchor is then adjusted to accommodate
tional information. According to many studies
1982, p.163 and Libby, 1981,pp.65-68], there is
for insufficient adjustments, given the
of knowledge; in effect, an anchoring bias
occurs. Practical implications of this bias aretype of
decision-makers usually exhibits regressional behavior [Bowman, 1963]
regarding a given category of decision task, therefore systematic bias
may be associated with each individual's decision in that particular
category, i.e., constantly overresponse or underresponse as compared
with a certain norm, and 2) it is possible that decision rules
(including both solution's design specifications and consequence's
evaluation criteria) applied by the decision-makers are inflexible to
the contingencies of the individual decision task.
In conclusion, long-term memory is an effective resort for breaking
through the limitation of human information processing capacity
restricted by the capacity of short-term memory. Experienced decision
heuristics, which are characterized by hypothesis-driven information
search and utilization of semi-processed information, are valuable
assets in solving problems. However, to attack a complex decision
problem, the human informaton-processing systems alone - even equiped
with experienced or educated decision heuristics - may still suffer from
various rationality bounds, e.g., the availability bias and anchoring
bias as mentioned before. And in many decision instances, although
trained heuristics could reduce HIPS' work load significantly, the
reamining information processing requirements, e.g., complicated
computations pertaining to a rational intelligence, design or choice
behavior - may still be too much a burden to be handled as a mental
process. Therefore, to further breakthrough the retionality bound, in
the domain of individual decision-making, one effective (but may be not
the last) resort is the external aids to the human
information-processing systems [Bailey, 1982].
B. External Decision Aid Systems
Following the notion of decision base [Section 2.2.2B], to reach a
decision for any given task, the decision-maker should bridge the gap
between the information requirement [*] and information available. To
do so, he can request more needed information 1) outwardly from other
persons, and/or 2) inwardly through the transformation of the
information available in his own decision base with or without external
information-processing aids. The approaches concerning the
outward-oriented process and the inward-oriented process without
external aids have already been discussed in the foregoing Sections (
2.2.2 and 2.2.3A), respectively. In the following section we shall
examine what external decision-aid systems can specifically do to
support a human to accomplish a decision task.
External aids to the human information-processing systems range
widely from simple tools such as the paper-and-pencil to a highly
sophisticated machine such as a general or special purpose digital
computer. In the following section, our interest is focused on how to
integrate the power of modern computer-based information technology with
the strengths of human heuristics to enhance the individual
decision-maker's capability and to advance decision quality.
[*] Many studies, e.g., those summarized in Ungson, et al, [1981],
suggest that human heuristics are specific to the task or problem
encountered. For instance, the less understood the problem is, the more
speculative and wide ranging is the search for clues that might have
some relevance to the problem; while the more the problem is understood,
the more selective is the informaton search. In other words, the
perceived information requirement varies with the nature of the decision
task.
Types of the Computer-based Information Systems
A computer-based decision-aid system represents a concept of the
role of computer within the decision-making process [Keen, 1980, p.1].
To define the share of role a computer can play in a man-machine
collaborated decision process, Mason [1969] suggested a typology. He
first identified five key elements of a total information processsing
system: source, data, prediction and inference, value and choice, and
action, then according to the inclusion or exclusion of the above five
elements, he defined four distinct types of computerized information
systems [Exhibit 2-2-7] as well as their corresponding application
arena:
1) Databank: for ill-defined open problems
2) Predictive System: for problems with known causation but lack
of preference consensus
3) Decision-Making System: for routine, closed problems but with
wide-range variable operating contingencies
4) Decision-Taking System: for routine, standardized problems with
stable operating environment
Although Mason failed to include one essential element of the decision
process - the alternative search or solution design phase, his typology
does shed light on two critical issues. First, it indicates the need to
recognize the limits of the computer role in various decision contexts.
These limitations stem primarily from the inherent nature of computer
operations: it cannot tolerate -any ambiguity in its operating
instructions nor any unspecified premises needed by the subsequent
operations; therefore, in a decision process, for those phases which are
characterized by insufficient knowledge or controversial preferences (or
both), the human role is indispensible for carrying through the process
Exhibit 2-2-7
COMPUTER ROLES AND MANAGEMENT DECISION CONTEXTS
(Source: Mason, 1969)
1) Information Processing Systems' Design Elements:
2) Alternative Designs:
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SOURC DATA PREDICTION, VALUE, ATOINFERENCE CHOICE
computer
Decision Context: Standardized Jobs with Stable Operating Environment
[*]. Second, it implies that a different type of decision has its
intrinsically different information-processing requirements and
consequently demands a different type of information-processing system
(i.e., different share on the roles of computer and human). In other
words, no single type computer-based information system can satisfy the
information processing requirements for the decision tasks at all
organization levels, because, as argued in Section 2.2.1, each
organization level is taking care of qualitatively different decision
tasks.
Decision Support Systems
Specific Utilities of Computer. Mason's typology is useful to
differentiate the roles of human and computer in accordance with their
relative strengths and weaknesses in various decision contexts. As to
the specific function the the computer should perform in computer-based
decision-aid systems - i.e., decision support systems (DSS) - Sprague
and Carison [1982, Chapter 4] summarize the following four user-oriented
utilities :
[*]: Along a similar line of thought, Keen and Morton [1978, Chapter 4]
argue that the tasks that need to be supported by computer-based
decision-aid systems are those "semi-structured" in nature. By
semi-structured tasks, they mean those decisions which are
ill-structured in solution procedures as well as those which are
structured in procedures but with a difficult to manage context [p.94].
However, in this study we consider the terms "structured" and
"semi-stucutred" confusion and observe. that, even for a task with
structured procedures as well as with managible context, external
decision support is sometimes still needed - not only due to the volume
of information to be processed but also the variable and uncertain
information contents. Exploring, testing and probing are indispensible
activities to such a decision task. Therefore, we tend to define the
role of computer played in a man-machine collaborated decision system
directly by the underlying characteristics of the decision task to be
Ž,upported rather than the notion of "problem structure".
1) Representation: the provision of contexts to facilitate
the conceptualization of the information available and the
communication of the emerging ideas, problems or proposals as
well as to invoke or stimulate further search action.
2) Memory aids: the provision of a) an indexed database of
internal or external information sources, b) working storage
for saving the information in process, and c) linking function
for cross-reference of various working storage and databases.
3) Operations (analysis and information manipulation): the
processes concerning intelligence (diagnose and define the
problem), design (specify ends and develop means) and choice
(predict consequences and determine preferences).
4) Control Mechanism (of the decision aid systems): the
mechanism allows the user to dictate the operating and
interaction of the above three capabilities of decision
support systems to fit his own decision need, such as style,
skills and knowledge.
Conceivably, the emphasis of these utilities in a system will
differ according to the nature of the decision task to be supported by
the system. For instance, for systems designed to aid the resolution of
ill-defined problems, the memory and representation functions would be
the two most important utilities, which allow the decision-maker to be
exposed to a wide-range of sources of information in various forms and
combinations, so as to stimulate his imagination, bring forth ideas and
help him gain insights into the problem. For systems installed to aid
well-defined routine tasks, all utility components can be designed as
task-specific, e.g., the control mechanism should be geared exactly to
the decision-maker's grand heuristics,. the analysis and information
manipulation component should be the core of the system to efficiently
enhance the task-specific search-and-choice process of human mind, and
the representation and memory aid components should be tailored
primarily to facilitate and support the core search-and-choice process.
As to the semi-open problem [Section 2.2.1C], the decision-aid systems
should be equipped with powerful representation and operation (analysis
and manipulation) components to facilitate communication among concerned
organizational units and to provide efficient analytical feedback for
further discussion and refinement of decisions.
Components of Decision Support Systems. The technological components -
required to support the representation, memory, operations, and control
functions - of decision support systems, according to Montgomery and
Urban [1969] and Sprague and Carlson [1982], can be categorized into the
following three parts.
1) Data Base and Data Base Management Systems: A set of data
(historical, user generated, or model generated) relevant to
the decision task; and a battery of computer programs used to
a) create, maintain, access and update the data base, b)
subset, combine and aggregate data, c) support the memory
requirements regarding the operations of the system.
2) Model Base and Model Base Management Systems: A collection
of modelling subroutines (cut-and-dried, ad hoc, user-built,
operational / tactical / strategic modles, etc.); and a
calling mechanism for invoking the model base which allows the
user to develop a solution process composed of a sequence of
primitive modles (modules).
3) Dialog Interface and Dialog Management Systems: A system of
representation and control mechanisms which enables the user
to communicate with data and model and supports the
interactive modeling by which decision maker analytically
explore, test, and probe the nature of a problem and its
solution; and systems which are able to generate and modify
the dialog interface.
Ideally, the dialog component should be designed operationally
flexible to support a variety of hypothesis-directed search processes
involved in and facilitate the preparation of standard lists of
questions for various decision environments. The model component should
enable the user to formulate and test hypothetical solutions
efficiently, to interrupt the modelling operations to examine the
intermediate results of the computer operations, run model segments in a
variety of sequences to suit the nature of the decision problem, and
change parameters (factual and valuational) to accommodate subjective
judgement as the user's perception about the problem changes. The data
base should be designed in accordance with the notion of decision-base,
and its management systems should enable the user to examine and
manipulate conveniently both information contained in the decision base
so as to link symptoms and evidences to prototype problems or to gain
new insights into the relationships among data through data formating
and display operations.
C. Integrating Human Information Processign Systems with Computer
Decision support systems are computer based external aids to the
human information processing systems (HIPS). The foregoing discussion
indicates that DSS may support HIPS in a decision making process in
following ways: 1) augmenting the limited capacity of the human STM
(mainly through the computer's memory aids, operations and
representation capacities), 2) enhancing the utilization of LTM and
supporting the intermediate stages of a decision process (mainly through
the representation, control and operations capacities of computer), 3)
saving human effort in the mechanical calculation and representation
activities (e.g., graphing) and allowing the decision-maker to
manipulate both processes (calculation and representation) more
accurately and efficiently (through computer's operations,
representation and control capacities), as well as 4) indexing and
cross-relating the information both in-process and in-memory more
systematically and precisely (through the memory aids capacities).
Tiic above four major functions collectively enable decision-maker
to be released, to a large extent, from the original bound of human
decision rationality, and allow him to 1) have more time spending on
the creative part of decision process - exploring more alternatives, 2)
consider more subtle interactions and trade-offs among alternatives and
consequences, and 3) cummulate the understanding of fragments of a whole
problem by embedding these fragments in a more comprehensive and better
structured conceptual frame.
To effectively integrate the power of computer technology with the
strengths of human mind to match different information processing needs
involved in various decision contexts, the design of DSS must begin with
an analysis of the decision-maker and of the decision-making process
that the DSS is to support. Idealy, DSS should also be designed to
avoid or minimize the potential bias of human heuristics (e.g., the
availability bias and anchoring bias) through the functioning of certain
built-in bias detection (prevention) elements which are able to flag
pitfalls for the decision-maker during the decision-making process. For
instance, if a first-line manager is diagnosed as having a tendency to
overlook a particular consequence in his decision (e.g.,
work-in-process inventory cost), then higher level management may refine
the choice module (which supports the evaluation of solution's
consequences) of the first-line manager's DSS which will highlight
automatically the performance indicators of that overlooked area. As a
result, the first-line manager is forced to consider the usually
neglected consequences in such a the computer supported decision-making
environment and the quality of the resultant decision is hopefully to be
improved.
In conclusion, decisions can only be as good as 1) the quality of
information on which decisions are based, and 2) the quality of the
decision heuristics applied in the decision-making process. The
function of decision support systems is to enhance the capability of the
human information-pro-cessing systems so as to improve the quality of the
above two determinants as well as ultimately the quality of decisions in
a variety of decision contexts [Exhibit 2-2-8].
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Exhibit 2-2-8
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND MAN-MACHINE DECISION SYSTEMS
STIMLVltS
DSS DIALOG COMPONENT: Representation
& Control Functions
MODEL COMPONENT: DATA COMPONENT:
Operation Function Memory-Aid Function
. . . . IIH
* LTM: Long-term Memory
STM: Short-term Memory
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2.3 Summary of Chapter 2
The purpose of this chapter is to conceptualize both the
controlling system and the system being controlled to provide us with
the needed substantive knowledge frame for the diagnosis as well as the
subsequent presentation of the performance of transportation systems.
Following the dual-system notion and the organization intervention
framework, a key function of the theory of the system being controlled
is to define a set of control objects which, on the one hand,
characterize the underlying technological nature of the controlled
system; on the other hand, can be explicitly assigned - in terms of
decision responsibilities and performance accountabilities - to some
identifiable organization units of the controlling system. These
organization units comprise of individual persons or groups of persons
which have or should have the capacity to control the performance of the
control objects. In this study such control objects are called work
units. In other words, in the conduct of transportation performance
diagnosis, the work units and the organization units as well as their
relationships (both between the two sets of units and within the same
set of units) are our focal points.
2.3.1 The System being Controlled
The delivery of transportation service relies primarily on' the
cycling of a number of resources (e.g., vehicles and crew) on some
supporting facilities (e.g., guideways and terminals). This notion of
resource cycling can be further elaborated into a series of concepts
which will eventually allow us to specify the work units, as well as
their interrelationships and managerial implications.
Resource Cycle, Core Operations and Interface Buffer. A transportation
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operating system is primarily structured in accordance with the flows of
work, in which any operation can be performed only after a successful
execution of some upstream operations. More specifically, because there
are natural orders of operations, which are dictated by the nature of
the technology adopted by a transportation operating system, the
resource cycles (which embody the flows of work) can usually be
systematically fragmented into distinct status or time phases.
Furthermore, these status or time phases can normally be related either
directly to the activities which are essential to the delivery of
transportation service, or to a function of which the primary purpose is
to provide a smooth connection between two interrelated activities. In
this study, the former set of activities is called core operations, and
the latter one is called interface buffers. Thus, from operations
management perspective, most trasportation processes can be thought of
as the transition of various phases of resource cycles which consist of
core operations and interface buffers. The notion of resource cycle
possesses the following features:
1) The resource cycle can be specified in varying degrees of detail;
however, their fundamental elements are either core operation or
operational buffer, or some collection of the above two elements.
2) The interdependence of the cycle componets derived from a resource
cycle can be specified through the analysis of the underlying cycling
process.
3) Different componets involved in a resource cycle demand different
analytical methods and measures for assessing the process, and different
management skill and talent are required accordingly.
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4) Issues concerning other resources can be addressed by adding
appropriate components to the original resource frame so as to broaden
the analysis scope if needed.
The resource cycle framework highlights the cyclic nature of
transportation work flows and the systemic mutual-dependence among
various core operations and operational buffers. Such a framework
provides not only the analysis with perspective, but also effective
heuristics in deriving the hierarchy of performace areas along a
particular resource dimension as well as the control issues concerning
other interacting resources cycles.
Work Unit. To translate the resource cycle components into work units,
we introduce a new term - management cycle, which is comprised of three
distinctive but interrelated phases of activities - planning, execution
and performance review. We argue that the control of individual
resource cycle component involves all three phases of the management
cycle. Therefore, to specify the work units involved in the management
of a selected resource, we can construct a work unit matrix with
resource cycle as the vertical axis and management cycle as the
horizontal axis. The entries of the matrix represent the elementary
work units which collectively define the totality of the tasks to be
controlled concerning a particular resource.
The notion of work unit possesses the following characters: 1) The
elementary work units thus specified may vary in their degree of detail,
depending on how detail we fragment the resource cycle; 2) Depending on
the issues, analysis perspectives and the structure of the controlling
system, the work unit actually assigned to the controlling
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organizational unit may consist of one or many elemetary units; 3) The
work units are interrelated in two ways - one is the technological
interdependence resulting from the underlying resource cycling process,
and the other is the administrative interdependence resulting from the
procedures of management cycle.
Control Task Hierarchy.
Putting the notion of work unit into a time perspective, and by
taking into account the structure of controlling system, we can
categorize the work units identified above into a three-level hierarchy
of control tasks: 1) steering control tasks concerning with the
execution of the cycle components, 2) functional control tasks
concerning with the planning and review of resource cycles (other than
the life cycle of resource), and 3) meta-control tasks concerning with
the planning and review of resource's life cycle as well as issues
relating to the non-circulatory (fixed) resources. After the hierarchy
of control tasks has been specified, the required contrlling functions -
for controlling very disaggregated work units to aggregated macro level
control tasks - can then be identified.
2.3.2 The Controlling System
The work unit's counterpart in thecontrolling system is the
organization unit. Individual person is indeed the most fundamental
unit in an organization. However, to understand the behavior of a
controlling system, in some instance, it is required to study the
performance of more aggregated object than individual person.
Therefore, in this study, we analyze the controlling system through
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three different but interrelated perspectives with gradual
disaggregation, i.e., organization as a whole, work team and individuul
person. Three sets of questions are intended to answer: 1) How the
system as a whole behaves in response to an organization-wide problem?
2) How a group of organization units works together as a team to carry
out a decision-making process? 3) How an individual behaves when he
encounters a decision problem? Our hypothesis is that, through such a
segmented analysis, the results can collectively provide us with a
sufficiently rich descriptive and analytical data to enable us to put
the function of the controlling system into perspective, to conduct
insightful diagnosis concerning the actual system performance, as well
as to develop norms for organization change if needed.
Macro Organization Structure. The first perspective views the system as
a-whole. According to March and Simon [1958], the basic features of an
organization strucuture and function are derived from organization's
problem-solving process, and the departmentation of an organization can
be mapped to a means-ends hierarchy which relates the individual tasks
to the organization purpose. Incorporating the above concepts with
Thompson's [1967] three-level notion of organizational function, this
study considers an organization as a three-level problem-conversion
mechanism which performs three major types of controlling functions
(control cycles) respectively:. 1). steering control - at the lowest
level, which streamlines the physical operations and pursues production
efficiency, 2) functional control - at the middle, which guides and
provides necessary buffers to insulate the low level operations in a
closed system and exercises incremental adjustments (within the bounds
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imposed by the top level) to enable the lower level operations to
accomodate short-run fluctuations, and 3) meta-control - at the top,
which provides the ultimate buffer between the organization and the
external environment and controls the overall systemic structure of the
organization. It is this control cycle which the organization to behave
as an open system and to pursue the effectiveness of the total system.
Failure in the above control cycles indicates malfunction of the
controlling system.
Organizational Team Process. The second perspective empahsizes the
organizational decision-making process. Due to the interdependence of
the transportation process, individual organization unit can rarely have
direct access to all the information needed or control of all the
factors involved in a concerned decision. As a consequence,
decision-making in such a context is not an individualistic behavior but
a team process. To accomplish a decision in a transportation
organization, a decision-net that links the following units together can
usually be identified: 1) the direct decision-maker: the organization
unit which executes decision-making function that directly determines
the performance of the underlying work unit; 2) the indirect
decision-makers: those units which are either controlling the immediate
upstream/downstream decisions (in terms of work flow) or performing an
immediate supervisory function; 3) the information units: those units.
which provide information to support the direct decision-maker's
decision, but in principle perform no decision-making function; and 4)
the action units: those units which perform the decision-taker's role
and implement the decision when it is actionable.
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The performance of a decision net is a function of the following
factors: 1) the organization units included in the net ad the task roles
they played, 2) the nature of the communication and coordination media,
3) avaialability of mutual influence bases and influence strategies
among the team members, and 4) the substance of information transmitted
in the communication channels. The systems with the capability to
provide support to the above factors so as to advance the coordination
effect of a team-based decision making process is called team-support
systems.
Individual Decision-Making Behavior. The third perspective concerns
individual decision-making behavior. The notion of human
information-processing systems is applied. The key theme here is to
identify the strengths and weaknesses of an individual decision-maker
through the analysis of the cognitive process involved in his
decision-making behavior. Two issues of particular interest are 1) the
problems associated with the limited human cognitive capacity -
specifically, the major concern are two phenomena: information-overload
and bounded rationality, and 2) potential biases of individual decision
heuristics.
Computer based decision-support systems (DSS) can provide four
primary functions to support decision-maker: representation, memory
aids, operations and control mechanism. A properly designed DSS should
be able to effectively integrate the strength of human information
processing systems with the power of computer technology, and enable the
decision-maker to: 1) expand his cognitive limits and the rationality
bounds, 2) detect and offset the potential biases of his decision
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heuristics, 3) save his effort in mechnical computation and allow him to
spend more time on creative part of decision process, e.g., exploring
more alternatives, and 4) consider more subtle trade-offs among
alternatives and consequences.
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Chapter 3
INTERVENTION PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES
The conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 for both the
controlling system and the system being controlled provides us with the
needed substantive knowledge frame to govern the organization
intervention process. To complete the development of a diagnostic
system, following Simon's two-components notion (knowledge vs.
procedures) [1981, p. 1101, the next task is to specify a set of
general procedures which can be applied, under the guidance of the
conceptual framework, to the diagnosis and analysis of transportation
operations management systems.
3.0 General Framework
In an analogy to the medical diagnosis [Gorry, 1967), the
organizational diagnosis is an information search and a judgement
process in which the search for relevant information, the structuring of
the information into a useful frame, and the association of particular
symptoms with possible system states are vital. To do so, a set of
systematic procedures which outline the step-by-step sub-tasks to be
undertaken in the organizational diagnosis process is essential.
Moreover, because it is difficult to establish and maintain an
appropriate structure for all the information relevant to the diagnosis
task, certain tools - analytical techniques - are demanded to facilitate
the documentation of the diagnostic information, to highlight the
symptoms and the potential causes of problems, and to enhance the
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generation of the subsequent alternative solutions to problems. This
chapter, as a complement to Chapter 2, is devoted to the development of
methodologies, i.e., the procedues and related techniques for supporting
the diagnosis process.
General Procedures. Organization intervention which aims at improvement
of the organization's performance can be carried out through individual-
or/and organizational- oriented approaches [Michael, et al, 19811, and
along any (or some conbination) of the following dimensions:
1) structural - e.g., creating or eliminating an organization
unit, or redefining the role of a unit,
2) procedural - e.g., refining the process of decision-making or
control,
3) informational - e.g., changing the information flow pattern or
media of communication,
4) behavioral - e.g., modifying the decision-maker's attitude,
5) technical context - e.g., providing delicate decision-support
devices, and
6) substantive context - e.g., changing the underlying technology
of the system to be controlled.
Due to the complicated dynamics involved in the organizational process,
effective intervention usually demands multi-dimensional strategies that
are capable of creating the desired momentum to bring about an
organization change [Huse, 1980].
In the transportation operations management context, following the
dual-system notion and given the knowledge about the two systems, we
propose a dual-system organization intervention process as shown in
Exhibit 3-1-1 [*J. To amplify, due to the distinguishing
*: This exhibit is an elaboration on the substantive part of activities
of Exhibit 1-2-2; procedural activities are included.
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Exhibit 3-1-1
DUAL-SYSTEM ORGANIZATION INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK *
CONTROLLED SYSTEM CONTROLLING SYSTEM
Development of conceptual Development of coneptual
framework and theories framework and theories
IJ
for the technology being for tne controlling
controlled organization
Development of analytical Development of analytical
and descriptive s and descriptive
methodologies -I methodologies
Procedures k techniques Procedures k techniques
III[ I I IT
Assessment and Choice of Alternative Change Plans
Implementation
*: Substantive activities only, procedural ones not included
- See Exhibit 1-2-2.
**: Ideal diagnosis covers organization, team, and individual
three levels' performance.
*H*: Ideal improvement plans may cover organization, team, and
individual three levels' activities.
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Description Phase
Investigation focus: **
>Control Task Hierarchy
)Functional Dependence
>Causality of Individual
Task
Prepara-
tion of
theories
and
method-
ologies
Diagnosis
Stage
Prescrip-
tion
Stage
Action
Stage
Description Phase
Investigation focus: *-
)Meta-Control Structure
)Functional Team Process
)Individual Decision
Heuristics
Analysis Phase - Analyze k Assess Systems' Performance
> Assess Strengths & Weaknesses
) Idehtify Symptoms
> Interprete Causes
> Define Problems
Identification of ideal directions for change and
potential intervention dimensionsp as well as
Development of Alternative Change Plans
e.q.. > Overall Task Meta-Control ***
> Functional Team-Support
> Individual Decision-Support
I .. - - - r --
I I I
%401
II
.i% o
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characteristics of the controlling system and the system being
controlled, as indicated in the exhibit, the diagosis will be carried
out along two parallel but interactive lines, and consequently two sets
of methodologies are required.
Due to the hierarchical nature of the control tasks pertaining to
transportation systems, as well as to keeping the process manageable and
systematic, a three-level - organization, team and individual -
intervention strategy is proposed. Each level implies a different but
interrelated approach to improve the organization performance, namely,
1) refining or improving the macro task management structure, 2)
enhancing or improving the integrating mechanism for multi-functional
team processes, and 3) installing or improving the support systems for
individual decision. In ideal situation, the diagnosis in either system
may be carried out progressively from general to specific. That is, in
both systems, we first intend to sketch a macro picture concerning the
whole system; then we proceed to examine some more detailed
interdependence among functional activities and the interactions among
organizational units; and finally, we get into micro analysis on the
causality of individual decision tasks and the behaviors of individual
decision-maker.
However, the three levels of intervention, in practice, could be a
a multi-faceted iterative process (rather than a simple linear
sequential process without feedback or iterations), in which all three
foci - organization, team and individual - are first examined in a
preliminary way, then all three or part of them are examined in more
detail. The actual emphasis of intervention will depend on the
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following factors:
l)the characteristics of the organization problems in study - a typical
scenario might be: there is a- symptom which brings us into the
situation; we first look quickly at all levels around the symptom; we
then redefine the problem, or maybe focus on different individuals and
different team processes when we shift to more detail.
2)the nature of the intervention process, e.g., the entry point (level
of organization hierarchy and functional area), the organization's
capacity to change, the intervenor's resource constraints (time,
knowledge, skill, etc.).
3)the strategies of intervention, e.g., whether a pilot project is
necessary to establish the intervenor's credibility through the quick
feedback effect of the project.
Techniques. Since the information search at each diagnosis stage varies
in its scope and degree of details, to serve the wide-ranging diagnosis
requirements, we need a variety of methodologies - it is like the
telescope and microscope that have their respective strengths and cannot
replace each other - which collectively are capable of providing us
with both macroscopic and microscopic information.
In the following sections, we shall first propose procedures which
are applicable to the intervention activities - which cover both the
diagnosis and analysis phases in the diagnosis stage of organization
intervention - for each of three levels mentioned above, and secondly,
present various techniques which could support us to proceed the
intervention process.
115
3.1. Diagnosis and Analysis Procedures
3.1.1. Macro-Level Diagnosis - Getting A General Picture
The general procedures for describing the macro-level
transportation operations management systems are proposed as follows.
A. Controlled System
The macro-analysis of the system being controlled is aimed at
developing a general conceptual framework for the systems in analysis.
The procedures are proposed as follows.
1). Anatomize the System Being Controlled
a) Conceptualize the physical process of the specific systems under
study in terms of key work flows [Section 2.1.2A].
b) Translate the work flows into resources cycles [Section 2.1.2A] (in
terms of selected resources particularly relevant to the task in
analysis).
c) Break down the resources cycles into components, identify core
operations and operational buffers, and identify the hierarchical
relationships among the cycle components.
2). Understand Interactions Among Components of Resources Cycles
d) Examine the interactions among cycle components of a particular
resource class, from both perspectives of the individual unit (e.g.,
individual vehicle, or employee) and the resource class as a whole
(e.g., a whole particular vehicle fleet, or a whole class of crew),
through the following two analyses:
d-1) Conduct ends-analysis: identify the purpose of each cycle
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component in analysis - from one particular resource perspective; and
identify the ultimate contribution of this resource to the overall
transportation enterprise's goals.
d-2) Conduct means-analysis: identify the controllable means (options)
available to the management of each cycle component in analysis to
achieve the above identified ends.
e) Examine the interactions among different resources classes, e.g.,
the interactions between vehicle and crew, vehicle servicing and
dispatching, etc.
3). Construct the Control Task Hierarchy
f) identify the work units [Section 2.1.2B] based on the knowledge of
resource cycle components' interrelations, their managerial implications
(drawn from means and ends analysis), and the notion of management cycle
[Section 2.1.2B].
g) classify the work units identified above into a control task
hierarchy [Section 2.1.3]. This hierarchy stands for a strategic
conceptual framework concerning the nature of the system being
controlled in study.
B. Controlling System
The macro-analysis of the controlling system is aimed at
identifying the meta-control structure [Section 2.2.1C] which is the
counterpart of the control task hierarchy in the controlled system.
1). Identify Relevant Organization Units
a) identify the relations between the components of resource cycle to
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functional departments of the organization: the result represents the
general roles (direct or indirect responsibilities) of each department
for managing the task in analysis.
b) Analyze the formal structure of the directly responsible
departments, and understand the specific role of all position holders in
each department in analysis.
c) Identify specific actors: relate work units to specific actors
(organizational units) at various levels in each department.
2). Identify and Describe Task-Actor Relationships
d) identify the authority and accountability (relate them to specific
actors in the organization) for each work units in the control task
hierarchy defined in Section 3.1.1A. This authority/accountability
relationship represents the management structure for the task in
analysis.
e) analyze the actual formal and informal processes of planning,
execution and performance review (evaluation), i.e., the procedural
aspect of the above authority and accountability structure.
3). Diagnose the Actual Function of the Task-Actor Structure
f) develop a normative task-actor structure and its desired
functioning pattern based on the knowledge about the nature of the
underlying work units, the problem context, and general organization
theories.
g) compare the actual structure and function of the task-actor
relations with the normative ones, identify and document their
incongruence, and explain the reasons causing the incongruence.
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h) identify the potential intervention dimensions for improving the
macro controlling performance of the system.
The above diagnosis may serve two purposes: 1) highlighting the symptoms
of deficiencies and malfunctions of the controlling system for the
overall task in analysis, and 2) providing a context for the diagnosis
of detailed functional-level and individual-level controlling behaviors,
if needed.
Summary. One may notice that the analysis and diagnosis procedures
described in Sections 3.1.1A and 3.1.1B are interrelated, specifically,
second set (controlling system) procedures are primarily based on the
results from the first set (controlled system). (Indeed, sometimes one
can learn things in the other direction too.) The underlying hypothesis
is that proper controlling functions must be congruent with the nature
of the process being controlled. Chapter 4 of this study provides an
example in which the above-described procedures together with certain
techniques (which will be disscussed in the second part of this chapter)
are applied to a particular rail operating context.
3.1.2 Functional-Level Diagnosis - Understanding the Detailed
Mutual-Dependence
The purpose of functional diagnosis is to gain more operational
insights' into certain selected areas concerning the underlying causality
and decision processes. More specifically, the objects in the
functional diagnosis are the components of the resource cycle rather
than the whole cycle (or a set of exhaustive work units), and the focus
of the analysis at this level is the detailed mutual-dependence (in
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terms of both the physical processes and the associated controlling
behaviors) among some selected work units, i.e., some subset of the
total task-actor relationships identified in the macro-analysis. The
procedures for analyzing and diagnosing the interdependence of
functional activities are proposed below.
A. Controlled System
The analysis of the system being controlled at the functional level
is aimed at 1) identifying and documenting the mutual dependence among
the key performance areas in terms of detailed causality of the
controllable and uncontrollable variables involved, and 2) refining the
content of work units identified at macro level analysis.
1). Refine the Relevant Work Units
a) From the total control task hierarchy developed from macro analysis,
identify the relevant work units which pertain to the functional area of
interest.
b) Augment, if needed, the above selected set of work units with new
elements which are not part of the original resource cycle hierarchy.
c) refine (from the results of macro analysis) the controllable
variables and uncontrollable variables for each work unit, and examine
the causality among the controllables and uncontrollables of each work
unit.
2). Relate Functional Causality to Overall Control Task Hierarchy
d) Translate the cause and effect factors identified above into
specific functional control tasks, i.e., operational strategies or
policies, as well as in terms of contributions or constraints to the
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overall task goals.
e) Integrate the above functional control tasks into the overall
control task hierarchy.
B. Controlling System
The diagnosis of the controlling system at the functional level is
aimed at: 1) identifying the decision-net (Section 2.2.2B] which takes
care of the interrelated functional work units in the controlled system,
and 2) identifying the actual team process in terms of the processes of
communication and coordinat actors involved.
1). Identify the Relevant Actors
a) Relate the functional work units to organizational units.
b) Identify the formal relationships among the actors, in terms of
authority and responsibility.
2). Identify the Communication Relationships Among the Actors
C) Identify the decision-net enacted for handling the routine and
emergency control tasks in daily operations.
d) Identify the decision-net for high level control tasks with longer
time horizons (e.g., weekly, monthly, annual processes) and the task
roles [Section 2.2.2B] for each actor engaged.
e) Identify the information exchanged as well as the nature of the
mutual influence basis [Section 2.2.28] in the team process.
3). Diagnose Team Performance
f) Evaluate the task team's performance, in terms of degree of
coordination, efficiency and effectiveness, based on the knowledge of
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underlying work units, the problem context and general management
theories.
g) Identify (informed by theories) the potential intervention
dimensions for improving the team performance.
Summary. The practical purposes in conducting the functional-level
diagnosis are: 1) to understand the managerial leverage available in the
functional area under study, in terms of the potential contribution to
the general task goals as well as the specific actions required to
produce the contribution, 2) to examine the coordinability of the team
process in the controlling system - e.g., whether the controlling
process is compatible with the underlying interdependence of the
physical process, whether' the team process is properly supported in
terms of communicatons media and mutual influence mechanism, and whether
the controlling activities are coherent in the concerned functional
area, and 3) to provide a context for the diagnosis of individual
decision-making behavior. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 (in part) of this
study demonstrate how to conduct the functional diagnosis in two
different selected areas concerning the management of rail locomotive
operations.
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3.1.3 Individual-Level Diagnosis - Examining the Individual Decision
issues and Expert Decision Heuristics
Individuals in an organization are the ultimate elements
determining the performance of the organization; therefore,
organizational diagnosis ideally must end at this most elementary level.
Once again, the proposed diagnosis process at this level is carried out
along two parallel lines - the controlled system and the controlling
system.
A. Controlled System
1). Analyze the Individual Decision Task
a) Single out the individual decision from a team-based macro-process
which is embodied by a decision-net.
b) Analyze the potential cause and effect relationships underlying the
decision.
2). Specify the Controllables and Uncontrollables of the Decision
c) Differentiate between the controllable and uncontrollable factors
involved in the above specified causality, in terms of both intrinsic
(e.g., uncontrollables due to lack of knowledge) and organizational
(e.g., uncontrollables beyond the authority limits) characteristics of
the factors.
3). Conceptualize the Decision Task in Means and Ends Terms
d) Define the individual task under study in terms of its ends and
available means, where the means should include two sets of variables:
one is controllables, the other is uncontrollable but can be intervened
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in through organization communication or coordination channels.
B. Controlling System
1). Identify the General Decision Procedure of the Individual
Decision-Maker
a) Describe the decision-making procedure adopted by the individual
decision-maker for the task under study, in terms of the general input
and output, as well as key intermediate steps, e.g., major trade-off
considered, or core calculation efforts.
2). Elaborate on the Detailed Search and Choice Heuristics Applied
b) Identify the step by step intermediate search and inference process
which transforms the *input information into decisions, i.e.,
transforming an incomplete decision base [Section 2.2.2B] into an
complete one. For routine repetitive tasks, this phase of diagnosis can
be further split into two sub-phases:
b-1) Specify the search-and-choice heuristics [Section 2.2.3A] which
a,4 IU*1d to dtevelop the routine working paln. Many modules may be
involved.
b-2) Specify the search and choice heuristics which are used to handle
the emergencies or to modify the routine working plan in response to
operating contingencies.
3). Diagnose the Potential Pitfalls of the Heuristics Described
c) Identify the likelihood of information overload, premature decision
due to insufficient information, heuristic biases and other potential
pitfalls concerning the decision behavior under study.
Summary. The aim of the analysis of the system being controlled at this
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level is at developing a prescriptive model concerning the nature of the
decision of the task under study, while the diagnosis of individual
decision-making behavior is aimed at identifying a descriptive model of
the decision-making process. The differences between these two models
indicate the existance of potential problems which result either 1) from
insufficient diagnostic information, indicating that more detailed
diagnosis should be carried out so as to refine both models and re-do
the comparison, or 2) from actual incongrunces which are the real
symptoms of our concern. The latter half of Chapter 6 in this study
demonstrates the diagnosis of the individual-level decision.
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3.2. Analysis and Diagnosis Techniques
The conceptual framework derived in Chapter 2 is built upon several
theoretical constructs, e.g., resource cycle, management cycle, control
task, work unit, meta-control, decision-net, decision heuristics, etc.
The diagnosis techniques, as explained earlier, are information
collection tools which provide 1) operational definitions to the key
theoretical constructs which embody the conceptual framework; and 2)
practical analysis methods which support the diagnosis procedures in the
inquiry for information. (One point worth noting is that we have not
attempted to inventory all possible techniques rather those we proved
useful in the case study).
The diagnosis techniques together with the diagnosis procedures
proposed in the previous section enable us to bring the state of the
system into focus. Because the techniques suitable for analyzing the
system being controlled are different in nature from those for
diagnosing the controlling system, our discussion again will proceed
along the two lines.
3.2.1. The Controlled System
On the controlled system side, the key operational questions are:
1) How to anatomize the flows of work into work units?
2) What is the role of the resource cycle?
3) How to represent the interdependence of work units? and
4) How to differentiate controllables and uncontrollables?
In the following, we shall present the approaches which lead to the
answers to the above questions.
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A. Anatomize Work Flow into Work Units
The term work flow, depending on viewpoint, can refer to either
macroscopic throughput of the system, or a microscopic process performed
at a local point, e.g., terminal operations. In this section (3.2.1A),
we are mainly concerned with the macroscopic system work flow and leave
the discussion of local work flow to the next section.
From System Work Flow to Resource Cycle
In this study, system-wide work flow is defined as the O-D traffic
movements, and as argued in Chapter 2, such traffic movement is normally
supported by various resource cycles [Exhibit 3-2-11. The role of
transportation operations management is to balance the goals of resource
productivity and service quality. Nontheless, to control service
quality is equivalent to controlling the loaded portion (e.g., work
flow) of a resource cycle, and to achieve productivity goal implies
controlling the total cycle, therefore along this line of logic, we
advocate that the transportation operating managers should perceive the
control of resource cycle as thier primary task, i.e., a properly
controlled resource cycle will perform balancedly in terms of cost and
service quality.
The notion of resource cycle is not only a substantive concept
concerning the nature of the transportation process, but also an
analytical approach which enables us to systematically construct a
general analysis framework for the controlled system and to examine the
detailed operations performed in the system.
In practice, the notion of resource cycle is not concerned with the
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EXHIBIT 3-2-1
ILLUSTRATIVE RELATIONSHIP OF WORK FLOWS AND PESOURCE CYCLES
LOADEDI I
-- LOADED -
<.
LOADED
- -*-- -
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>4
EMPTY
- - 4 RESOURCE CYCLE (INCLUDING BOTH LOADED AND EMPTY COMPONENTS)
-o WORK FLOW (INTERMS OF O-D TRAFFIC)
0 WORK FLOW TRANSFER POINT
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physical trajectory of movement of the resource, but with the transition
pattern of status phases of resources. Moreover, resource cycle can
refer either to the cycling pattern of individual units of a particular
class of resource [Manheim, 19811 or to the average cycle pattern for a
class of resource as a whole [Mao, Martland and Sussman, 1980];
macro-level analysis puts more emphasis on the latter.
The first step in applying the resource cycle approach is to select
one particular type of resource among those which are circulated around
in the transportation system. This selection is depended on the nature
of the issues to be dealt with. However, in most transportation modes
(except the pipeline and conveying-belt system), because the vehicle is
the resource most fundamental to the delivery of transportation service
(the other key resource is crew) and furthermore, because vehicle cycle
is a relatively well-developed concept and has already been applied
successfully in various contexts, e.g., AAR [1977], Manheim [1979], Mao,
Martland and Sussman [19801, Mao, Philip and Susman [1980], and Mao and
Martland [19811, it is convenient to select the vehicle cycle as the
basis for constructing the general analysis framework.
From Resource Cycle to Cycle Components
As an analytical tool the utility of the resource cycle is that it
can normally be systematically fragmented into distinguishable
components. The example of vehicle cycle hierarchy given in Chapter 2
[Section 2.1.2B, Exhibit 2-1-2] indicates clearly that, given the
knowledge of the transportation physical process, the breakdown of a
resource cycle is relatively straightforward. Furthermore, the
breakdown scheme of a resource cycle is flexible in terms of the degree
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of details of the components specified in the cycle. For instance, in
the preliminary phase of analysis or high level diagnosis, one can
specify the components in relatively aggregated terms ,e.g., using the
dichotomy - in motion and detention - to represent the whole cycle and
leave the elaboration to the later phase of the analysis or lower level
diagnosis. Given the fragmented cycle components, by putting them into
a time perspective, we can then arrange them into a resource cycle
hierarchy, e.g., life cycle, annual cycle, maintenance cycle, operating
cycle, etc.
From Resource Cycle Component to Work Units
In Chapter 2, we argue that managerial activities, in principle,
constitutes a cycle which can be primarily categorized into three
interrelated phases - planning, execution and review. The control of
individual resource cycle components involves all three phases of the
management cycle. Therefore, to specify the wrk units involved in the
management of the selected resource, we can construct a matrix as shown
in Exhibit 3-2-2; the elements of the matrix collectively respresent
the totality of control tasks (work units). The elementary control
tasks specified in the resource cycle vs. management cycle matrix may
vary in their degree of detail, depending on the degree of detail of the
fragmentation of the resource cycle.
From Work Units to Control Task Hierarchy
To put the work units identified in the previous step into
managerial perspective, we may further categorize them into various
levels of control tasks - steering contorl, functional control and
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Exhibit 3-2-2
IDENTIFYING WtRK UNITS
- RESOURCE CYCLE VS. MANAGEMENT CYCLE MATRIX
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meta-control - as illustrated in Exhibit 3-2-2. There is a general
correspondence between the control task hierarchy and the organization
hierarchy [Section 2.2.1C].
B. Analyzing Interactions Among Work Units
The purpose of macro-level analysis is at least two-fold: 1) to
gain an overall picture of the system; and 2) to provide a general
analytical skeleton for detailed analysis - either still probing within
the originally selected resources dimension, or probing some
multi-resource issues, i.e., the interaction of various resources in the
terminal area. In other words, the add-on to the original analytical
skeleton is taking place at this level's analysis. In this subsection,
we shall discuss some techniques which can be used in more detailed
analysis of the interactions among work units (either within or between
resource classes) and of the local work flows.
1). Schematic Techniques
Schematic model is a widely adopted tool to carry out systematic
analysis and synthesis in a variety of disciplines, e.g., operations
research, industrial engineering, information-processing engineering,
organization study, etc. A schematic is a convenient starting point for
setting up the more formal model, e.g., a quantitative model. In many
situations, the schematic model represents the principal tool available
for use in problems which involve "the analysis of methods by which
people perform work which is hot machine-oriented" [Bowman and
Fetter, 1967, p. 64]. A schematic - which may be very simple or
elaborate depending upon its intended use - can show qualitatively the
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logical structure of a complex system in study and the relationships
among its elements within a relatively small space.
The use-of schematic methods are basically three-fold. First, they
can be used descriptively in the documentation and explaination of the
processes and performance of an existing system. Secondly, they may be
used to diagnose the existing system by incorporating with some
normative theories or other relevant arguments. Thirdly, they can be
used prescriptively in the design, analysis and representation of the
characters of a new system.
We have no attemp here to catalog all the schematic techniques
developed in various disciplines. In the following, we shall only
discuss briefly two major types of schematic models, namely, flow
doagram and causal diagram.
Flow Diagram. A family of techniques can be categorized into this type,
for instance, the flow process chart, the multiple activities chart, and
the work place chart used by industrial engineers [e.g., Bowman ad
Fetter, 1967, Chapter 2; Marynard, 1971, Section 21; the system logic
flow chart, the data flow diagram, and the block diagram used by
computer system analysts or management scientists [e.g., Gane and
Sarson, 1979; Shannon, 1975], to name a few. In this family of
techniques, two subcategories can be further differentiated into two
sets. One is material-based, that is, of which the order of occurance
of the events which constitute completion of some desired objective is
directly associated with some flow of physical objects - vehicle, crew,
passenger, cargo, etc. The flow process chart, which portrays the
sequence of steps of a production process, applied by industrial
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engineer is a typical example. The other is logic-based, that is, the
step-by-step details of a process (which is actually performed or
anticipated to be performed) portrayed by the schematic is primarily
concerning the logic structure of the process, e.g., the interrelations
among decisions. The system logic flow chart and the various block
diagram models used by computer system analyst and management scientist
are typical example of this category. Some of the elements specified in
a logic-based flow diagram as well as in a causal diagram (which will be
discussed later) may pertain to the "performance" of the process in
study rather than the sole "action" elements which characterize the
material-based flow diagram. Although the logic-based flow diagrams are
more abstract than the material-based ones, the logic specified by the
former diagrams are usually embedded on microscopic work flows involved
in the physical process. Both types of flow diagrams are useful in our
analysis. During the systematic manipulation of schematic models toward
understanding and improvement of a system, it is usually fruitful by
concentrate on work which is of the interface buffer type. It is also
worth to note that, in many cases a typical conventional flow diagram,
takes little account, if any, of the structure of the controlling
system; sometimes, a single decision-maker is implied. In this study,
we emphasize the importance of breaking down the process in such a way
that each sub-process can be explicitly assignable (and is assumed to be
assigned eventually) to a specific organization unit (individual or
group of individuals).
Causality Diagram. Another commonly used technique in conventional
system analysis is the causal diagram [e.g., de Neufville and Stafford,
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1972; Forrester, 1968], which uses arrows (as well as some auxiliary
notations, e.g., positive or negative signs) to indicate how a change in
one variable may generate chages to other variables - the portrayed
interactions among variables could be empirical or hypothetical informed
by theory or other arguments. Causality implies regularity (necessary,
contributory or contingent relationships) between pairs of events
[O'Shaughnessy, 1972, p. 64]. In a complex system, such as the
transportation operating system, the causality involved usually
constitutes a complicated network - any effect has its recognizable
immediate, intermediate and remote causes. Because in principle, cause
does not mean all necessary and sufficient conditions, and the length of
the causal chain is not fixed [ibid, pp. 69 - 70], the key is that as
far as management control is concerned, the cause of certain problematic
situations must be traced back to the actionable condition. More
specifically, in a management context, there is an issue concerning with
the controllability regarding the causes - for any particular
manager, a causal explanation should be able to help him to solve his
problem (i.e., problem concerning the work unit he is in charge of). In
other words, in constructing a causal diagram, the analyst should have
the structure of the controlling system in mind, and the causal diagram
developed should facilitate the identification of controllable and
uncontrollable factors for those work units of particular concern. One
point worth noting concerning the schematic models discussed above is
that these techniques are not only applicable to the analysis of the
system being controlled, but also very useful to the analysis of the
controlling system.
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2). Quantitative Analysis Techniques
Any quantitative analysis technique, e.g., simple data
manipulation, statistical analysis or formal mathematical models applied
by researcher, has its strengths and weaknesses, and consequently has
its most appropriate application domain. In the following, we shall
mention two different types of analysis which are applicable to the
system being controlled at macro-level and lower levels.
Aggregate Analysis. Macro-level analysis of the controlled system can
serve two major purposes: 1) as a preliminary or pilot study which paves
the way for further detailed analysis, and 2) as an approach to enhance
senior management's conceptualization of the process being controlled.
The general context for this level's analysis is normally
characterized by one of two cases: 1) detailed knowledge concerning the
system process is insufficient, or 2) operational details are not the
real issue of concern. Given the above situation, at this level the
development of sophisticated models is not only inefficient
(time-consuming) but may merely be masking confusion (due to
insufficient knowledge). Therefore, a legitimate and effective approach
to be adopted for this level's analysis should be to construct some
simple but informative aggregate models. In a sense, many
financial-performance-indices based interactive decision-aid systems,
*such as the IFPS (Interactive Financial Planning Systems), are typical
aggregate models. In Chapter 4 of this study, we present an aggregate
policy analysis model [also see Mao and Martland, 1981] based on a set
of operational performance indices of the vehicle cycle components as
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well as on certain hypothesis concerning the technological process. In
short, for macro-level analysis, aggregate models are shown appropriate
because they are characterized by 1) simple to develop and easy to
communicate, 2) explicitly identifiable assumptions, 3) providing
insights into the trade-offs among policy variables, and 4) assignable
controlling responsibilities of the policy variables specified in the
model.
Detailed Process Analysis. To carry on a preliminary analysis or to
operationalize the policy formulatted at the senior level, more detailed
analysis should be conducted. Various conventional operating planning
and system analysis techniques can be adopted for this level's analysis
[e.g., de Neufville, et al , 1972; Hillier and Lieberman, 1978]. We
make no attempt to review these techniques here. The only point we like
to note is that organization analysts should be willing and able to
borrow applicable and relevant techniques and knowledge from any field
of scientific endeavor.
3.2.2 The Controlling System
The diagnosis of the controlling system, according to our
conceptual framework, focuses on three sets of issues: 1) the
meta-control structure for the totality of the tasks in study, 2) the
performance of the functional task-team which collectively takes care of
a set of mutually-dependent work units, and 3) the performance of
individual decision heuristics concerning specific individual decision
issue. The techniques which are suitable to support the analysis and
diagnosis of the controlling system can also be categorized into three
137
groups.
A. Techniques for Analyzing and Diagnosing Meta-Control Structure
To diagnose the meta-control structure, there are three information
collection issues: 1) the identification of relevant actors in the
organization, 2) the understanding of the controlling roles of these
actors, and 3) the documentation of the meta-control structure. We
discuss them in tur below.
1) Identify Relevant Actors - Structural Roles of Actors
Analysis of Organization Chart. The analysis of an organization can
normally start from the analysis of the organization chart which is
available (although updating may be needed usually) in most
transportation enterprise. According to Stieglitz [1964], information
which can be read from an organization chart primarily includes: 1)
division of work, 2) grouping of work 3) superior-subordinate relations,
4) levels of management in terms of successive layers of superiors and
subordinates, and 5) general nature of work performed by various
components. However, as pointed out by Stieglitz, there is a lot more
information an organization chart cannot show, such as: 1) the degree of
responsibility and authority (delegation and allowable discretion), 2)
staff and line relation (who supports whom), 3) status or importance
(organizational power), 4) lines of communication, and 5) the informal
organization through which things really get done. In other words, what
an organization chart can show is the formal and static but not the
dynamic and operational aspect of data.
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In short, the analysis of the organization chart alone is
insufficient to generate all the needed data concerning the controlling
structure of an organization, but it is a practical first step which
provides us with a "road map" and facilitates our further probing
process.
Job Description. Job description is a supplementary technique to the
analysis of organization chart. It provides us with detailed data
concerning the content of the job (authority, accountability, task, or
function) of the individual position holder [Steward 1976, p.121]. In
practice, job description data can be collected through the formal
organizational documents (if available), or through personal interview,
or both. Although the data obtained from job description is still
basically limited to the formal aspect of the role of the individual
organization unit, when it is used with the general knowledge from the
organization chart, we are usually able to identify a set of first cut
relevant actors.
Summarizing the Strucutral Roles of Actors
To specify and summarize a list of relevant actors, there are at
least two techniques: 1) constructing a control task vs.
organization-level matrix, and 2) extracting a subset of the
organization chart and relating it to the control tasks [Exhibit 3-2-3].
Resource cycle vs. Organizational-Level Matrix. The application of
this technique is flexible. For instance, in the preliminary stage, the
organization levels can be generally classified into three levels, and
the actors identified (i.e., the element of the matrix) can be a group
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Exhibit 3-2-3
IDENTIFYING RELEVANT ACTORS
A. CONTROL- TASK VS. ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL MATRIX
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of officers rather than specific individuals. During the later phase of
diagnosis, as more knowledge is accumulated, the breakdown scheme can be
gradually made more elaborate and the entries of the matrix can be more
specific.
Linking Organizational Chart to Control Tasks. This technique is an
alternative to the previous method. Its advantage is that the formal
structural relationship of the identified relevant actors is explicitly
shown. However, when the control tasks have been specified as a
hierarchy, this method may encounter some technical problems - the need
to link two hierarchies (one is the hierarchy of control tasks, and the
other is the organization units). In this case, unless the
representation can be made sensibly readable, the previous matrix
technique is suggested.
In summary, the above two techniques basically serve as vehicles to
facilitate the documentation of the formal roles of the relevant actors
and to force us to search for relevant actors if there are "holes" of
unassigned control tasks. The aim of this stage's analysis is to
generate a reasonably comprehensive list of relevant actors. The
collection of data follows two principles: 1) gradually getting into
details as diagnosis progressing, and 2) not necessarily to be uniform
in details across the organization but issue-focused.
2) Understand Procedural Roles of Actors - Analysis of the Formal and
Informal Organizational Process
To identify the specific authority and accountability of the
actors, information about their formal structural role is far too
superficial and insufficient. The next step is to understand the
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functional roles of the relevant actors, i.e., the procedural
relationships among the actors. The techniques enumerated below are
alternative methods which can be applied to acquire the above needed
information.
Clarify the Authority of Individual Organizational Unit
Any organization, in order to perform its controlling function,
must develop various system-wide mechanisms to assist in the integration
of work, in monitoring the actual achievement and in dealing with
problems for which no existing procedure is adequate [Weisbord, 1978, p.
44]. It is these mechanisms which make an organization function. To
uncover the nature of these mechanisms and to probe into the actual
roles of the actors in the organization-wide process, we may focus our
information search effort in the following areas.
a) the planning and replanning processes which produce and
change the operating schedules (e.g., service schedules,
preventive maintenance schedule, crew assignment schedule,
etc.),
b) the budgeting and auditing procedures (e.g., corporate
budgeting, departmental budgeting, divisional budgeting,
local terminal budgeting),
c) the institutionalization and adaptation of operating
policies and rules (e.g., various work rules, decision
rules),
d) routine operating conferences (e.g., daily, weekly and
monthly operating conferences),
142
e) ad hoc problem-solving meetings which the organization
or individuals devise spontaneously to solve problems not
envisioned by the formal mechanisms (e.g., the handling of
emergent operating contingencies, the management of
departmental conflicts).
The key to understanding the above processes is to describe: a) the
general agenda and the key issues of the process, b) the participants
and their roles, such as who leads the process, who initiates proposals,
who is consulted, and so forth, c) the decision mechanism, e.g.,
democratic, authoritarian or some mixture, d) the relations of the input
and the output of the process to the rest of the organizational
processes, e.g., on the output side, whether or how the decision is
implemented. In short, the above analysis should enable us to gain a
clear image of the actual responsibility of each individual or group of
individuals in the overall organizational controlling structure.
Clarify the Accountability of the Individual Organization Unit
To understand the accountability relationships, we should
understand the performance review system of the organization. In
principle, the review of performance must rely on certain performance
measurement systems [Drucker, 1977, Chapter 31]. Therefore, one
operational approach in analyzing the accountability is to analyze the
performance indices adopted by an organization and their relations to
the formal and informal reward and sanction practices. The formal
reporting systems are the major source of information for accomplishing
this end. The focus of the analysis should be on:
a) What are the performance indices available and used in the
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systems?
b) How are these indices filtered and aggregated through the
organization levels?
c) Who receives what performance feedback?
d) How does an individual use the performance feedback ? (e.g.,
for evaluation purpose? supervision purpose? self-correction
purposes?)
To summarize, the analysis of the actor-specific controlling roles
may result in adding or deleting actors from the original list. Given
the explicit responsibility and accountability knowledge, the next
practical problem is how to summarize and represent the potentially
profound findings in some systematic way to facilitate our diagnosis -
identifying problematic symptoms and systemic malfunction. The
techniques proposed in this study to resolve the above problem are
presented below.
3) Documenting Organizational Meta-Control Structure - Task-Actor Matrix
In response to the drawbacks of the traditional organization chart,
Larke [1954] suggested a technique called the Linear Responsibility
Chart (LRT) which represents the relationships between managerial tasks
and individual actors in a matrix form as shown in Exhibit 3-2-4, and in
an LRT, the roles of each individual manager can be explicitly
described. In this study, we consider this matrix formation as a
helpful technique for documenting the relationships between the
controlled system and controlling system, because the tasks on the far
left column of the matrix are the specific work units derived from the
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EXHIBIT 3-2-4
TASK-ACTOR RELATTONSNHIP - LINEAR RESPONSIBILITY CHART
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nature of the controlled system, and the organization units on the top
row of the matrix directly correspond to the relevant actors identified
in the controlling system, while the entries of matrix cells describe
each individual actor's task roles - in terms of authority and
accountability.
However, Larke's technique only highlights the responsibility or
authority aspect of the task and overlooks its potential to include the
accountability elements into the matrix by assigning review phase's work
units to organization units. To amplify, Larke's matrix can be
perfectly associated with our notion of meta-control structure [Section
2.2.1C].
According to the notion of the management cycle
(planning-execution-review) mentioned in Chapter 2, there are, in
principle, inherent relations between authority and accountability -
specifically, they constitute control cycles. Thus, in our opinion, the
linkages between the work units (i.e., tasks) and organization units
(i.e., actors) are by no means linear - due to the existence of cycles.
It is for this reason that we change the name of the matrix as
task-actor matrix, and refine the procedures for constructing the matrix
as follows.
A) systematically rearranging the organization units (actors) along the
top horizontal axis basically in accordance with their positions in the
organization hierarchy;
B) lining up the work units identified along the vertical axis
according to the following order: 1) planning tasks first and review
tasks last, 2) among the planning and execution tasks, meta-control
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tasks first and steering control tasks last, 3) among the review tasks,
steering control tasks first and meta-control tasks last, and
C) filling in the authority, accountability and actor's task roles into
the cells of the matrix.
By above token, in principle, the entries of the matrix will emerge some
particular pattern as shown in Exhibit 3-2-5.
Moreover, we also argue that the task-actor matrix is not limited
as a descriptive documentation tool, but also has normative utility.
For instance, based on the nature of the work units and their underlying
interdependence, we may prescribe the ideal authority and accountability
structure which should embody the controlling system. The practical
importance of this prescriptive task-actor structure is that it can be
used to make systematical comparison with the descriptive structure and
to identify the problematic symptoms accordingly (e.g., whether
authority is matched with accountability).
In summary, the task-actor matrix is a useful tool for providing us
with an explicit image of the controlling system's meta-control
structure. The information contained in the matrix can be either
prescriptive or descriptive. Furthermore, this technique can be applied
to the analysis of the controlling structure of either organization-wide
or function-wide missions.
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Exhibit 3-2-5
TASK-ACTOR MATRIX
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B. Techniques for Diagnosing Functional Task Team Process
The analysis of the meta-control structure provides us with an
overall picture of the totality (at least along one selected class of
resource) of the operations management system, i.e., the controlling
system and the system being controlled as well as their linkages, in
terms of the task roles of the actors. Given this knowledge, we are
able to conduct a more detailed diagnosis, i.e., taking some subset of
work units and their corresponding controlling organization unit from
the totality of the system, and investigating the detailed proceses
taking place in the selected sub-system. By this token, three purposes
can be served: 1) to elaborate on the knowledge concerning the overall
system, 2) to diagnose and improve the performance of the selected
functional sub-system, 3) to provide a context for the analysis of
individual decision-making behavior.
One point worth noting is that the diagnosis techniques described
in the preceding section (3.2.2A) and the schematic techniques discussed
in Section 3.2.1B are not only applicable to the macro-level analysis or
to the system being controlled, in many cases they are equally effective
to be used in the diagnosis of the functional level of the controlling
system - as demonstrated in later chapters (4 through 7). Given this
understanding, in this section we shall concentrate on those techniques
which were not covered previously but are particularly useful at the
functional level diagnosis.
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Operationalize the Notion of Decision-Net
In this study, we define the decision-net as a sub-set of the
meta-control structure, e.g., some sub-set of the overall Task-Actor
Matrix, which stands for a controlling structure for some selected
functional work units. Moreover, given a collection of some functional
work units, the actually enacted decision-net is dependent on operating
contingencies, e.g., the decision net for handling emergency may be
different from that for routine operations.
The key themes of the decision-net analysis are: 1) explicating the
informational inputs on and outputs from individual decision-makers, 2)
understanding the role of decision variables on communication events
(i.e., how they drive the information search and exchange processes),
and 3) the communication and coordination connections between multiple
decision-makers in a team-based decision processes. In short, our focus
is on the flows and transformations of information as well as the role
influences associated with the team decision processes.
Communication Locus Analysis. Samuel Eilon [1968] proposed a method for
coding messages in a communication network to identify and analyze
control mechanisms in an administrative system. In his own words:
"Although one often speaks of the 'flow' of communications, in fact,
this flow consists of a series of discrete messages of different length,
form or content. These messages are transmitted through certain
channels which make up the communication network." Eilon argued that
these messages could be coded and displayed in a communication chart as
shown in Exhibit 3-2-6 - in which the actors are lined up horizontally
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at the top of the chart, while the vertical axis stands for the time,
and the lines drawn in the chart represent the communicaton locus of a
specific decision process. Codes can be annotated alongside the
communicaton lines to indicate the nature of the transmitted messages.
Eilon's method is an efficient tool to amplify the dynamics and
time-dependent relationships of a task team. However, in Eilon's
original specification, the codes employed in the analysis are basically
the forms of messages (e.g., routine report, memo, personal contact,
etc.); in fact, this practice does not fully exploit the power of the
technique. According to our experience, the analysis of the
communication locus can exhibit at least the following descriptive data:
1) the decision-net evoked in the decision process in question,
2) the chronological order of the process,
3) specific types information transmitted in each step of the
process, e.g., state-related, alternative-related, outcome-related,
criteria-related, etc.,
4) the task roles of the actors, e.g., Who are the primary
decision-makers? Who are the informational supporters? and When
should a person play the role of an information supporter at one
time, and a decision-maker at the other?
5) How does a decision-maker search for new information? and How
does he accumulate the information available before making a
decision?
6) by studying the same decision task in different contexts, e.g.,
routine situation vs. emergency, we can observe in which case
certain indirect decision-makers or supportive actors will be evoked.
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A well-documehted .communication locus greatly enhances the analysis of
the coordinability of a decision task because it can 1) show whether
means-control or ends-control is properly applied, 2) facilitate our
probe into whether an effective influence basis is provided between two
interrelated decision-makers, and 3) even allow us to prescriptively
examine the potential consequences of new scenarios [O'Conner, 1978]
concerning the characteristics of the communication locus.
Decision Base and Communication Locus. The decision base [Section
2.2.2B] in this study is defined as the information available to and
used by a particular individual in a specific decision. Because the
information contained in an individual decision base is either passively
received or actively acquired, a well documented decision-specific
communication locus can enhance the identification of the contents of an
individual decision base. The vertical line in the communication chart,
in fact, represents an actor's internal cognitive process - for a
decision-maker, it stands for the functioning of his decision heuristics
(either with or without external aid) - by now it is still a black box
subject to be analyzed by more microcsopic techniques as shown below.
C. Techniques for Diagnosing Individual Decision Behavior
Techniques available for the study of the individual manager's
behavior include: working diary study, the analysis of critical
incidents or sequences of episodes, and problem portfolios, to name a
few [Mintzberg, 1973; Stewart, 1976]. In this study we are particularly
interested in the analysis of the individual behavior exhibited in a
specific decision-making process. This knowledge allows us to specify
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the decision heuristics employed by the individual and to identify their
potential pitfalls. The eventual practical aim, based on the above
information, is to develop effective decision-aid systems.
Protocol analysis. The analysis of verbal protocol is a typical
approach to constructing descriptive models of managerial decision
behavior [Newell and Simon, 1972; Winston, 1979, Chapter 5; Libby, 1981,
Chapter 41. The general procedure is to encode the verbalized
("think-aloud") step-by-step processes applied by a decision-maker in
the course of solving a specific problem. The key is to construct a
data base which enables us to uncover the intermediate inferences that
lead to the final decision. This information normally is not
transmitted or revealed in the ordinary decision-making process.
Protocol analysis is a structured experiment and is particulary
powerful in the study of human information processing in solving
well-defined and limited problems. A sensible protocol normally
requires complete and precise detailed information - in an ideal case,
the data base should be capable of supporting the development of a
computer program which is able to replicate the behavior of the
decision-maker [Newell and Simon, 1972].
Decision-Maker Introspection. In order to understand a decision-maker's
heuristics, an alternative to the protocol analysis is the analyzsis of
data collected from a decision-maker's introspection about the
generalized sequences of episodes involved in his decision process.
This method allows a manager to describe what he knows best about his
usual performance of a specific task, and leaves the interpretation of
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data and the development and test of theories to the analyst [Mintzberg,
1973, p.222]. Practical issues involved in the application of this
method are the need to: 1) systematically examine the decision-maker to
ensure the consistency between what he says and what he does, and 2)
validate the analyst's inference and conceptualization derived from the
decision maker's introspection. The analysis of a decision-maker's
introspection is a flexible approach compared to formal protocol
analysis; it can be helpful (as illustrated in Chapter 6) to sort the
decision-maker's introspection into the following categories: 1) the
general problem-solving frame of a specific decision task in terms of
the general relationships among decision's premises, key decision
variables and contingency factors, 2) search-and-choice framework
associated with the key decision variables, and 3) detailed algorithms
employed in the search-and-choice process. By doing so, we are allowed
to examine the likelihood of information overload and the potential of
heuristic biases. The influence of non-measurable (intangible) decision
criteria can also be observed through the detailed breakdown of the
choice procedure.
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3.3. Summary of Chapter 3
3.3.1. Organizational Diagnosis Procedures
A diagnostic system consists of two primary components: a large
body of substantive knowledge and a set of systematic procedures. The
theoretical constructs presented in Chapter 2 provide us with the needed
substantive knowledge which enables us to:
1) observe and organize relevant information about the dual-system in
study,
2) identify problematic symptoms of the system through the normative
ideals informed by the theories,
3) generate explicit hypothesis of desired states to be achieved by the
system, and
4) develop alternative change plans.
The methodologies presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 provide
operational techniques and procedures which instruct us how to proceed
with the diagnosis. The three-level diagnosis strategies -
organizational, team and individual - imply three different but
interrelated approaches to improve the organizational performance: 1)
refining or improving the macro task management structure, 2) devising
or improving the integrating mechanism for multi-functional team
processes, and 3) installing or improving the support systems for
individual decisions.
The three levels of diagnosis, in practice, could be a multi-faceted
iterative process, in which all three foci - organizational, team and
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individual - are first examined in a preliminary way, then all three
or part of them are examined in more detail. The actual emphasis of
diagnosis will depend on the following factors:
1) the characteristics of organization problems in study - a typical
scenario might be: "there is a symptom which brings us into the
situation; we first look quickly at all levels around the symptom; we
then redeilne the probtlem, or maybe Locus on ditterent individuals and
different team processes when we shift to more detail".
2) the nature of the intervention process, e.g., the entry point (level
of organization and functional area), the organization's capacity to
change, the intervenor's resources constraints (time, knowledge, skill,
etc.).
3) the strategies of intervention, e.g., whether a pilot project is
necessary to establish the intervenor's credibility through the quick
feedback effect of the project.
3.3.2. Analysis and Diagnosis Techniques
Controlled System. The notions of resource cycle and work unit are
operationalized through the following procedures: 1) translate work flow
of a transportation process into resource cycles, 2) select one class of
resource (each time) and break its cycle into components, specify the
hierarchical and horizontal mutual-dependence (inherent in the nature of
core operations and operational buffers) among the components of the
resource cycle, and 4) construct the work unit matrix through the
identification of the managerial tasks involved in the planning,
execution and review for each component of the resource cycle.
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Controlling System. Operational procedures and techniques are developed
in this study to support the diagnosis of the controlling performance
from each of the following three perspectives- organization-wide, team,
and individual. The technique suggested for examining the general
linkages between the dual systems is the construction of a Task-Actor
Matrix [Exhibit 3-2-5] which displays the relationships between the work
units and the authority / accountability of the organization units as
well as the three management control cycles. Inadequate linkages will
be explicated through such an analysis.
The diagnosis of team-based decsion behavior is conducted through
the analysis of communication locus [Exhibit 3-2-6] and the decision
base of individual actor involved in the process. These analyses allow
us to examine the adequacy of communication and coordination process.
Decision heuristics are the focus in the diagnosis of individual
decision behavior. Protocol analysis and introspection analysis are two
alternative techniques. The key theme is to specify the requirements of
the external aid system which is capable of improving individual
decision quality.
The organizational diagnosis procedures and techniques mentioned in
this chapter can be summarized into a single sheet as shown in Exhibit
3-3-1, which by an organizational diagnostician as a kit of tools,
provided he is interested in transportation operations management
issues.
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3.3.3. Post Diagnosis Intervention Tasks
Identifying Potential Dimensions for organization Intervention
In theory, organizational diagnosis is only one of the steps in a
more general organization intervention and charge framework in which the
organization diagnostician can be viewed as a change agent, who could be
either an external analyst or internal manager [Philip, 1980]. Bennis
[1966, Chapter 7] pointed out that a change agent may intervene at
different structural points in the organization (person, group,
intergroup, etc.) and at different times. He listed the following nine
major kinds of interventions which facilitate the organizational
performance:
1) discrepancy: to call attention to a contradiction in action or
attitudes,
2) theory: research findings or conceptual understanding which helps
the system gain perspectives,
3) procedural: a critique of the existing method of problem-solving,
4) relationship: to focus attention on intergroup relationships,
5) experimentation: to set up comparisons and to test several
actions before a decision is made,
6) dilemma: to identify choice points, understand assumptions and
search for alternatives,
7) perspective: to provide situational or historical understanding
through detached study,
8) organization structure: to identify sources of problems bound in
the structure and organizational arrangements,
9) cultural: to focus on an examination of traditions.
The above list suggests the following two important points: 1) an
organizational diagnostician should be sensitive to issues in a variety
of dimensions, such as behavioral, informational, structural,
procedural, contextual as well as technological, and 2) to improve the
performance of an organization, there exist multiple approaches (also
see the quotation from [Michael, et al, 1981] in Section 3.0), although
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each approach may imply a different degree of effectiveness to the
improvement of the performance. In short, because there is usually more
than one way to treat the same symptom identified through the
application of substantive knowledge and the diagnosis methodology,
during the course of intervention, the organization diagnostician should
collect information in a way which will facilitate the selection of the
most effective intervention (prescription and treatment) approach from
all available dimensions.
Behavioral Dimension of Organization Intervention
According to the planned change paradigm, the successful
implementation of an organizational intervention program depends
essentially on the acceptance and commitment of management [Philip,
19801; therefore, to develolp an effective change program (in terms of
the substance of change rather than the change procedures)[*],
management's participation is critical in the process of defining the
problems (e.g., the interpretation of symptoms and the identification of
the underlying causes of the symptoms) and of determining the change
goals (e.g., to what degree the causes of the symptoms should be
treated, which intervention dimension should be selected, etc).
In this study, we recognize the empirical importance (in terms of
eventual implementation) of management's acceptance of and commitment to
an organizational planned change process; nevertheless, our key theme is
limited to the demonstration of how to establish a logical linkage to
*: Successful organization intervention will proceed back and forth
between two sets of activities, i.e., substantive (technical) and
procedural (behavioral) [see Exhibit 1-2-2].
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integrate the following elements: substantive theories, diagnosis
methodology, symptom identification and specification of improvement
plans; therefore, management participation is not emphasized in this
study.
C. Emerging Actionable Improvement Plans
The eventual objective of organizational diagnosis is to develop
actionable and effective performance improvement plans. To do so, it is
important to integrate the potentially profound diagnostic information
into a coherent intervention perspective. Chapter 7 of this study
demonstrates how to identify problematic symptoms and to sketch
actionable plans to improve the macro-level, functional-level as well as
individual-level performance, based on the backgroud information
(Chapter 4 through 6) and the theories derived in Chapter 2.
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APPLICATION
Introducation to the Application Chapters
In the following four chapters (4 thru 7), we shall demonstrate how
to apply the theories and methodologies developed in the preceding
chapters to the context of rail motive power operations management, and
illustrate how specific theoretical and practical insights into the
technology being managed can be used explicitly to describe, diagnose
and improve the controlling system. We shall also illustrate how the
various notions developed or adopted in this study (such as work flow,
resource cycle, work unit, control task, meta-control structure,
decision net, decision heuristics, etc.) can be applied to a real world
context, and how important it is in terms of the insights gained.
By referring to the general organization intervention framework,
the materials covered in Chapter 4 through 6 basically pertain to the
first phase of the diagnosis stage in an organization intervention
process as indicated by the top block of Exhibit 4-0-1, i.e., concerning
with the provision and description of background information about the
technology being controlled and the related organization system.
Chapter 7 covers those tasks pertaining to the second phase of the
diagnosis stage as well as the presription stage as indicated by T-2
thru T-7 in Exhibit 4-0-1. More specifically, the first part of Chapter
7 deals with the diagnosis of the strengths and weaknesses of the
systems in question, the identification of problematic symptoms and the
definition of problems, while the second part deals with the
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Exhibit 4-0-1 Contents of Chapters 4 thru 7
- Intervention Process Perspective
DBSERVATION DATA ORGANIZATI N
1) Observe, identify and describe technological
and organizational factors relevant to problem areas
Chapter 4 thru 6
collect & Generate
background information
for various levels'
activities
Chapter 7, Section 1,
diagnosis & analysis
power management
Chapter 7, Section 2,
design of improvement plans
a particular selected
intervention dimension
ACTION IMPLFMENTATION and INSTITUTIONALIZATION
STAGE !
8)1.dminister both the substantive k procedural.change iplans to improve total system's performanceL . ~ M M 1MO VM
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DIAGNOSIS AND ANALYSIS
T-21 diagnode strengths and
weaknesses of .systems
T-3) Explain causes of
symptoms & Define problems
DIAGNOSIS
STAGE
PRESCRIP-
TION (
STAGE
PRESCRIPTION - DESIGN &
CHOICE FOR SOLUTIONS
T-4) Identify the ideal
directions for change
T-5) Develop feasible
& evolutionary design
specifications
T-6) Develop alternative
solutions tb problems
defined above
T-7) Assess L choose
alternative substantive
:hange plans
identification of ideal change directions and the development of some
priliminary design specifications for the improvement plans. However,
we should note that the purpose of this chapter is demonstrative - in
terms of how the theories and methodologies developed in this study can
be applied to guide the design of change plans - therefore, some of the
tasks listed above (T-2 thru T7) are done partialy or implicitly. For
instance, we have no attempt to identify exhaustively all possible
directions for change, or all possible alternative solutions to the
problems defined. Nevertheless, this token should not be critical to
the purpose this chapter is intended to serve.
From dual-system perspective, based on the theories and
methodologies developed in this study, the specific foci of the
following chapters are as below [see Exhibit 4-0-2]. Chapter 4 devoted
to the identification of the control task hierarchy and the meta-control
structure of rail power operations management as a whole. Chapter 5
highlights the functional dependence between maintenance and
transportation operations, and functional team processes associated with
the above operations. Chapter 6 concentrates on the analysis of one
specific decision's (locomotive dispatching) underlying causality and
heuristics applied by the decision maker. Finally, Chapter 7 deals with
the overall diagnosis and proposes three interrelated sets of plans to
improve the performance of the overall task, the coordinability between
functional lines and the quality of individual decision.
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Exhibit 4-0-2 Contents of Chapters 4 thru 7 - Dual-System Perspective
CONTROLLED SYSTEM
Prepara-
tion of
theories
and
method-
ologies
Diagnosis
Stage
Prescrip-
tion
Stage
Action
Stage
CONTROLLING SYSTEM
Development of conceptual Development of coneptual
framework and theories framework and theories
for he tchnoogy ei - "aor tne controlling
' control° neelecnlf e an9I Lrganizat~
i
o
n
- II iiii 1 I ll
I Development of analytical Development of analytic-al
and descriptive and descriptive .
-methodologies -methodologies
Procedures L techniques Procedures techniques
Analysis Phase - Analyze bk
) Assess Strengt
> Idehtify Sympt
> Interprete Cau
) Define Prnblem
Description Phase
Investigation focus: -1
)Meta-Control Structure
>Functional Team Process
)Individual Decision
Heuristics
Assess Systems' Performance
hs & Weaknesses
oms
sea
s
CHAPTER
2
CHAPTER
3
CHAPTERS
4 thru 6
Assessment and Choice of Alternative Change Plans
Implementation
l: Substantive activities only, procedural ones not included
- See Exhibit 1-2-2.
*-l Ideal diagnosis covers organization, team, and Individual
three levels' performance.
**I1 Ideal improvement plans may. cover organization, team, and
individual three levels' activities,
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Investigation focus: **
)Control Task Hierarchy
)Functional Dependence
)Causality of Individual
Task
Identification of ideal directions for change and
potential intervention dimensions, as well as
Development of Alternative Change Plans
e.g., ) Overall Task Mets-Control ***
) Functional Team-Support
> Individual Decision-Support
CHAPTER
7
I
_ 
. m
Description Phase
y
L
i I
.. . |
14
> De+ine Problem
Chapter 4
THE GENERAL TASK OF POWER OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
The purpose of this chater is to understand the general nature of
railroad motive power operations management and to draw an overall
picture concerning both of the controlling and controlled systems
through the application of the theories and methodologies developed
before. The knowledge and insights gained in this chapter are essential
to the diagnosis of the macroscopic performance of the systems,
moreover, they may also serve as a general reference frame for the more
microscopic inquiry into the systems.
4.1 The System Being Controlled
4.1.1 Conceptualization of the Railroading Process
A. Special Features of Railroad Technology
The railroad technology is characterized as well as complicated by
the following factors:
1) Railroad vehicles can only maneuver one-dimensionally along
their confined guideways. The advantage associated with this character
is that high capacity of vehicle flow as well as safety in all weather
can be attained via a deliberate traffic control system that keeps its
vehicles in proper relation to each other. However, there is also a
disadvantage, e.g., this character limits the accessibility of the
service network and the flexibility of operation in picking up and
delivering cars.
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2) Railroads enjoy a high degree of operational freedom in creating
various sizes of freight carrying capacity of its vehicle - the train.
The advantage is that vehicle capacity can be tailored exactly as
traffic demands - in Morlok's term [ 1978, p. 103], a rail freight
train is a typical "fully differentiated vehicle." The conceivable
disadvantage is that it is uneconomical to operate single car, thus
considerable effort must be spent to form train of cars.
3) Freight cars are detachable from the motive power; locomotives
can be utilized even while the cars are being processed (loading,
unloading, or switching).
4) The motive power on a rail train can be closely tailored to the
actual speed or travel time requirements of the train, or the gradients
and speed restrictions of railroad lines. From operating point of view,
the last two characteristics create a particular managerial task in the
rail industry - the management of motive power operations. There are
normally two power fleets in a railroad: one is for linehaul operations,
the other is for yard switching. This study focuses on the linehaul (or
road) power fleet.
B. Analysis Perspectives of Railroad Operations
The analysis of the railroading process can be put into a variety
of perspectives. The first is from a carrier's . viewpoint. "The
business of the railroad is the selling and delivery of transport. From
an economic stand point, it is the ability to assemble and move a large
number of coupled cars as a unit that distinguishes the rail systems: so
the real name of the game is running trains" [ Armstrong, 1978 p.79].
However, the nuances of train scheduling are important to the railroad,
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but the shipper does not care how the trains move. The important thing
is when the carload will be delivered at the consignee's plant (ibid,
p.172]. In other words, from the customer's point of view, the quality
of dock-to-dock service is the most essential attribute of rail freight
transport.
To integrate these above two potentially contradictory view points,
a more disaggregate and subtle conceptualization of rail operation is
necessary - a carload movement perspective. The railroading of freight
cars consists primarily of the following elements:
1)local pick-up switching
2)departure-terminal classification and assembling
3)linehaul movement and intermediate yard reclassification (if any)
4)receiving-terminal set-out
5)local delivery switching
Exhibit 4-1-1 [ modified from Wyckoff, 1976, pp.24-26] schematically
describes the typical railroading process in terms of its physical work
flow and its associated controlling information.
To translate the above notion of carload-movement into a framework
which can directly serve our purposes, we must further analyze the flows
of resources which result in car movement. From vehicle flow's
perspective, the railroading process can be reduced into two
complementary work flows: 1) the main flow of cars and trains, and .2)
the supporting flow of power. Exhibit 4-1-2 depicts such a view of the
railroading process which underlies the analysis of this study.
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C. The Interplay Between the Power Flow and Car Flow
Since we conceive that the management of power plays primarily a
supportive role in rail operation, it is important to have a general
picture regarding the fundamental interplay between the processes of
power and freight car movement. The cycle of a freight car can be
basically divided into four categories: terminal loading, loaded
movement, terminal unloading and empty movement. If we put these
components into a car cycle framework, they constitute a sequence as
shown on the right hand side of Exhibit 4-1-3.
To deliver freight cars, first there must be power available on the
scene, and then power and freight cars must be assembled into a train.
Thus, in the process of power operation, there will be some components
directly associated with the movements of freight cars. There will also
be some components primarily devoted to be awaiting (or distributed
without any load - usually called deadheading - to certain industrial
sidings and then awaiting) the call for service at rail yards or
industry sidings. In other words, there are two primary components in
the process of power operation which are linked with car cycle: we may
refer to them as the linehaul and the stand-by (or deadheading plus
stand-by) components of the power cycle. Exhibit 4-1-3 depicts the
relationships discussed above.
The practical implications of the above relationships are two-fold.
The first is that it highlights the degree to which the management of
power affects the ultimate service of rail operation. In linehaul
operations, both power and cars (either loaded or empty) are locked
together; therefore, the performance of the freight car is determined by
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the performance of power. For the other interface elements (on the car
side, the departure operation; and on the power side, the stand-by
components), *the interactions are more complex. By and large (as we
will discuss in detail in Chapter 6), the interrelation is basically a
compensatory one: shorter (average) car departure delay can be attained
only at the expense of longer (average) power stand-by time.
The above trade-off between the flows of power and cars entails
another important operating concept, the notion of the physical
operational buffer. Referring back to Exhibit 4-1-2, at the interface
between the car flow and power flow, two respective operational buffers
can be identified. One is the assembled car blocks in the departure
yard and the other is the power pool on the ready (dispatch) tracks.
From a power management point of view, to protect on-schedule train
performance and to absorb unexpected demand, it is necessary to maintain
a pool of slack resources (locomotive) standing by for service.
However, an oversized power pool is simply in conflict with efficient
utilization of this resource. Therefore, in this study, we argue that a
key to controlling power performance is to control the operational
buffers in the power process since, to a very large extent, they
represent the pivot point on which the balance of service quality and
power utilization relies.
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4.1.2 The Power Cycle Hierarchy
A. Factoring the Power Cycle
According to the dual-system paradigm presented in Chapter 1, the
analysis of the system being controlled involves defining the control
tasks and the interrelationship among them. In Chapter 2, we suggested
that vehicle cycle is a useful analytical concept. To specify the cycle
of motive power (which is the vehicle of major concern in this study),
the power flows identified in the preceding section must be factored
into components. Exhibit 4-1-4 gives a typical set of componential
processes arranged in their normal sequences (a more elaborated
fragmentation can be found in Chapter 5) which a road-locomotive (or
engine) regularly undergoes. Briefly, as soon as it enters a terminal
from its linehaul journey, an engine may experience one of the four
processes:
1) retaining at the main track - run through power,
2) servicing (fueling, sanding, watering, inspection) or
performing running repair, if needed, at service station,
3) scheduled maintenance or unscheduled repair at engine shop, or
4) storage (tentatively or seasonally) at the storage tracks.
After the completion of servicing (or repair, or storage), an engine
will be sent to the dispatch tracks awaiting linehaul service. Finally
on receiving the service call, the designated engines will be moved to
the forwarding yard and be coupled to an outbound train. A linehaul
journey for those engines will then begin and the whole process will
start over again [*].
*:Road units in certain cases may be assigned to assist terminal work -
used as yard switchers. Nevertheless, we consider this a minor practice
and exclude it in the above flow break-down.
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B. Power Cycle Hierarchy
Since at any point in time, an engine cannot appear in more than
one of the locations (i.e., sub-processes) specified above, the factored
power flow diagram (Exhibit 4-1-4) can be viewed as a road engine's
state-transition diagram. It is possible to observe some regularity
regarding the transition pattern of an engine's operating status when
the pattern is put into a time perspective. The process of power
cycling, constitutes a hierarchy of status (see Exhibit 4-1-5).
At the lowest level, linehaul operation, daily inspection and
servicing (including minor running repairs) at service station, stand-by
at dispatching tracks, temporary storage, as well as the pick-up and
set-off operations, are the five elementary components which a normal
road unit undergoes consecutively on a daily basis. They may be called
collectively the OPERATING CYCLE of a road unit.
On a periodic basis, namely, every 45-day[*], 90-day, semi-annual,
annual, and biennial, an engine is subject to scheduled maintenance. In
addition, an engine may accidentally break down and need to be fixed,
not in accordance with the maintenance schedule. Before being engaged
in any major maintenance operation (scheduled or unscheduled), a road
unit normally will have already served several operating cycles. The
series of operating cycles between two consecutive major maintenance (or
repairs) including either maintenance (or repairs) can be called the
MAINTENANCE CYCLE of motive power.
[*]: The monthly procedure (it is actually and legally implemented
every 45 days in most U. S. railroads), which mainly covers running
gear, controls and breaks, is usually supplemnted by such diagnostic
tests as a chemical analysis of the lube oil to detect early symptoms of
unusual engine wear or internal leaks.
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Exhibit 4-1-5 POWER CYCLE HIERARCHY
POWER LIFE CYCLE
SERVICE CYCLE SERVICE CYCLE ... SERVICE CYCLE REBUILDING
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OPERATING
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OPERATING
OPERATING
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...... CYCLE
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STORAGE/
Others
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MAINTENANCE
SET-OFF (OPERATIONAL
STORAGE)
SERVICING/
INSPECTION
STAND-BY PICK-UP
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For some units, in addition to maintenance/repair, various off-line
activities may be involved, such as seasonal storage, leasing to other
railroads or to commuter rail agencies. The series of maintenance
cycles in conjunction with the subsequent off-line activity comprise
the SERVICE CYCLE of an engine.
After a series of service cycles, depending on the severity of the
service to which it has been assigned, a unit will be ready for a major
overhaul - this could entail rebuilding trucks, replacing a power
assembly, or other major work - which usually calls for a "project" for
that unit. Complete rebuilding may be in order at the end of a unit's
life (20-30 years), at that time a unit could be 1) traded in for new
units, 2) remodeled (by the railroad's own shop or by a contract
rebuilder), or 3) cannibalized for parts to keep sister engines in
service. These actions either technically renew or eventually terminate
the LIFE CYCLE of an engine.
In summary, the major components of the power cycle can be
specified as: 1) linehaul, 2) inspection and servicing (including
running repairs), 3) standing-by, 4) set-off and pick-up, 5) operational
storage, 6) maintenance and repair, 7) seasonal storage and other
off-line activities, as well as 8) overhaul or rebuild. There is a
hierarchical relationship among the above components. The notion of
power cycle refers to a hierarchy of cycles: operating cycles,
maintenance cycles, service cycles, and life-cycles.
C. Interaction Among Power Cycle Components - Individual Unit
While there is no single measure that adequately describe the
multi-dimensional management implications of the power cycle, time is
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one practical performance criterion. A systematic evaluation of how a
unit spends the. time of its life cycle provides many prospects regarding
the characteristics of power cycle.
For an average unit in the power fleet, the total amount of life
time can be fragmented in accordance with the power cycle components as
shown in Exhibit 4-1-6. Within the pie of the power cycle time split, a
change in any one component will affect other component, in terms of
their respective share. Moreover, the characteristics of the individual
cycle components could feedback and determine the life cycle of a power
unit. For instance, a constant heavy work-load may shorten an engine's
life cycle, while high quality maintenance may prolong the cycle. These
mutually dependent relationships among power cycle components have
vital implications for the management of motive power.
For demonstration purpose, Exhibit 4-1-7 displays some principal
trade-offs among various elements of the power cycle: a) to the extent
that faster maintenance will not jeopadize its quality, less time in
maintenance means more time will be available in the operating cycle; b)
given total operating cycle time, less time in detention indicates more
time used in linehaul operation; c) given total detention time, less
time in the servicing process denotes longer time available in stand-by
for service. These trade-offs have significant implications for power
management and the key is to specify the underlying decisions that will
result in these particular relationships and to identify alternatives to
modify or improve decision behaviors. However, our discussion so far is
individual unit oriented. Before we get into the issue of translating
power cycle into actionable control tasks, we must further examine some
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EXHIBIT 4-1-6
POWER CYCLE TIME SPLIT
* A CHANGE IN ANY ONE COMONENT WILL AFFECT OTHER COMPONENTS
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EXHIBIT 4-1-7 TRADE-OFFS AMONG POWER CYCLE COMPONENTS
(INDIVIDUAL UNIT)
A. Given Maintenance Cycle Time
(to the extent faster maintenance
would not deteriorate its quality)
Time in
Operating
Cycle
Time in Maintenance
B. Given Operating Cycle Time
Time in
Linehaul
Time in Detention
C. Given Detention Time
Time in
Stand-by
)* Time in Servicing
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fleet-wide aggregate effects of power cycling.
4.1.3 The Aggregated Effect of Power Cycling and Its Ultimate Service
Impact - Total Fleet
In this section, for each level of the power cycle, some
performance indices are specified to illustrate the interactions among
the cycle components as well as their impact on service. The material
is extracted from Mao and Martland [1981], Mao, Sussman and Philip
(1980].
A. Aggregate Effect of Power Cycling - A Power Availability Measure
The performance indices specified here for each level of power
cycles are as follows [1].
life cycle: total fleet (number of units, denoted by N) and
composition - mixture of various models (measured by average
horsepower per unit, denoted by P) [2];
service cycle: active fleet size (total fleet excluding off-line
units),
maintenance cycle: serviceable fleet size, i.e., active fleet
excluding the out-of-service units (the effects of off-line
acttvities and maintenance are collectively represented by a
multiplier F),
opeating cycle: ton per horsepower ratio, speed, time utilization
(denoted by R, S and U, respectively).
To measure the collective effect of various levels' power cycle
components, a "Power Availability (PA)" foumula was defined. [details
see Mao, et al., 1980, 1981]:
PA = ( N * P * F ) * ( R * S * U ) (ton-mile / time-unit)
1: We don not claim they are the only relevent indicies to this issues,
but they are convenient ad informative.
2: The flexibility of being able to use the power fleet
interchangeablly to provideL total power for each train is an important
factor in achieving efficie•nt locomotive utilization.
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The most important policy implication of this fleet-wide formula is
that, given a certain desired level of power availability, there exists
a set of multidimensional strategies which can be implemented at various
levels of power cycle to achieve that desired availability. In order to
increase the total power availability (PA), for instance, one may
increase the static capacity: serviceable power fleet or the average
horsepower/unit, or alter the dynamic operating factors: operating
speed, ton-per-horsepower ratio or improve the time utilization rate.
The optimal PA level and the choice of strategies for achieving that
level will be determined by the operating and economic implications of
the strategies [ Mao and Martland, 1981, p. 309 ]. To assess the
appropriateness of the PA level, we should further probe into the impact
of different PA levels on rail service. To serve this purpose, based on
the queueing theory, an aggregated service impact model was developed.
B. Ultimate Service Impacts - An Aggregate Service Impact Model
In queueing theory, there are three fundamental measures: capacity,
system-load and service quality. To apply this paradigm, we may refer
to the collective power availability as the system capacity. As to the
system load, an operational definition called "Power Requirement(PR)"
was specified, which is a function (also in product form) of the
following factors: the number of car-loads, average car weights, average
length of haul, empty-to-load ratio. The interactions between power
availability and powe.r requirement can be reflected by the service
quality which was defined as the train delays due to power (both in
terms of frequencies and the total elapsed time) [details see Mao, et al
1980,1981]. Exhibit 4-1-8 illustrates some results of the aggregate
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Exhibit.4-1-8 AGGREGATE SERVICE IMPACTS ANATYSIS
Source: Mao and Martland [1981]
(A)
The Calibrated Relationship Among the Average Number
of Trains Delayed and the Power Availability Ratio
The Calibrated Relationship Among the Total Minutes
of Train Delay and the Power Availability Ratio
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Remarks:
In ExhibitA, a scatter diagram is portrayed with the fitted curve of the
number of train delays vs. the PR/ PA ratio. From this figure, we learn that
delays increase nonlinearly with the increase in the PR/PA ratio:
Number = 133 (PR/PA) 2 + 3.6 (DUMMY)
In this equation, NUMBER is the total number of delays caused be
mechanical or operating factors, as summarized in Exhibit 3. The dummy
variable is included to account for a major change in operations in June 1979;
for earlier months, DUMMY is one, while for later months it is zero.
Exhibit B illustrates the parametric relationship between the train delay
time and. the PR/PA ratio. We find a steeper curve in this case than the
previous one - the power of the PR/ PA term is 4 instead of 2:
DELAY = 18600 (PR/PA)* + 3190 (DUMMY)
In this equation. DELAY is the total minutes of delay for the approximately
5000 trains operated each month.
From the above analysis, one can show that changes in the PR/ PA ratio
(which range from .6 to .8) relate to changes of up to4000 minutes/ day in train
delay time (against a mean of 4000 minutes) and 40 trains delayed (against a
mean of 60/day). The interdependence between the PR/PA ratio and the
freight train delays is significant, as hypothesi7ed in Exhibit I.
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service-impact model by using a set of data collected from Railroad A.
The aggregate service-impact analysis provides insights into the
trade-off between power operations and service quality. It indicates
that given the level of power requirements, train performance varies
with power availability. When power requirements are high relative to
power availability, both the number of train delays and the total delay
time increase. In addition, in Mao,et al [1980], using a different set
of data obtained from another major U. S. railroad, a relation was
found between car O-D trip time and power utilization. Most
importantly, it highlights the importance of balancing the cost of power
availability against the service quality (the latter could not only be
directly translated from car utilization into customer satisfaction, but
also into car utilization costs).
In summary, power availability analysis represents a means-analysis
endeavor. The power availability formula, in fact, produces a
suggestive framework for controlling power availability, which transfers
the problem of power management into several key control tasks as we
will see in the next section. On the other hand, the service-impact
analysis represents an ends-analysis. It integrates the effects of the
complicated interactions among operating strategies, system traffic
condition and ultimate service quality. The results of such an analysis
greatly enhance the clarification of the overall task goals as well as
the linkages between power operating procedures and the more general
operating environment. Based on the knowledge obtained thus far, we are
ready to define the totality of the control tasks concerning power
management.
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C. Task Goals of Power Management and General Strategies
Due to the fact that without goals, there can be no control, to
define the control tasks engaged in power management, we should start
with the identification of the task goals as well as the general
strategies which can be applied to achieve those goals.
Task Goals. Due to the supportive role played by rail motive power, the
primary goal of power management is to support train operations so as to
pursue desired service quality. The task of power management is an
endeavor to match power availability to power requirement at both system
and terminal levels, with an aim to balance service quality and other
resources' (e.g., car, crew, etc.) costs against power cost.
General Strategies. There are at least two distinct sets of general
strategies that can be applied by power management to attain the above
task goals. The first, by taking the power availability level as given,
is through the changes in power requirement to 1) improve the service
quality, or 2) improve utilization efficiency of power. Specific
strategies within this category include: 1) reducing the empty-to-load
ratio through well-designed car distribution plans, so as to accommodate
more car loads (and less empty car) in each engine's lineahul journey
(By the same token, shorter dock-to-dock transit times can be attained),
2) encouraging shippers and consignees to ship on a regular and
continuous basis even during off-peak periods (e.g., low seasons of
year, or slack days of week), so as to make better use of available
power. This set of strategies usually requires the cooporation of
marketing forces in the organizations. Effective coordination with
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certain corresponding marketing programs is the key to the success of
this strategy.
The second set of strategies is, by taking the power requirement as
given, through changes in power availability to 1) improve the service
quality, or 2) reduce power cost yet maintaining the same level of
service quality. The identification of the specific strategies under
this category, is one of the key themes of this study. In the following
sections, we will first use the power cycle hierarchy to elaborate the
control issues involved in each level of the power cycle as well as the
inter-cycle relationships. Then we will translate them into a hierarchy
of control tasks which represent the totality of the task of power
management.
4.1.4 The Control of Various Power Cycles
The strategies to control power performance can be conceptually
categorized into two classes. One is through the control of various
fleet sizes, which are relatively long-run or mid-run oriented,
including total fleet ownership, active-fleet and serviceable fleet.
The second is through the real-time control of power utilization which
includes the control of terminal power pools and network distribution,
coordinating train/power dispatching as well as the scheduling of train
and service operations. The following presents a detailed discussion of
the above control tasks. (The material presented below is basically a
synthesis from Mao, Sussman and Philip [1980], Mao and Martland [1981
and 1982], RSMA [1964], Emerson [19751, and Armstrong [1979]).
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A. Fleet Ownership Planning
The control of an individual power unit's life cycle can be
aggregated and transferred into issue of fleet ownership planning. The
decisions on power fleet ownership mainly deal with the acquisition,
disposal, rebuilding and retirement of power units. The determination
of the size and type of locomotive to be contained in the power fleet
has a direct bearing on the ability of power managers and the railroad
to effectively discharge its service responsibilities.
In the process of planning the fleet ownership, it is essential to
know the current motive power utilization, work performed and fixed
requirements (e.g., maintenance); so that this data can be related to
the prediction of traffic growth, the estimation of minimum base
ownership, the identification of the need for specialization and
standardization in matching power to tasks, and as a result the
appropriate number of locomotives can be provided by purchase,
rebuilding, and retirement programs.
Changes in service design can have considerable impact on motive
power requirements. For example, changes in ton/hp ratio and ton/car
ratio will change the horsepower required for a train; changes in train
running time affects the required linehaul locomotive-hours, and so
forth. Total fleet size is the general decision premise for the
downstream fleet sizing (active fleet and serviceable fleet) and fleet
utilization. The performance of the lower level decisions, in turn,
feeds back to the total fleet sizing decision. The performance indices
for this task should include, for instance, total horsepower available;
GTM per available horsepower-day; and average car O-D transit time -
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ideally the portion of time delayed by power should be specified.
B. Active-Fleet Sizing
The control of an individual power unit's service cycle can be put
into the control framework of active fleet sizing. The control tasks at
this level include decisions on the number of units to be stored, units
to be leased in or out, the appropriate net balance with foreign roads.
The incentives to reduce (store or lease out) active fleet size are
several-fold:
(1) Maintenance Cost Savings. Fewer units to maintain requires less
parts inventory, as well as less maintenance crew - about one man can
be reduced due to the reduction of one unit [RSMA, 1964]
(2) More Control on Maintenance Schedule. Fewer units to maintain
could result in better maintenance quality; well maintained units would
perform better with lower failure rate.
(3) Less Fuel Expense. Due to the temperature-related engine
effieciency reason, a current industry-wide practice is to keep the
engine running during detention. For a 1000-unit fleet, fuel consumed
during engine detention could cost millions of dollars in expense [ Mao
and Martland, 1982]. As long as it is mechanically desirable to sustain
this practice, smaller power fleet could imply remarkably lower fuel
cost.
In other words, to serve the same level of traffic, a smaller fleet
implies higher power productivity and less short-run operating costs as
well as long-run capital commitment (but at cost of less slack). In
response to the changing pattern of traffic level, it is usually
desirable to store units - particular those perceived as "odd ball",
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expensive to run, or performing poorly - during the low seasons of the
year. Another way to treat the surplus units during off-peak seasons is
to use them as a shop margin allowance for maintenance operation, which
will be discussed later. In effect, active fleet sizing provides a
context within which maintenance activities will be both planned and
controlled.
Active fleet sizing refers to the task of cutting the total fleet
during off-peak periods down to the size which is most economical to
operate but without jeopardizing the service quality. Thus, the
performance indicies for this task may include: total power operating
expense (or total power expense / ton-mile), GTM per active
horsepower-day, amount of horsepower stored, etc.
C. Serviceable Fleet Sizing
The individual unit's maintenance cycle can be aggregated into the
serviceable power fleet. The primary decisions involved in serviceable
fleet sizing include decisions on the fleet shop margin (units out of
service due to maintenance or repair), the quality and reliability
standards (e.g., tolerable en-route failure rate) as well as certain
maintenance logistics related issues (e.g., policies on parts inventory,
home-shop assignment, manning-level, etc.).
Mechanical reliability determines the rate of unscheduled
maintenance, and. in conjunction with the scheduled maintenance
operation, also determines the serviceable fleet size. The serviceable
fleet should be sized to have all possible engines available during the
peak seasons. If unavailability is reduced to the lowest level during
the peak months, and is allowed to go higher during the remaining
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periods, effective fleet can be reduced to a remarkable extent.
Maintenance and repair policies must establish the targets for peak
period shopping, maintenance and servicing. The allowances for off-peak
unavailability must be planned. Moreover, reliability of power in the
fleet affects the amount of power assigned to trains. Horsepower will
be added to the locomotive consist as an insurance against failures
occurring en-route. as a result, "insurance" horsepower requires more
engines in the fleet to handle a given service requirement and is also
costly in terms of fuel consumption.
The daily measures of maintenance performance should include the
number of units out of service (shop margin) compared to the targeted
ratio for that period of the years, the train delays due to power
enroute mechanical failures and, ideally, the number of units made
available during each shift with respect to certain standards. The
periodical performance statistics to be reviewed should include the
ratio of scheduled maintenance versus unscheduled repair, mean elapse
times of servicing, various categories' scheduled maintenance,
unscheduled repairs and ideally, mean-time between road failures. The
effect of mechanical reliability on power assignment is critical to the
size of the serviceable fleet. However, the measure of this effect
conceiveably could be very controversial because all overpowered
assignments do not necessarily result from reliability considerations.
The assessment of this effect should be an integral part of power
productivity control which will be discused next.
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D. Steering Control of Power Utilization
The control of the power operating cycle refers to the
around-the-clock task regarding assignment and dispatch of serviceable
engines to trains, as well as the balance of power distribution over the
rail network. To this task, the general decision premises are train
schedules, tonnage assembled to haul, as. well as the maintenance
schedule (which indicates when and where a unit is subject to shopping).
All power operating related polices, such as ton/hp ratio, speed
requirements, deadhead policy, helper-service, will be executed at this
level. The major sub-tasks involved include maintaining power pools at
each terminal, dispatching power in accordance with train dispatching
operations, coordinating servicing schedule and train schedule as well
as controlling power detention time.
The daily indices of performance should include: time utilization
of power (linehaul horsepower-hour versus serviceable horsepower-hour),
GTM per serviceable housepower-day as well as the number of trains held
and train-hours delayed for power. More ideally, records such as
dragged trains (trains which are run with power level below that for
normal operation), cancelled trains (concellation of train due to lack
of power) and tonnage removed from trains (in order to run the trains
with available power) should also be summarized, both in terms of
frequency and equivalent car-hours delayed, as gadgets to signify the
operating effectiveness of the road freight fleet.
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4.1.5 The Control Task Hierarchy of Power Management
To put the above seemingly complicated control tasks into
perspective, a hierarchy of power management options can be summarized
as illustrated in Exhibit 4-1-9 - which indicates that the control of
power operations constitutes two intereralted sets of options: the
management of power fleet size and the steering control of real-time
operations; the former includes the control of engine's life cycle, the
sizing of active fleet and the serviceable fleet, the latter includes
the control of terminal power pool and network distribution pattern, the
coordination and scheduling of train and power dispatching operations.
To further amplify the above notions, we should differentiate the
management options at each level into three major phases: planning,
execution and. performance reviewing, i.e., translate them into control
tasks. In addition, to highlight the nature of the control context,
certain major control premises should be specified at each level.
Exhibit 4-1-10 summarizes the control tasks and their premises discussed
in the preceding section into a control task hierarchy in a matrix form.
Generally speaking, the high level control tasks create contexts for
lower level operations, while equally important to note is that the
lower level's performance in certain situations will indicate the need
to alter the higher level control practices - for instance, the lower
time utilization ratio during off-peak seasons can primarily be resolved
by cutting down the active fleet size, but not through the improvement
of real-time dispatching. To effectively and efficiently utilize motive
power, a railroad should seek a "balanced" set of strategies to guide
the control of the management of power through different periods of the
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Exhibit 4-1-9 Key Strategies of Power Management
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year.
These strategies indicate a way to coherently structure the tasks
to be controlled, and provide a basis for management to identify: Which
task at what level is the emphasis of their operations at a particular
period? Which task is for continuing? Which task is only subject to
periodical review? Due to the fact that, once the strategy is
established, certain rigidities will develop, it is important to
integrate a self-check function to signal the timing to shift from one
set of strategies to another and to revise the control premises at
various levels. For instance, during peak periods, the real-time
control of power operations should be the emphasis of the management -
all available power units should be mobilized to serve the traffic
promptly. However, during the non-peak season, active fleet sizing
becomes critical to reducing power operating cost. Off-peak periods are
also the time for heavy repairs and the completion of deferred
maintenance work, if any.
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4.2 The Controlling System
4.2.1 The General Organizational Settings
In the context of rail motive power management, many functional
departments play various roles and collectively contribute to the
ultimate performance of power operations. These departments inculde:
a) Transportation Department. It controls the utmost utilization of
power in the handling of trains through developing power pools which
will bring the units back to servicing and maintenance points at the
proper intervals.
b) Mechanical Department. It exerts efforts to reduce out-of-service
time, speedily advancing locomotive units through servicing and repair
facilities by close coordination of supervisors and the crafts so that
the units are being continuously progressed. The most important thing
is the provision of dependable repairs and servicing to eliminate delays
and engine failures while the power is in service.
c) Finance Department. It assists the operating department (which is
usually on top of both transportaiton and mechanical departments) in
evaluating the effect of maintenance costs, depreciation and taxes, and
the appropriate time to trade old power for new, to reduce or increase
ownership.
d) Engineering Department. It is responsible for assisting in the
development and provision of adequate and efficient facilities which
will reduce out-of-service time and maintaining track to reduce wear and
damage to equipment.
e) Personnel-Labor Department. It renders great assistance in the
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employment and training of qualified employees and development of
efficient and effective supervision. The economical use of crafts in
servicing and repair and the elimination of conflicting work rules will
reduce this cost and justify faster release of power from those
facilities.
f) Marketing Department. It encourages shippers and receivers to ship
on a regular and continous basis to make better use of available power
during slack periods of the week, the month and the year.
The most important thing is the integration of all these
departmental functions toward the economical and effective utilization
of motive power. A measure of the strength of a railroad's power
management is its ability to coordinate people with all the necessary
experience and resonsibility working together as a team.
Exhibit 4-2-1 summarizes the relationships between the power cycle
components and the responsible departments of a railroad. However, a
general description at departmental level is insufficient from the
diagnosis point of view. We need to specifically identify who is
responsible for what on a more disaggregated basis, and to concentrate
our attention on the task-roles played by each engaged individual
organization unit. In the following section, to serve our purposes, the
focus of the detailed structural and functional analysis will primarily
concentrate on the Operations Department - the key department in charge
of power operations.
4.2.2 Anatomy of The Operations Department
The variability resulting from the complexity of technology and
geographical dispersity of the network makes the control of daily
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operations an overwhelming task of railroads, thus, "about 85 of every
100 railroaders work in the operations department"[Armstrong, 1978, p.
2111. Their utmost task is to run trains. Exhibit 4-2-2 is a condensed
organization chart (by leaving out many staff and support positions at
various levels) of the operations department in railroad A. (For
smaller railroads, like Railroads B and C, some consolidation of
positions and simplification might occur). Further explanation is
deserved for both the transportation and mechanical departments. The
key issue is to reveal the underlying task role of relevant individuals
in each of the key departments.
A.Transportation Department
A-I Headquarters Organization
Operations Control Office (OCO), headed by the AVP of the
department, is the nerve center of the day-in-day-out operations of the
rail system. Both movements of train (directly controlled by Train
Dispatching Center, supervised by the General
Superintendent-Transportation) and power (directly controlled by Power
Control Center, supervised by the General Superintendent-Locomotive
Distribution) in the system are coordinated by this office. OCO is
usually equiped with various aids of status display (e.g. CTC board,
power status board, etc.), and communicates with divisions and local
officers through dedicated telecommunication lines.
The General Manager-Terminal Operations is primarily a trouble
shooter and technically plays a back-up role to the AVPT because he is
one-step back from the operating fire-line. Usually all the incremental
adaptation concerning train schedules and other operating plans (e.g.,
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Exhitht 4-2-2 THE CONSOLIDATED ORGANIZATION CIHART 0 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
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blocking plans) is initiated and proposed by him - in many cases, this
kind of adaptation is the planning function of Railroad A. For
comparison purpose, Exhibit 4-2-3 gives the organization chart of
railroad C's transportation department.
A-2 Divisional Organization
Division Superintendent is responsible for the train and car
movements within the division limits and divisional budget. For the
host railroad A, both the divisional master mechanics and the divisional
engineer (primarily under Engineering Department which is not shown in
Exhibit 4-2-2) should technically report to him. Therefore, he is also
responsible for the coordination of maintenance of equipments and of
roadways within the division boundary.
Division Trainmaster is the transportation staff of the division
superintendent responsible for determining (guided by the system train
schedules) the arrangement of carblocks into trains, and for scheduling
and supervising the train crew to move trains over the division line.
Once the train is beyond the limit of a terminal territory, the train
conductor will directly communicate with him.
Division Train Dispatcher is responsible for the steering control
(i.e., authorizing and directing) all movements of trains over the
division. He issues train orders to the train crew via the terminal
tower operator before the train has departed, and afterwards via the
signal system within the CTC territory, or radio communication system
directly. All division train dispatchers are physically housed at the
headquarters and are the fundamental members constituting the OCO. Like
master mechanics and the divisional engineers, they are another typical
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example that railroad employees are usually responsible to different
chains of command for various parts of their duty - in a sense, this is
a task-oriented matrix structure.
A-3 Local Terminal Organization
Terminal Trainmaster is Terminal Superintendent's transportation
staff who supervises yardmasters, yard crew, switcher tenders and
hostlers in making up trains, getting locomotive to the trains,
switching cars to local industries, and moving trains into and out of
the terminal limits.
Terminal Tower Operator (Terminal Dispatcher) is a messenger to
transmit information from 1) yardmaster, 2) terminal trainmaster, and 3)
division train dispatcher to train crews concerning their on duty time,
train orders and etc.
B. Mechanical Department Organization
The Mechanical Department of a railroad is responsible not only for
the maintenance and servicing of cars and locomotives, but also for
upgrading or modifying them and for improving maintenance precedures.
Therefore, we can usually find some equipment design and industrial
engineering units in the mechanical headquarters.
Heading up mechanical department organizations at the local level
are the Master Mechanic. They are the principal supervisors in charge
of' the daily mechanical operations and coordination with transportation
personnel. For major system shops, which take care of heavy repairs,
overhaul or even rebuilding work, Shop Superintendents are created to be
in charge of the operation, they are at the same level as the master
mechanic.
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The annual or long-run planning responsibility for locomotive
maintenance is not quite identifiable in Railroad A, except up to the
VPM level. Regional General-Superintendents primarily play operating
role to coordinate division master mechanics and shop superintedents.
The Manager-Information System literally generates the schedule of the
mandatory inspections due for each locomotive. Except for certain
modification projects, no deliberate power maintenance planning effort
can be identified in Railroad A.
For railroad C, although the organization chart is quite
complicated, the observed function of each unit and the managerial
process seem more clear (Exhibit 4-2-4). The system-wide coordination
and control of daily operations of power is supervised by the Director
of Locomotive Planning; while the ACMO-locomotive is responsible for
annual and long range scheduling and planning and is supported by some
research staff.
206
O O
0Q)
S0 0 0
a)0 0 U) U c U 0
on a o vn Ln o on
c o o a a) a a
o o
c 0 0 C > .> > >
I I I I • •t 5 '-I •-
' U C)0 C0 C)0 0> o o~ o~0 n o 0n o 0o
> > .HO HO HO HOC% u ' H C O k o po p w
;1 0 w 4 d * w) Q) m a 0t
Cl u )- U C. H QU
I I I
O 9-
-1 -1 n 14 0 4-
• , .r--1 , , *M 3 ir- M C I
P.-
I I
C-
I I
I .•
C:O
CC c
C 0
rHU
r Ua)> c
'H 0
SFOL
0
A I
O O
0 0 u
0U)U
*oni Oecr
4 I-I I
+ 4
II
I I
.L I
ua
O'Cl)
•- 0 .
a) U)
-e 'H'He
I 'I m c1n
'U
0
0
a) ..
u* .-.
'H
CC'
0
ry-
O *, '
-w Wi
C O0
4-
1-4C 'H
'H k") U~
I 0
CC' Uw rl I
'HU s
c) o 0 I+
•' 4-4
207
Fr:Z
U)
C.
-1'
-C
L_ ·
bC/
U)03
Y V~ s~-CL C) I
C. Document Relevant Organization units
Given the knowledge concerning the jobs of the key organization
position holders at various levels and departments, we are ready to
identify the relevant organization units as well as to specify their
task roles, i.e., who is responsible for what particular power cycle
component. Such a probing process will force us to take a closer look
at the organization than we would have been done otherwise.
To generate a list of relevant actors, a power cycle vs.
organization level matrix is constructed as shown in Exhibit 4-2-5
(following Exhibit 3-2-3). Taking the control of the power life cycle
as an example, the formulation of general policy is an integral part of
corporate strategy, thus this responsibility would be taken by the chief
executive officer; while Senior-Vice-President of Operations, of
Marketing and of Finance would usually provide proposals or
recommendations concerning fleet size and compositions of the system.
Finally, according to the nature of the issue, the decision would be
executed by either VPT (utilization of power), VPM (maintenance
modification or rebuilding of power), or VP-Purchase (acquisition of new
power).
As to the control of the power operating cycle the General
Superintendent-Locomotive Distribution as well. as General
Superintendent-Transportation jointly determine, in coordination with
mechanical officers (regional mechanical-superintendents or division
master mechanics), the power change locations on the system - where
locomotive consists will change (in whole or in part) due to
interchanges, grade conditions, system classification yards, fuel
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Exhibit 4,2-5 Identified Relevant organizational Units
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consumption policy or other logical points of operating change. These
locations will constitute the primary supply and demand points for road
freight power distribution and assignment of units. The power
dispatchers at the Power Control Center, working together with Division
Train Dispatchers as well as Terminal Trainmasters and terminal engine
foremen, control the real-time distribution and assignment of power
operations, while the Division Trainmasters and Division Master Mechanic
control system-wide train operations and engine's terminal operations
respectively. They jointly provide a context in which the power
dispatchers perform their duty.
4.2.3 Functioning of the Controlling System - Operating Document
Priority
To put the above knowledge concerning the roles of relevant
organization units into perspective, the understanding of a particular
controlling mechanism applied by rail operations management is
essential, that is the priority system of railroad operating documents.
Although many people today perceive the railroad industry as
characterized by a lack of creative adaptability, believing that "many
of the practices still based on technologies of a bygone era" (Kerr and
Kornharser, 1980, p. vii], and by theory X's management style [Ellen,
1982], the organizational structure of railroads used to be highly
creditable [e.g., Chandler, 1976]. According to Wyckoff (1976, p.57]:
"As the management tasks of the [railroads] shifted fron the
financial promotion and construction to the operating and
administration phases, substantial creativity in organizational
design occured. ... In many respects, the railroads were pioneers
in designing organization structures to manage large
enterprises.... not being able to rely on ... developed
organizational theory, ... the early railroaders innovated. Since
they were designing organizations to cope with specific situations,
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... they were actually applying the contingency organization
theory (that was not to be articulated until nearly a century
later)."
To provide the needed flexibility required by the real-time
operations, while still confining these operations within an overall
managerial frame, railroads have developed a particular adminstrative
mechanism - the priority of operating documents [Armstrong, 1978,
p.220].- The core of this mechanism is the Timetable-and-Train-Order
(T&TO) system [Armstrong, p.95], in which responsible operating manager,
normally the Division Train Dispatcher as described precedingly, may
issue train orders to change - in effect, supersede - the instruction
given in the predetermined timetable in case of operating contigencies
or for the benefit of the system goals; while except on receiving such a
train order, the train enginemen have no authority to disobey the
timetable.
When putting the T&TO system into a broader document priority
framework, we will obtain a result as shown in Exhibit 4-2-6. Power
operations is essentially operated within the framework of train
operations. Therefore, in line with the above train-oriented document
priority system, there is a power counterpart which embodies the
controlling structure for managing power operations. More specifically,
in the power management context, there are various predetermined
policies (e.g., maintenance schedules) which - derived pricipally from
railroad's overall operating strategies - are general operating
reference lines to be followed in normal situation; while in case of
operating contingencies, except the mandatory ones (e.g., bridges' axle
limit, federal regulated test due dates), they are subject to being
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superceded by the instructions issued by certain on-line officers
through some specific authorization processes. Moreover, as to the
time-span of these power operating policies and schedules, some of them
(e.g., ton-per-horsepower) would usually be updated, piece by piece, in
accordance with the revision of corresponding timetable and train
orders; full-scale revision, in some railroads, will be implemented
periodically - e.g., Railroad C revises its power special operating
instruction (see Chapter 6) on a semi-annual basis.
In summary, the practice of document priority system, which
exemplifies railroads' general problem-conversion-processes, in a sense
stands for the rule of the game of railroading. Anyone who fails to
recognize this rule might either lose himself in the operating details
without acknowledging the existance of the broader contextual issues, or
oversimplify the railroading process and fail to appreciate the subtlety
of the control practices involved. Given the above knowledge concerning
the controlling system, we are ready to identify the specific linkages
between the controlling system and the controlled system, which will be
discussed below.
4.3 Linkages between the Two Systems
4.3.1 Task-Actor Matrix
To explicitly identify each actor's roles and the
interrelationships among the actors, we can construct the Task-Actor
Matrix [section 3.2.2] - which relates the control tasks derived in
Section 4.1.5 to the task-relevant actors specified above - as shown in
Exhibit 4-2-7 (based on data from Railroad A). The Task-Actor Matrix
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explicitly describes who plays what roles in each sub-task at different
phases. It summarizes the authority/responsibility and accountability
relationships, the initiation and input-output characteristics, the
interactions among actors, and the general direction of information
flow. It is clear that in a task as complex as power management, the
relationships among the actors should not be "linear". This upward
feedback function should not only be viewed as a mechanism to assess
lower levels' performance, but also as a internal source which amy
signal the need for adaptation concerning higher levels' strategies,
policies and plans.
4.3.2 A Meta-Control Interpretation
An organization can be conceived of as a problem-conversion
mechanism, and in such a context power management is a process which
gradually converts a relatively open and abstract system-wide power
availability planning problem into a very specific real-time power
dispatching problem. Applying this meta-control notion to the
task-actor relationships identified in the task-actor matrix, we can
reintepret their relationships as follows.
At the lowest level is the steering control of physical power
dispatching and distribution in line with the execution of maintenance
work and train dispatching. At the next level the role is primarily
derived from.the.need to plan and monitor the operations of the rail
service delivery processes. This function includes 1) the review of the
performance of physical operations, 2) development of power operating
polices and maintenance schedules, as well as 3) the review of train
schedules. The latter two jointly determine the power service cycle.
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In other words, this level exercises typical ends-control over the
lowest level, as well as imposing constraints on the means that the
first-line managers are allowed to practice.
At the top level, its function is the meta-control. That is, on
the one hand, this level adjusts the system-wide power availability to
persue efficiency goals for power management; on the other hand, it
maintains sensitivity to environmental influences on effectiveness of
the task. The key issue to this level is the re-examination of key
planning premises on which the various task strategies and tactics are
based. These premises include system power requirement, meta-control
structure (section 2.2.1) per se, power related key cost estimates,
reward/incentive system (if any) and the basic infrastructure.
To summarize, the above described meta-control structure is a
conceptualization concerning the overall task of power management. From
a diagnosis point of view, such a conceptualization provides an
analytical perspectrive concerning the nature of the controlling system
and directs our attention to problems, not organizational hierarchy. To
complete the diagnosis, the last step left is to identify symptoms of
problems and rooms for improvement. However, in the following chpaters
(5 and 6), we shall continue our analysis on the operations concerning
power maintenance (which is a key functional area of the overall power
operations management task) and the control of real-time power
dispatcing (of which major emphasis will be on individual level decision
behavior), respectively. All the diagnostic assessments regarding
various levels' performance as well as some corresponding change
proposals will be discussed later on in Chapter 7.
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4.3.3 Summary of Chapter 4
This chapter devoted to the general description and analysis of the
characterisitcs of railroad motive power operations management. We
first analyze the technological aspect of the systems in question. The
work flows involved in the railroading processes are analyzed, the power
cycle hierarchy is identified. To analyze the interdependence among the
cycle components as well as the impacts of power operations on the rest
of the systems, a power availability measure and an aggregate service
impact model are presented. Based on this knowledge, we discuss the
issues involved in the control of various power cycles. We then
summarize the findings into a work unit matrix (power cycle components
vs. management cycle phases) which identifies the totality of the
control tasks of power management.
In the analysis of the controlling system, we first identify the
general roles of various departments in the host railroads, then focus
on the key actor - operations department, and anatomize its two major
sub-units - transportation and mechanical departemtns. Given the above
analysis, we document the relevant organization units (individual or
group of individuals). To gain more insights into the actual
functioning of the controlling mechanism, the system of operating
document priority adopted in the railroading processes is reviewed.
Based on the knowledge gained through the aove analysis, the
linkages between the two (controlling and controlled) systems can be
identified through the construction of the task-actor matrix as shown in
Exhibit 4-2-7. The data obtained in this chapter is not only essential
to the diagnosis of the macroscopic performance of power management, but
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also a general reference frame for the more microscopic analysis and
diagnosis into the systems to complete a thorough organization
intervention [*]. For instance, the analysis conducted in Chapters 5
and 6 can be viewed as an elaboration on some subset of the work units
and organization units identified in the general task-actor matrix -
more specifically, Chapter 5 amplifies the maintenance module of the
matrix, while Chapter 6 highlights the interface between the mechanical
and transportation departments' steering control tasks as well as the
work units taking care of by individual power dispatcher.
[*]: For some limited intervention endeavors, the diagnosis may be
terminated at the macrosopic level - they only have the chance to see
the "woods" but not the "tree"; or the other way. However, this is not
the case for this study.
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Chapter 5
THE MAINTENANCE FUNCTION
In this chapter, we amplify the maintenance module of the system.
The reasons to select this area are 1) maintenance is a key functional
activity which supports as well as constrains power utilization, 2) the
relationships between maintenance and transportation operations provide
an opportunity to observe problems concerning interdepartmental
coordination. The analysis of the maintenance function is basically
following the above two lines, i.e., on one hand, the total control
tasks and the control structure of the maintenance operations are
analyzed; on the other hand, the mutual-dependence between the
maintenance and transportation function is highlighted.
5.1 The System Being Controlled
5.1.1 Operations of Individual Shop and Engine Terminal
The elementary unit of a power maintenance system, depending on the
equipment installed, will consist of various facilites which range from
an engine terminal furnished only with minimum servicing equipments to a
power shop which is capable of performing heavy repairs. Power
maintenance facilities can be characterized by: 1) physical
characteristics - track, facility layout,etc., 2) procedural
characteristcs - standard operating procedures, job contents and job
priority for each craft,etc., 3) personnel characteristics - craft
class, number of men for each craft class in each shift.
For a typical power maintenance base, the principal components
include: 1) servicing facility which contains stations for fueling,
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watering and sanding operations, bays for inspection as well as pits for
running repairs, 2) repair facility comprised of a wheel shop, engine
shop, as well as an electric and control equipment shop, 3) criple and
dispatch tracks for placing out-of-order units and lining up ready units
respectively [ see Exhibit 5-1-1]. In the following, we shall examine
the servicing and maintenance activities in detail.
A. Servicing and Running Repair
General Nature of Servicing. In case of minor defects, running repairs
may be performed during servicing. Servicing and running repair are
maintenance activities operated at the "fire line". Their task is to
turnaround an inbound engine in serviceable condition as soon as
possible so as to assure maximum power availability and thus support
real-time transportation needs. The out-of-service time in the
servicing area is measured on a minute basis, while in the repair shop
the time measure is locomotive-days.
Servicing is an interface activity between the transportation and
mechanical operations. Typical jobs that take place in the engine
servicing process are: fueling, sanding, watering, safety inspection,
and occasional lube oil testing [*].
[*] Oil spectrographic testing: if the sample results are infavorable,
. e.g., some symptoms of malfunction of engine such as fuel leak/ water
leak/ air filteration/ etc., a history of samples for that locomotive
will be transmitted to the lab technician for his decision concerning
whether to issue an oil call - which lists the reasons for the call and
what actions should be taken. The corrective actions may 1) add a
treatment substance, 2) perform an inspection, 3) be an order for the
immediate shutdown of that locomotive.
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The decisions - which shall be made whenever an engine arrives the
engine terminal - include the following three major categories: one
must determine whether 1) the engine is on its inspection or project
due, 2) an en-route failure is reported, or 3) the engine is on the
storing unit list. If neither of the above is the case, then the engine
will be switched to servicing station, otherwise, the engine will be
sent to maintenance shop first. However, to serve a train, there are
usually more than one engine coupled together - which is called a power
consist - to provide enough horsepower; therefore, before the servicing
operations, one has to decide whether the consist shall be decomposed
into individual units. ( Mechanical man-hours could be saved if this
decision could be coordinated with the later power assignment decision.
That is, if the same consist can be used in a later outbound train, then
it may be preferable to retain the consist as it is during the servicing
process.) During the daily inspection process, one should determine
whether there is any identifiable minor or major defect and what to do
about the defect. For instance, one may choose to send the defected
unit to undergo a running repair, or if the defect is a minor one and
there is a high demand for power, then one may choose to defer the
repair work and send the unit back to service as soon as possible.
Exhibit 5-1-2 shows the typical power flow pattern exhibited in a rail
engine terminal. Exhibit 5-1-3 gives a distribution of power servicing
time [exerpted from Mao and Martland, 1982].
Procedural Characteristics of Servicing. The procedures and the rules
by which the various decisions are made with respect to the servicing
and movement of units in the service area are crucial to the efficiency
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EXHIBIT 5-1-3
Distribution of Servicing/Inspction Time
Observation = 155
Mean = 2.32 Hr
Std.Dev.= .98 Hr
SERVICING/INSPECTION TIME
(HOURS)
224
o r;
·,e
~-~;
of engine servicing.
Personnel Characteristics of Servicing. According to Kaufman [1980,
p.7]: "Because of the fact that railroad operations are highly
irregular, ... it is quite evident that all men cannot be regularly
assigned to specific runs or assignments ... personal discrimination
and favoritism might well arise ... For this reason many rules in the
railroad agreements are designed to prevent favoritism and to bring
about a fair distribution of work ..." To protect against any arbitrary
or capricious action of management, the craftline distinction of
maintenance workers is one of the major rail work rules which determines
the crew utilization patterns [*]. Exhibit 5-1-4 gives a typical craft
class and their engaged work in power servicing and terminal movement.
One may view this exhibit as an amplification of the execution phase's
maintenance - related elements in the general Task-Actor matrix.
B. Scheduled/Unscheduled Maintenance
The electrics, the diesel, the truck and the wheel are among the
components of a locomotive whose condition is mandated by the federal
government to be inspected periodically. Exhibit 5-1-5 is a sample of a
partial readout of two inspection schedules - one is on chronological
basis, the other is on an engine roster basis.
[*]: These work rules aim primarily to stabilize the conflicts in crew
utilization rather than to economize the utilization.
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There are two kinds of unscheduled maintenance. The first is
engine's unexpected defects, either occurring as a road failure or
detected during inspection. The second is, from the shop's point of
view, any engine assigned to a shop but not according to the shop's
origianl assignment schedule. This is in effect an unscheduled work
load to the shop. Unscheduled shoppings 1) reduce the actual
availability to a level lower than that calculated by a planned
maintenance schedule, 2) force shops to maintain an inefficient level of
work force [*] and material inventory. They will generally disrupt the
scheduled shop work process as well as material supply. In one road
surveyed, these unscheduled shoppings account for about one-half
(sometimes even up to two-thirds) of all the locomotive shoppings. This
implies that work loads and material supply cannot be consistantly
planned for more than half the work performed by the shop forces [Mao
and Martland, 1982]. As a result, many locomotive-days of scheduled
maintenance may be lost awaiting materials and shop forces because a
large share of these resources are absorbed by the unscheduled
shoppings. Exhibit 5-1-6 shows time distributions of scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance operations (exerpted from Mao and Martland,
1982).
[*] Though the work force is separated, the craft classes of a repair
shop is basically the same as those of servicing stations - see Exhibit
5-1-4.
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Unscheduled shoppings are in principle related to the amount of
preventive maintenance practiced by the railroad. Therefore, for
reliability reason, in addition to the mandatory inspections, a railroad
must find its own desired levels of preventive maintenance [*] which
will result in an affordable amount of road failures and unscheduled
shoppings for the road. The size of the locomotive fleet is in large
part determined by these levels, implicitly or explicitly. However,
according to a mechanical officer in Railroad A, their maintenance
operations were not preventive but "mandatory" oriented. An engine is
shopped either at the last minute of the inspection due time, or in a
failed condition. The major reason is that any preventive maintenance
must be proved "productive to justify the budget; but thus far there is
no such analysis or data available in the industry to suggest and defend
any engine preventive maintenance policy." Because preventive
maintenance is an important notion to mechanical reliabillity, it
deserves further elaboration.
[*]: Practical preventive maintenance refers to overhauling components
of the diesel engine and other key modules at regular intervals, and
after 1 to 3 overhaul, for instance, the engine will be given a complete
rebuilding usually at the middle of unit's economic life, 10-15 years.
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5.1.2 Notes on Power Reliability and Scheduled Maintenance
Scheduled inspection and maintenance, in principle, can be
categorized as a preventive maintenance practice based on system
parameters monitoring [Gertsbakh, 1977]. At the end of various
inspection periods, different levels of standard diagnostic procedures
are applied to an engine. For instance, the scope and depth of a 90-day
inspection is more thorough than a 45-day one, and so forth. In theory,
in a preventive maintenance system, what the maintenance officer
actually controls are the service policies of the equipments which
include the inspection period, the critical level for the controlled
parameters and the stopping rules regarding the use of the equipment
[ibid, p.8]. An optimal preventive maintenance policy should consist of
a set of optimal service policies.
In the context of locomotive maintenance, since the equipment is
such a sophisticated piece of machinery and the operating environment is
so complex, to our knowledge, explicit and practical quantitative guides
regarding the optimal power preventive maintenance policy have not yet
been developed. In a recent effort, Canadian Pacific reported the
followings [1977, pp.14-16]:
On Short-Term Periodic Inspection: "The datal inspection is
considered to be the backbone of our preventive maintenance policy.
As such, its effect should be measurable, and to this end we chose
to determine whether the occurrences of unscheduled shop visits and
road defects were influenced by the time elaspsed since the date of
inspection.
The results illustrated for unscheduled visits showed that the rate
of occurance was constant with them. While we initially concluded
that the datal did not appear to have any impact on subsequent
unscheduled event and defects. Discussion with Dr. A. K. S.
Jardine of University of Windsor. ........ made it clear that
such an outcome is to be expected. When discussing the question of
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evaluation of short-term inspections, which Dr. Jardine considered
to be the most difficult in the maintenance field, he stated that a
complex piece of machinery, such as locomotive with many- failure
modes, would be expected in sum, to exhibit constant rate of
occurrences. What the inspection frequency and content does do is
affect this rate and this can only be measured by experimentation.
The first stage in this process is to have an accurrate picture of
the defects and the reasons for repair, from which those items
requiring preventive maintenance can be identified and incorporated
in the inspection. Not having such information we were unable to
make any further analysis in this direction.
On Long-Term Replacement and Overhaul. "Gathered all available
data on labour laws, material, road failures and availability for a
group of SD-40's, these data were plotted with respect to time,
using the previous overhaul point as base zero. When suitably
smoothed, a trend towards a "bathtub" characteristic was observed
indicating the three phases of running-in (the post-overhaul
period), the period of least unscheduled work, and finally the
period of rising costs and failures.
Concurrent experiments in extending overhaul intervals on selected
units have just indicated that serious engine problems can be
developed if overhauls are deferred a year beyond the prescribed
value [5 years], also realizes that indefinite deferral of overhaul
result in excessive failures".
In this study, within the limited time frame and accessible data,
we failed either to find any sensible relationship between the
locomotive's unscheduled repairs, work load and maintenance schedules.
One major difficulty in studying the actual impact of preventive
maintenance on engine reliability by using existing data base is that
dne should factor out the effect of all intermediate inspections
(including running repairs performed during servicing) [*] between the
scheduled inspection and the observed failure. In fact, this is a
virtually intractable task except through some particular experimental
efforts as suggested by Dr. Jardine cited above.
[*]: More precisely, one should also factor out the effect of the
scheduled inspecitons prior to the preventive maintenance in study.
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In summary, although we have no way to determine how much room for
improvement there is left on the existing maintenance schedule , it is
plausible to conclude that the current mandatory inspection schedules do
have their preventive effect on power reliability; different quality of
diagnosis as well as workmanship do result in different failure rate.
Exhibit 5-1-7 gives a two-year monthly summary of reported road
failures, in terms of failure frequency/unit. [*]
5.1.3 Vehicle Technology and the Maintenance Logistic Systems
A. Impacts of Vehicle Technology Change
To illustrate the impact of vehicle design and technology on the
maintenance practices, the most dramatical examples are found during the
late 1950's and early 1960's dieselization movement in the U. S.
railroad industry. The following is a summary of various railroads'
experiences reported in Railroad Systems and Management Association's
"Railroad Motive Power Utilization, 1964, Chicago".
[*]: Road- failure record is a very controversial statistic. Both the
transportation and Mechanical departments maintain separate information
systems for recording road failures. The transportation data is based
on failures reported by engine crew and train dispatchers. The
mechanical sources are normally the same except that the department
judgementally determines whether an equipment failure did occur. For
instance, cases commonly reported as road failures include: 1) a stall
on a grade due to improper reporting of the train weight; 2) running out
of water / fuel en route; 3) failures due to component breakdown or
improper servicing which preventedthe unit from normal function. From
a mechanical viewpoint, only the last case consists of an actual
equipment failure.
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EXHIBIT 5-1-7 MONTHLY ROAD UNIT FAILURE PATTERN
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In addition to other operating advantages, diesel units are
generally perceived to be more maintainable and reliable, i.e., they
require less inspection in a given period and it takes shorter time to
complete the maintenance work. However, a more remarkable impact of
dieselization on maintenance is resulting from diesel unit's operational
characteristics. Due to the fact that the diesel engine can run much
longer mileage than the steamer locomotive before any servicing is
required, several significant changes have taken place since the
dieselization:
1) Railroads centralize their power distribution authority which was
previously a divisional responsibility - because diesel power can travel
far beyond the divisional boundary, it is no longer operationally
efficient to treat the diesel engines as divisional assets.
2) Railroads begin to consolidate their maintenance facilities to enjoy
the scale economy. Originally, servicing equipment was required at each
terminal; engine shops were distributed over the network, dieselization
makes many intermediate servicing points unnecessary and decentralized
maintenance operation inefficient.
3) More deliberate distribution effort will be required to bring an
engine back to the home-shop when it is due. For a non-home-shopping
system, in which an engine is not regularly assigned to a specific shop,
engine shops have to take care of more unexpected work load than before.
The lessons we can learn from the above historical events are that
vehicle technology will significantly affect 1) the availability and
reliability of the engine, 2) the maintenance policies, and 3)
eventually the maintenance logistic systems. When we put the above
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observations into perspective, they in fact highlight the importance of
matching the capability of maintenance systems with the transportation
operating characteristics. In the followings, we shall discuss some key
options concerning the maintenance logistic systems.
B. Maintenance Logistic System
General Maintenance System Structure. Since the nature of the physical
process of power maintenance can generally be categorized into two
classes [*], namely: operational servicing (including daily inspection
and running repair) and major maintenance (including scheduled
maintenance and unscheduled repair), the power maintenance system can be
structured into a two-level system accordingly, as in Railroad A. In
such a system there are certainly more servicing stations than repair
shops. Nontheless, there is an alternative structure which consists of
three levels, i.e., in addition to the second-level major maintenance
shops, there is a level of back-shops which perform the actual repair
work [**]. In this case, the second-level shops only perform basically
a replacement function, so as to minimize the power detention time.
[*]: Engine rebuilding certainly is another class. However, for
railroads with rebuilding capacity, like Railroad A, they usually
separate it from the normal maintenance function and operate the
rebuilding shop primaily as a contractor that can also accept outside
rebuilding projects on contract basis.
[**]: According to AAR's "Compendium of Locomotives and Cabooses
Information System", 1979, Union Pacific's maintenance system is so
structured.
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Pools of components funnished by the back shops must be stocked by the
replacement shops in this system, and all the replaced components are
delivered to the back-shops to undergo repairs. It is evident that the
three-level system tends to use higher material inventory cost to
trade-off shorter power out-of-service time.
In addition to the levels involved, another decision of maintenance
systemic structure is the degree of concentration. The location of
maintenance facilities inhibits the availability of the fleet. Too few
locations require longer travel time for necessary shoppings, whereas
too many locations make control difficult. In Railroad A, there are
more than ten (level-two) engine shops in operations. For many
mechanical officers in the railroad, such a system is considered to be
too decentralized and uneconomical to operate. However, they are short
of capital to consolidate the facilities.
Shopping Assignment Policy and Mechanism. Assigning the maintenance
responsiblity of each individual unit to a specific shop tends to
improve reliability [Emerson, 1975]. This is the so called
home-shopping policy. In addition to the advantage of clear
accountability, this policy also makes the shop work load more
predictable and material inventory more controllable. However, a strict
home-shopping policy may result in extra nonproductive power deadheading
mileages by returning engines home for either scheduled or unscheduled
maintenance, or excessive power idle hours when those engines which will
be due shortly are held at their respective home terminals awaiting
scheduled maintenance to save the otherwise required distribution
effort. In both cases, fleet availability suffers.
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In addition to the accountability of engine reliability, another
important consideration is shop workload to the design of shopping
policy. Due to the uncertain nature of unscheduled maintenance, strict
home shopping policy may result in an imbalanced distribution of
workload of shops in the system from time to time. To efficiently
utilize the shop capacity and to maintain desirable availability,
shopping assignment policy should be sufficiently flexible to allow some
balancing of workload among shops, although this balancing should be
minimized if responsibility integrity for individual units is to be
sustained.
Either for the purpose of minimizing the loss of fleet availability
associated with the shopping operation, or for the purpose of shop
workload balancing, the coordination between the mechanical and
transportation control officers is vital. Some railroads consider shop
workload balancing as a priority maintenance policy; they even assign a
mechanical liaison officer working together with the power dispatchers
in the same office to schedule power shopping activities on a real-time
basis [RSMA, 1964; AAR,1979]. However, this is not the mechanism
employed by Railroad A.
Material Control. Spare parts inventory is an important element of
power maintenance logistic systems. Inadequate control of power spare
parts not only can cause excessive parts inventory cost, but also can
prolong the out-of-service time of power. Usually two categories of
items should receive particular attention, namely, high use rate items
and high cost items. The stock level of the first category is
preferably kept high and the second category low.
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5.1.4 The Total Maintenance Task
In summary, maintenance is a rather complicated function. Although
the floor level control tasks are easy to be recognized, high level
tasks are not as apparent, e.g., the design and operations of the
maintenance logistic systems. The development of a proper conceptual
framework (which guides the identification of the control tasks at all
levels) is essential to the analysis and assessment of the maintenance
performance (as well as to the proper discharge of the maintenance
responsibility). To do this, in this section (5.1) we investigate the
nature of the control tasks and their interrelations involved at various
levels of maintenance operations. Given this knowledge, we are able to
synthesize the total control tasks concerning power maintenance.
A Causal Map of Maintenance Decision
Before we synthesize the maintenance control task hierarchy, let us
first summarize the causal reltionships discussed thus far.
Since high engine utilization is dependent on availability, and
engine availability in turn is dependent on the efficiency (time
required) and effectiveness (reliability) of maintenance operations,
availability and reliability constitute the core of the maintenance
tasks. Centered around such a core, Exhibit 5-1-8 gives a summary of
the causality regarding maintenance decisions discussed in this chapter.
Briefly, vehicle technology is essential to the selection of
maintenance policies, while the maintenance policies can be categorized
into two major groups: the "service policies" of the equipment which
include policies on inspection intervals, critical level of controlling
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parameters and stopping rules; the other is the choice of the logistic
systems which include the choice of the maintenance systemic structure,
material control policy, and shopping assignment policy and mechanism.
Equipment service policies set the tune of the required maintenance
standards and work quality, as well as directly determine the achievable
level of power reliability. The performance of material control has a
direct bearing on fleet availability and maintenance cost; while the
practice of shopping assignment in conjunction with power cycling
operations determine the shop workload which in turn affects maintenance
quality, and eventually the engine reliability.
Control Tasks Hierarchy of Maintenance Operations
To facilitate our later analysis on task responsibility, we can
translate the interrelationships shown above into a control task
hierarchy in matrix form as shown in Exhibit 5-1-9.
Briefly, because maintenance function is operated within the
general (meta-control sturcture)of power management, in the maintenance
module our concern starts from the work units relating to maintenance
cycle. The control tasks involved in the power maintenance cycle in
general include: 1) the planning of maintenance logistic systems,
facility locations, service policies and various standard operating
procedures; 2) the execution of serviceable fleet standards, maintenance
budget, mechanical quality standards and related transportation service
quaity standards; and 3) the review of fleet availability, maintenance
costs, and the system's train performance relating to maintenance
function. The execution phase of the above tasks can be further
elaborated by breaking them down into two sets of components, i.e.,
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scheduled and unscheduled mantenance, and servicing operations. In
practice, they may carried out in an interrelated way. The tasks
involved include: 1)the planning of maintenance schedule, shop manning
level, material handling policy, as well as the intervention in train
schedules if necessary, 2) the execution of shopping assignment, shop
floo supervision, material control, mechanical quality control,
servicing supervision, and the train/power dispatching coordination, and
3) the review of shop count, shopping time, unit reliability, shop
expenses, servicing count, servicing time and terminal train performance
accountable for maintenance.
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5.2 The Controlling System
5.2.1 Engaged Actors
From a power cycle control point of view, in the maintenance
context, there are three major sets of control tasks: the control of the
power maintenance cycle in general, the control of scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance operations, and the control of the power
operating cycle related to the servicing operations. The actors engaged
in the above three tasks are identified in Exhibit 5-2-1, by following
Railroad A's Mechanical Department structure as given in Chapter 4.
Looking more closely at the floor level management, Exhibit 5-2-2
shows the organization of a major power maintenance shop in Railroad A.
Management is primarily organized on a work-shift basis and along
distinct craft lines. Among the positions on the organization chart,
shop coordinator deserves our particular attention; he plays a liaison
role between the transportation and shop operations. In other words, in
Railroad A, there is no central maintenance scheduler to coordinate the
workload among major shops, but such coordination task is normally taken
care during the daily 9 A. M. telephone conference which is chaired by
the General Superintendent-Mechanical, or the shop coordinators and
Division Master Mechanic in case of an emergency.
Engine terminals which primarily perform servicing function, have
much smaller staffs (refer to Exhibit 5-1-4). The foreman in charge of
the servicing operation usually reports directly to the Division Master
Mechanic who in turn coordinates with other divisions and the power
control center. Nevertheless, in any situation, the power control
center can directly contact servicing foremen to determine power status
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Exhibit 5.-2-
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or ask them to prepare power consists for outbound trains.
Given the actors engaged in the maintenance operations, in the
followings we shall examine how they actually perform their roles.
5.2.2 Maintenance Control in Practice
To examine actual maintenance control practices, we concentrate on
three aspects: shop level supervision (including both servicing
operation, major inspection and repairs), shopping assignment and power
status monitoring, and general maintenance performance control.
A. Shop Level Supervision
The supervision of shop performance is basically comprised of the
control of resources (including human and material) and the control of
maintenance physical process. The control of manning level and parts
inventory are tasks with a relatively long time frame as compared with
the control of flow level of maintenance operations. In a sense, the
former two provide an operating environment for the latter. The shop
Superintendent and the Master Mechanic are the persons in charge of the
workforce and material supplies for their respective shop or division.
By and large, these decisions are made within the frame of a monthly
shop (or division) budget. The general foreman is normally the person
in charge of the flow level maintenance operation.
Control of Maintenance Physical Process. Based on the interview data
from Railroad A, the control of maintenance physical process may be
described as follows. At the beginning of each shift, the general
foreman first looks at the turnover report prepared by the preceding
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shift's general foreman (sample shown in Exhibit 5-2-3) regarding what
work remains. Then he will check the crewforce statement (sample shown
in Exhibit 5-2-4) and the parts inventory statement prepared by the
clerk in the shop superintendent (or master mechanic's) office,
concerning the available man power and material. After that, he refers
to the maintenance schedule as well as the train schedule and estimates,
implicitly or explicitly, the incoming workload. Finally, he asks the
Superintendent or Master Mechanic for special instructions, and then
sketches out a working plan for his shift regarding crew assignments and
job priority. Certainly, revision of the plan is necessary whenever an
operating contingency occurs. Exhibit 5-2-5 gives an output rate
profile of a Railroad A's major repair shop, which represents an outcome
of the interactions among manning level, material supply status, work
planning and execution, maintenance schedule, shopping assignment and
power dispatching requirements.
Putting the above introspections into the frameowrk of the expert's
cognitive process suggested in Chapter 2, because of the repetitive
nature of the work, an experienced general foreman will develop a number
of rules of thumb for the sketching of his working plan. By applying
such a heuristic, it usually will not take long for them to work out a
plan. Indeed, the key questions are: How good is the plan? Are better
plans feasible? and How could they be developed? In this regard, the
design of some accountable performance indices becomes critical to the
evaluation of a general foreman's performance. Moveover, these indices
should be capable of not only reflecting the efficiency and
effectiveness of the working plan, but also the nature of the execution
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Exhibit 5-2-3 EXAMPLE OF ENGINE REPAIR-SHOP TURNOVER REPORT
(Prepared by 11 - 7 Shift General Foreman)
73/- :.* •''. .c. ..I //. .O. . - .
,o, 7 -7 " I
i7- , -. O-7"i, • 6d , .l.. Q/- /4 -"';. c . C.. a .l .. 4 ", . ,
8 0 3 4 - d -
- 0. ':
80.3 -4 .- ( Z
847 A- - -.,-ad ',: J Aj
9 178 - 90- . '- clc (.,,o
8992- 4 0 " - P. oi
7s4 ,- ,- . ,. 37 7. # , "]" . /.y#
a. • - t,-i / - - - ,; l
, -Ž . -,C , .r. t647- edod-r -AT-t
7-O J - E: . <•; c ,.- 6 1 a
4007-- As,..- o /. ,.
;/o- .9 o. .C IA/4 o0 - •ul - • <, . ,,., -j
7 6 ". / d " f- ./ 7 -, -t
,;;O- , -;,. .. , •Aq -,; ,. ." . .
. .. / : , , ,r .N.z io-.. rid
/ - . ," " . ',. "
647- -:sOO - 4/ /.- -
,,14-.e m c, i.f -A" g Ti.
l o4- _ . , " . ) . ,]-. , ,
.,•. ,. ,, •;,, -,/i ,....,• .:... • :,C/ ,:
249
Exh 4 4bt 5-2-4
WEEKLY SHOP MANNING LEVEL CONTROL SHEET (Railroad B)
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Exhibit 5 -2-5.
of the plan (which includes the control of work quality). We shall
return to this point later.
B. Shop Assignment and Power Status Monitoring
Shop Assignment. The importance of shopping asssignment comes from its
impact on shop workload. Usually, scheduled maintenance in a
home-shopping system and servicing operations for scheduled trains'
power consists do not cause trouble to shops or service stations,
because they are anticipated. The real problem is the unscheduled work.
In the following, a communication locus concerning the handling of
engine road failure is presented which sheds light on the underlying
mechanism for the assignment of unscheduled maintenance work ( Exhibit
5-2-6).
When road failure occurs, the responsible Division Master Mechanic
is notified through the Division Train Master. The Master Mechanic
informs the power control center as well as orders the local engine
terminal preparing to receive the dead engine. In many cases, the
Master Mechanic also asks the train engineman about the problems
through radio. In any case, the local maintenance crew will diagnose
the engine after its arrival and report to the Master Mechanic about the
type and amount of work to be done.
If the work can not be handled in the Master Mechanic's division
for some reasons (e.g., lack of necessary part, repair equipment, crew
speciality, or all facilicities has been overloaded already), then he
will select and contact the appropriate shop superintendent or
coordinator to ask for an agreement to accept the bad-order. Given the
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Exhibit 5-2-6
(ENGINE ENROUTE FAILURE) SHOPPING PROCEDURE
253
EMERGENCY
confirmation from the negotiating repair shop, the Mechanic will next
request the power control center to deadhead the engine, while the
center will determine the time and train number to make the delivery.
Finally, the local maintenance officer will be notified to make ready
for the deadheading. The key to the whole process is the choice the
Master Mechanic made on the candidate repair shops, and the basis for
him to negotiate afterwards.
Power Status Monitoring. Detailed information on the fleet status is
essential to power dispatch operations. Efficient communication between
the maintenance officers and the power control center is the premise of
efficient utilization of power. The flow chart shown in Exhibit 5-2-7
illustrates the operating procedures adopted in the engine shopping
process in Railroad A (this flow chart is a an elaboration of the shop
movement components of power flow shown in Exhibit 5-1-2). Particular
attention should be given to the role played by the shop coordinator.
The tasks performed by the coordinator include: 1) assigning the engine
to tracks that lead to areas which perform certain specific work, and 2)
keeping power control center informed concerning the change in the
engine's status (e.g., the beginning of a new process, completing an old
process). For local servicing stations, such a coordination role may be
taken by designated foreman or Master Mechanic himself in case the
stations encounter a work balance problem.
The above observations also indicate that there are channels
through which the power control office can exercise its influence on the
maintenance operations. When an engine passes through a branch point of
the shop's process, the shop coordinator may contact the responsible
254
Exhibit 5-2-7 MAINTENANCE SHOP STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
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power dispatcher. In case of a power shortage, the power dispatcher can
then affect the mechanical officer's subsequent decisions through the
same communication channel; for instance, influencing them to alter
their work plan or priority, or increase the immediate size of power
pool to satisfy a pressing demand. Exhibit 5-2-8 shows the relations
between the power pool size and shop count in one terminal area. The
point is that the opportunity to pull more shopped units back to service
usually exists, yet the key questions are: 1).Whether it is necessary,
since this parctice implies the remaining units may stay longer due to
reallocation of (concentration of) man-power, and 2) If necessary, on
what basis the power dispatcher can exercise his intervention
effectively? One should remember that there is no formal authority
relationships between him and the shop officers.
C. General Maintenance Performance Control
There are at least four levels of tasks involved in the control of
general maintenance performance: daily telephone operating conference,
periodic performance and policy review, annual budgeting and long-term
systemic improvement.
Daily Telephone Conference. The daily telephone conference is an
important coordination mechanism adopted by railroads (in Chapter 6, we
shall discuss the transportation version of the operating conference).
In Railroad A, the maintenance operating conference is held on a
regional basis (there are two regions in the system) and chaired by the
Regional General Superintendent-Mechanical (RGSM) who is in charge of
region-wide operations and reports directly to VPM.
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The function of the conference is principally to 1) give the RGSM
opportunity to review daily performance and to coordinate operations in
the region (balance shop work-load, set work priority and so forth), and
2) give the Shop Superintendents and Division Master Mechanics an
opportunity to get immediate feedback regarding their performance, put
forth their specific requests, and receive from RGSM special operating
instructions concerning the coming day's operations. Exhibit 5-2-9 and
5-2-10 show two sample reports which will be referenced during the
conference. The first is a 5 A. M. shop count report, which stands
for the number of engines out-of-service in a particular engine
terminal. When summed up across the system, in Railroad A this measure
stands for the shop-margin of the fleet for the day; therefore, shop
count is in fact the operational basis for calculating the daily
serviceable fleet. The second report is a summary record of locomotive
en-route failures occurring in the previous day, and it will eventually
reach the VPM's desk every morning. In fact, this report reflects, only
in part, the fleet reliability during the last 24 hours, because a
complete reliability measure should cover all the unscheduled repairs of
which road failures are only a part. However, the road failure record
is the only available reliability report in the railroad.
Periodic Performance and Policy Review. Daily performance is sensitive
to the variability of the rail operations; therefore, for evaluation
purpose, average performance through a relatively long period (e.g., a
week, or a month) is usually a more appropriate measure. In the power
maintenance context of Railroad A, the principal performance target
applied throughout the year is a 10% rule - shop margin of the fleet
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Exhibit 5-2-9
EXAMPLE OF 5 A.M. SHOP-COUNT REPORT
(Prepared by 11 P.M. - 7 A.M. General Foreman)
(Used by Division Master Mechanics in 9 A.M. Telephone Conference)
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should be no more than 10% - the primary calculation basis is the daily
5 A. M. system shop count. The actual achieved shop margin, in terms
of monthly average, normally ranges from 8% to 12%. According to a
senior operating officer, the designation of the 10% rule dates from the
early years of dieselization of the railroad and the rule has been left
unreviewed ever since. In other words, no deliberate review process
concerning the policy of fleet availability existed in the road.
Exhibit 5-2-11 shows two monthly shop performance summary reports
prepared by the Information System Manager of Mechanical Department
regarding the average out-of-service time for each type of scheduled
maintenance and the manitenance expenses. From the above
performance-report, one can find that relatively few units underwent
scheduled maintenance without having unscheduled repair work done, for
instance, for the 45-day inspection the ratio is 38 out of 106.
Annual Budgeting and Long-Term System Improvement. Maintenance
budgeting is basically a top-down process in Railroad A. The "flat"
serviceable fleet policy (10% rule), the approximately constant fleet
size and incrementally changed train schedules result in a comparatively
stable average maintenance workload which makes annual budgeting
relatively straightforward. Primarily becase ther is no explicit policy
review concerning with appropriateness of existing maintenance
practices.
5.2.3 Linkages Between the Two Systems
A. Task-Actor Matrix
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The observations and findings presented above can be summarized in
terms of the relationships between the control tasks and responsible
actors as shown in Exhibit 5-2-12. In fact, this Task-Actor matrix is
an elaboration on the maintenance module in the general Task-Actor
matrix as shown in Exhibit 4-2-7. Further detailed diagnostic
assessment and change recommendations will be discussed in Chapter 7.
B. Summary
Maintenance is a key functional activity which supports as well as
constrains power utilizaton. The knowledge on maintenance operations is
issential to the assessment of overall power management performance.
The relationships between maintenance and transportation operations also
provide us with an opportunity to observe problems concerning the
process of interdepartmental coordination. In additon, this chapter
also shows how to develop work units in a specific functional area based
on theoretical and practical insights into the technological system to
be managed, and how to apply these insights to describe and analyze the
controlling function of maintenance operations. From the methodology
point of view, this chapter shows how to apply various descriptive and
analytical techniques, e.g., work unit (control tasks) matrix,
communication locus analysis, task-actor matrix, etc., in a specific
performance area to generate and document data essential to the later
phasses of intervention (i.e., diagnosis, prescription and action). The
insights gained in this chapter also facilitate more microscopic
diagnosis through the provision of contextual information.
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EXHIBIT 5-2-12 MAINTENANCE TASK-ACTOft MATRIX
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Engine Shopping Assign
Train Dispt. Coord.
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Chapter 6
THE STEERING CONTROL OF POWER OPERATING CYCLE
Given the knowledge of Meta-Control Structure (Chapter 4) that
characterizes the general operating context within which power managers
perform, as well as the nature of the supporting maintenance function
(Chapter 5) that imposes the primary constraints on real-time engine
availability, we are ready to discuss the control of the power
operating cycle.
* In the following sections on the controlled system side, we will
first examine certain key determinants which directly govern the
performance of the power operating cycle, and then we will translate
these determinants into decision variables. Performance indices
corresponding to these decisions are specified as well. The goal is to
shed light on the causal relations underlying the physical process,
which can be manipulated by power managers through their control
decisions.
On the controlling system side, given the higher level decision
premises discussed in the preceding chapters, we can narrow our focus
down to real-time operating control issues. Starting from group-level
activities to individual decision processes, the analysis reveals the
nature of the progressive decision-making processes, the characteristics
of individual decision-making processes, and the interactions between
individual and team performance. Through such an analysis, the goal is
to pin-point the potential areas for improvement and to indicate the
nature of needed changes.
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6.1 The System Being Controlled
The dynamics involved in rail power operations are complex which
relate to complicated interactions among those factors such as tonnages,
linehaul running time, detention time at terminal, bad orders, and
maintenance and repair times. For analysis purposes, we divide the
operation into two major categories: linehaul and terminal.
6.1.1 Linehaul Operations
Linehaul speed is, to a very large extent, governed by physical
laws and is the traditional emphasis of transportation engineers. The
remaining major factor concerning linehaul performance is en-route
delay caused by congestion. Exhibit 6-1-1 gives a further breakdown of
the cause-effect relationships.
A. Train Motion and the Demand-Tailored Power Unit
The power on railroad trains is typically closely tailored to the
actual transportation requirements. For most main line trains, multiple
engine units are used to form a power consist. Due to the complex
interaction of locomotion forces, gradient and curvature, train motion
usually cannot be predicted by simple analytic formula but by
simulation [ Morlok, 1976, p.169], although the fundamental rules are
relatively straightforward, namely, 1) the minimum number of motor axles
(lower bound)- which generates the required total tractive force and in
turn can be translated into the required number of locomotive units - is
determined by ruling grades and /or desired accelerations; and 2) total
power (upper bound) is determined by speed or travel time of a train
(as imposed by time table). However, for some line sections, the
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loading limits of a structure, e.g., bridge, track, and road-bed, may
also constrain the maximum axle weight.
In practice, to facilitate the task of assigning power to trains,
railroad management usually specifies the desired speed for each train,
applicable ton-per-horsepower ratio or tonnage rating for each type of
locomotive, and the maximum allowable axle weight in each line segment.
Exhibit 6-1-2 gives an example of such a special operating instruction -
including speed restrictions, locomotive tonnage rating and engine
restrictions. Here, the tonnage rating and ton-per-horsepower ratio
deserve further explaination.
Tonnage Rating. The maximum tonnage that a specific locomotive can haul
over a given territory at a specific minimum speed is called its
tonnange rating. Detailed derivation of the tonnage rating formula can
be found in the Appendix of this chapter. Since the usual speed of a
train ascending a grade is between 10 and 20 mph, that is the speed at
which engine produces maximum tractive force [Armstrong,19791; the key
limiting factor of an engine's tonnage rating is then the ruling grade
of the territory in question. In short, tonnage rating is the
discounted (according to the ruling grade) total pay load an engine can
haul over a given road segment. In other words, this rating is used to
specify the minimum number of engine units needed to satisfy the minimum
service requirement, given the tons to be moved.
Ton-Per-Horsepower Ratio (W/P Ratio). An alternative to the tonnage
rating as a power assignment guideline is a load factor, which gives the
maximum allowable ton-per-horsepower (W/P) for each train on each
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EXAMPLE OF SPECIAL OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
-- SPEED LIMITS, ENGINE RESTRICTIONS,
ENGINE TONNAGE RATING (Railroad C)
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
MPH
ALL SUBDIVISIONS All Trains
Through all switches, except where another speed
is prescribed:
Dual Control switches and spring switches .... 20
SAllother switches and crossovers ........... 10
Approaching "19" indication train order signal
until rearof train has passed ................. 30
TRAINS HANDLING ORE CARS
On lst.2ndand3rd Subidvisions .............. 30
On Line and 4th. 5th. 6th. 7th and 8th Sub-
divisions .................................. 25
TRAINS HANDLING SCALE TEST CARS
Except X-870 ...................... 25
Locomotives with friction bearings when handled
deadinatrain ............................... 25
TRAINS HANDLING PIVOTING MACHINERY ON
ITS OWN WHEELS, derricks, pile drivers, cranes,
et., except wreckers
On lst,2nd and 3rd Subdivisions .............. 25
On 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Subdivisions and on
Line . ........................... 20
(Note: Locomotive cranes 258054 and DS-823--
speed shown applies only when boom end is trail-
ing. Born Car must be behind crane. When lined
up otherwise, handle only on separate in-
structions)
WRECKERS 'Freight
Diesel & Steam Wreckers with boom end trailing Train
and boom car behind. Speed
*Unless slower speed required as directed by
wrecker foreman. Conductor will confer with
wrecker foreman to determine soeeoa desired.
FIRST SUBDIVISION
MAXIMUM SPEED ................... ....... 40
EXCEPTIONS:
MP I78.9- Crossing, Jct., until crossing
isoccupied .............................. 20
MP 205.8- -over St., 1st
crossing west of depot....................... 10
MP 205.9-' -through First Subdivri-
sion turnout ............................... 10
MP 252.6- Crossing, 3.7 miles west of
,until crossing is occupied ............. 20
LINE.............................. . 30
EXCEPTIONS:
MP 210-MP 236.3- Between' .and 20
SECOND SUBDIVISION
MAXIMUM SPEED .......................... 40
EXCEPTIONS:
City-on Uptown Track over first curve
crossing highway and two curves at bridge ...... 5
MP294.0-297.0-Between .Cityand 30
MP 314.5-MP 314.9 :-between i
Line Crossing and Third Street ......... I 20
MP 330.72- trains using siding over first I
Crossing•eastof depot ....................... 5
" I LINE ...................... 10
LOCOMOTIVE MRAXTING 1NTNSOF 2.000 POUNDS BETWEEN
SEVENTH AND EIGHTH SUBDIVISIONS
WESTWARD HORSEPOWER
PoM To s17 I5Iwo 12oo
......... 3400 000 2125
........ .......... 3100 270 157I5S
.. .......... ...... 3800 3300 190
........ooo3000 2600 1550
......... ....... 3500 3100 1775
.. ..... ......... 4 3 X) i 200
........... 3500 3100 1800
.......... .......... 
3300 2900 1650
......... 3800 3400 2125
............ ............ 3300 2900 1550
..... 3900 3450 2475
...... .. 3100 2700 1950
..... .......... 2100 1800 300
.......... .......... 2600 2300 16es
.......... ........ 5700 5000 350
........... Ryder........... 3800 3300 1950
.
........... 
NewTown 
....... 
3900 
3400 
2125
EASTWARD
From To
........ ........ 2100 1525
..... ....... 3800 3300 1950
....... ......... 3700 3200 2300
2600 2300 1600
............... 3900 3400 2450
, ....... .......... 4500 4000 2953S
............... 4000 3450 2450
. 5300 4900 31.2,
.......... 3000 2600 1575
3800 3400o 2:25
.24W00 2 .C 1is
2900 2500 1500
.... . ..... 93000 25W asM
......... ........... 3000 2600 1850
............ ........... 5200 4500 3175
S6300 SF00 . 350
0... o  3o00 1775
.......... ............ 3700 31 300 2350
NOTE: These ratings are for single units.
Locomotive ratings in tons of 2000 pounds lfo 2000. 2:50. 2400. and 2500
horsepower units is 150% or the ratings lor 100 horseower units
ENGINE RESTRICTIONS
Fourth, Filth, Sixth. Seventh and Eighth Subdivisions
And the & Lines
1. Do not operate four axle locomotives exceeding a total
weight of 267,000 Ibs.
2. Do not operate six axle locomotives except Unit No.
"(SD-9).
Second Subdivision-Locomotives with six wheel trucks will
not be operated on the middle transfer track at
Third Subdivision-At locomotives cannot be operated
beyond clearance point of track 15 (!oading platform track).
When pusher engines are used at the rear of trains to assist on
grades, the following restrictions will apoly:
1. No more than two units may be used to pi sh trains. If
pusher engine consist exceeds two units. the excess
units must be isolated and left idling.
2. When total power of pusher engine consist exceeas
3.000 horse power. not including units idling in consist
controller must not be advanced beyond the fourth (4tn)
position.
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EXHIBIT 6-1.2
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section of line under a given speed requirement. The underlying
principle of this approach is similar to that of tonnage rating. The
major difference is the means of expression - in W/P ratio approach, the
running speed is an explicit independent variable (refer to Appendix).
Therefore, this ratio can be used to specify the power assignment rules
for high speed service, not only the minimum speed. Exhibit 6-1-3 shows
the typical relationship between W/P ratio and linehaul speed.
Practical Considerations of Power Assignment. Economy usually rules out
frequent consist changes. In actual practice, it is not uncommon to
compromise grade and speed requirements at ruling locations, i.e.,
overpower the train to maintain desired speed at ruling grades ( e.g.,
TOFC service), or apply ruling grade-minimum power and sacrifice some
speed on flat terrain to minimize power requirement.
If a power consist is made up of units with different tonnage
ratings, tonnage for the consist is calculated by multiplying the number
of units by the rating of the lowest rated units. If the units are not
compatible, there is usually some loss of performance of the more
capable units - maximum speed is limited to the unit with lowest gear
ratio.
The fuel consumed by an engine can be estimated from the total work
performed on that engine trip. However, when a train is "overpowered",
more fuel will be consumed per gross-ton-mile than in normal
situations. Exhibit-6-1-4 depicts such a relationship. (Nevertheless,
within the range of the sampled data, the fuel consumption is positively
related to workload and negatively related to running speed as shown in
the regression equation given in Exhibit 6-1-4.)
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Although data collected in this research are not sufficient to
establish the relationship between an engine's workload (both in terms
of time used and mileage travelled) and its maintenance need (refer to
Chapter 5), according to Armstrong [1979, p.170], scheduling train speed
very close to a locomotive's rating may result in high traction motor
maintenance need. In other words, maintenance prefers conservative
assignment.
B. Line Capacity-Related Decisions
Because of the interactions between scheduling, dispatching, and
the physical characteristics of the line, line capacity can be defined
in a number of ways. The physical capacity of a railroad line can be
specified as a function of train length, speed, headway, distance
between sidings, and the nature of the traffic control system [ Little,
1982, p. 111. According to Manheim [ 1979, p. 271], "although
physical capacity is usually a well-defined concept, workable practical
definitions of capacity must be related explicitly to the level of
delay." However, on our host railroads, the line congestion problem is
a minor one relative to other more pressing issues such as the control
of terminal operations.
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Exhibit 6-1-3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TON/HP AND LINEHAUL SPEED
Data Source: Railroad A's "Fuel Consumption of Locomotive in TOFC Service"
Nov. 1976.
Average Linehaul Distance = 480 miles.
Average Horse-Power / Unit = 2400 HP.
Test Locomotive Pool = 15 units [ 6xGP40, 5xGP10, 4xGP38 ].
No. Test Runs = 14.
North Bound:
South Bound:
Ln(Speed)= 3.13 - .35 * Ln(GT/HP)
(R2=.67, t=32.65, -3.2)
Ln(Speed)= 2.84 - .39 * Ln(GT/HP)
(R2=.75, t=21.68, -3.8)
K
North Bound
South Bound
0,20 0.40 0.60 0.80 .1.00
GROSS-TON / HORSE-POWER
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Exhibit64l-4FUEL CONSUMPTION VS. ENGINE WORK LOAD AND SPEED
Data Source: Railraod A's " Fuel Consumption of Locomotive in
TOFC Service", Nov. 1976
Average Linehaul Distance = 480 miles.
Average Horse-Power / Unit= 2,400 HP.
Test Locomotive Pool = 15 units [6XGP40, 5XGP1O, 4XGP38]
Number of Test Runs = 14.
3
•m U
In(GAL/GTM) = .522 * In(TON/HP)
(R2 = .83, t = 6.44,U
mm.
U
ln(GAL/GTM) = .522 * In(TON/HP)
(R2 = .83, t = 6.44,
- .048 * In(SPEED)
-1.77)
0,20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20
GROSS-TON / HORSE-POWER
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6.1.2 Terminal Operations
Recalling the interactions between the power cycle and freight car
cycle mentioned in Chapter 4, the linelhaul movement is the only
component in which both vehicles are interlocked. In other words, the
linehaul performance of one vehicle can be directly translated into that
of the other. However, this is not the case in the terminal operations.
Once a train arrives at a terminal, freight cars and power consist are
usually decoupled; and they will then be sent into two totally different
processes before being reconnected and departing from the terminal
again.
Since the power process is perceived as a supporting task to car
movement, in order to assess the power terminal performance, it becomes
necessary to briefly examine the nature of the operations of car
switching first.
A. Car Switching Processes
General Procedures. The car switching process can be generally divided
into three phases - receiving, classification and assembly. From a
control point of view, the essential decisions involved in each phase
can be identified as follows [after "Freight Car Utilization and
Railroad Reliability: Case Studies", AAR Report Number R-283, 1977,
pp.302-303]:
1. Receiving Phase
1) track assignment of arriving train
2) number of crew required/available to inspect trains
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3) clerical support required to finish the paper work promptly
2. Classification Phase
Planning:
1) classification priority of cars
2) assigned tracks to particular blocks
3) manning level and allocation of switching crew and engines
Execution: If a track is full,
1) should an overflow track be established?
2) should that track be pulled before continuing classification?
3) should additional cars for that block be sent to a re-hump
track?
3. Trimming and Assembling Phase
1) crew manning and assignment
2) timing and block order of train assembling
3) in case of tonnage constraints, which traffic should be delayed?
Exhibit 6-1-5 is a schematic summary of the control decisions,
their premises and consequences concerning the car switching process in
a terminal area. The influence of power operations will come into play
at the last step in the process.
Complicating Factors
On the surface, the freight car switching process may look very
much like the stage-wise manufacturing production line. However, one
distinctive feature of rail service is the variability of the
throughput. To gain the necessary stability required by efficient
operations, the manufacturing process can be isolated from the exposure
of fluctuating demand by inventory stocks. For transportation systems,
on the contrary, producing prompt service to both expected and
unexpected demand is the business of the industry. Therefore, all the
decisions specified in the preceding sections should take into account
the variability of traffic patterns.
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Exhibit 6-1-6 shows the average weekly profiles (base on four
consecutive weeks' data) of arrived cars, departed cars and car
inventory in a major terminal of railroad B. It is not uncommon that
the actual traffic level is 20 to 30% higher or lower than the average
level - an amount which may be well beyond the tolerable limit of any
predetermined operating plan. From power management's point of view,
the variability of terminal thoughtput means variability of demand for
power service. It is the need to respond to the variabilities
effectively that makes the real-time control of power operation
challenging.
B. Train and Power Dispatching
Operational Buffer - Power Pool at the Dispatch Tracks. The mechanism
railroads employ to cope with the abovementioned uncertainty is the
creation of various operational buffers (e.g., resources pools) to
absorb the unexpected variations, and to localize the impact of these
variations. From a power management perspective, both the assembled car
blocks at the forwarding yard and the lined up engines at the dispatch
tracks can be conceived of as such operational buffers.
In the completion of servicing or maintenance, engines will be
lined up at the dispatch tracks to constitute a pool of power that can
be allocated in any desirable way to the subsequent outbound trains. In
other words, it is this power pool which insulates the mechanical
department's maintenance operation from the transportation department's
train/power dispatching operations.
Since the train crew should be called one-and-a-half hours earlier
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than the anticipated train departure time, and power will usually be
confirmed available before the calling for crew. An approximate
two-hour time-lead was observed between the profiles of the power pool
and outbound power (Exhibit 6-1-7) [Mao and Martland, 1981]. This
correlation in pattern may have resulted from a mutual adjustment
between the practices of train and power dispatching - when power is
unavailable, outbound trains must be held; and similarly, in the
anticipation of a great deal of outbound trains in a terminal area, more
power may be distributed to the terminal in advance, and faster power
service may be found to replenish the power pool quickly.
Train Depature Performance. To dispatch a train, several necessary
conditions must be satisfied, such as the availability of power and
crew, and the completion of car switching and train assembling. A train
would be delayed if any of these conditions were not met. Nevertheless,
when all these conditions are satisfied, a train may still be delayed
because of other operating contingencies.
Put into the classical production function framework of micro-
economics, to satisfy a given level of demand, the above two operational
buffers, i.e., car queues at forwarding yard and the power pool, are the
mechanisms a railroad can use to trade-off the utilization of two
essential resources - power-hours and car-hours. In other words, to
serve a given amount of traffic at any particular terminal, on one
extreme, a railroad can maintain a large power pool relative to the
outbound volume, and result in high power idle time but low car delay
time account for power. On the other extreme, a railroad can maintain a
small power pool and hold the trains when power runs short - despite the
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service quality implication, this is a strategy where car-hours are used
to substitute for power-hours.
To test the notion of this production function empirically, one may
hypothesize that the real leverage the power managers have in protecting
the unexpected demand is the "surplus margin" of the power pool, i.e.,
the difference between the inventory level of power pool and the level
of actual or expected subsequent outbound power flow. Exhibit 6-1-8
using data collected from Railroad B highlights the existence of the
trade-off between train departure delay and power idle time, where
power idle time is the idle time of the surplus margin in the power
pool. In short, when the surplus margin goes short, the chance of train
delay would become larger and the delay time would be longer.
Therefore, to effectively support train dispatching, both in terms
of departure reliability and minimizing car backlog due to power
shortage, the essential task of power operating cycle management is the
control of the power pool at each terminal.
6.1.3 The Total Control Tasks of the Power Operating Cycle
From the above, we can conclude that the essential control task of
power operating cycle is to deploy a network-wide power pool system. In
principle, power distribution could be an integral part of the power
tonnage rating or W/P ratio policies. In normal operating conditions,
decisions following policy guidelines should not result in distribution
problems; nevertheless, in emergency situations (e.g., high traffic
seasons, sudden surge of traffic, significant directional unbalance),
timing becomes a key factor and the power distribution requires
particular effort. The general distribution strategies include: 1)
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Exhibit 6-1-7
Power Pool Inventory And Outbound Flow
POWER POOL INVENTORY
(with 2 hours lead)
Inl , il 4%* U
• At I ! ir
,/OUTBOUND FLOW
0o
HOUR OF DAY
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Exhibit 6-1-6 IMPACT OF ENGINE AVAILABILITY ON REAL-TIME TRAIN PERFORMANCE
(A) Interactions Between Power Cycle and Freight Car Cycle
Power Operating
Cycles
Car Operating
Cycle:
OUT OF SERVICE ERVICEABLE
(Operational Servicing/Set-Off • Storage) Inspection Stand-By---Pick-Up-9Linehaul
/ OperationalBuffer
/ I
o-"* Classification ---* Forwarding -1Yard Yard
(B) Trade-Off Between Power Idle Time and Train Departure Delay.
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--Mum
overpower the train (running light train) from power surplus area to the
deficit area; 2) deadhead power consist; or 3) intervene in the
maintenance operations to pull back promptly more serviceable units.
To summarize, the control task concerning power operating cycle is
comprised of two interrelated sub-tasks. One is the coordination of
power and train dispatching so as to serve the scheduled demand and to
protect the unexpected demand. However, the success of the first
sub-task is very much dependent upon the effective execution of the
second sub-task, i.e., the control of power inventory at each individual
terminal. To accomoplish these two sub-tasks effectively, both the
competence of distribution planning and the efficiency of the
coordination with mechanical operations (servicing and repair) are the
primary factors.
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6.2 The Controlling System
6.2.1 Steering Control Settings
A. Engaged Actors
Actors engaged in real-time control of linehaul and terminal
operations can be traced through the authority-responsibility lines of
the physical processes. Exhibit 6-2-1 gives the organization hierarchy
responsible for real-time operations. In the following, the dynamics
which take place among the specified actors during the actual
controlling practices will be examined.
B. Overall Controlling Mechanism - Daily Operating Conference
The daily operating conference held at the beginning of the day
(8:00 A. M.) is a mechanism to coordinate various departments' daily
working plans so as to ensure consistency between the control actions of
different functional areas. This mechanism is also necessary to make
the Document Priority System [refer to chapter 4] function effectively.
General Procedures. The conference can be divided into three
consecutive sessions, i.e., pre-session, main-session and post-session.
Before the main-session takes place, each participant will review the
previous day's performance, inquire about the current system status from
local officers, identify special operating situations to which he and
his superiors should pay attentioqn, and develop a working plan for the
responsible task for the coming day. The main-session basically
provides a formal channel to exchange information across departmental
boundaries, and to facilitate senior management in its issuing of new
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general operating guidelines or specific operating orders [*]. The
post-session is basically order transmission activities, i.e.,
transmitting the conclusions of the conference to first line management
who issue the eventual operating orders.
Performance Review. Reviewing the previous day's performance is a key
task of general management in preparation for the daily operating
conference. In railroad A, at least three media are used to generate
needed performance data, namely, through the standard operating reports,
through the inquiring function of the Train Operating Information
Systems, and through interpersonal communication. Shown in the Appendix
of this chapter is a set of sample operating reports, Exhibits 6A-2-A
thru 6A-2-F (in the original priority order), found on the desks of the
AVPT and his assissting managers every morning. In principle, the
contents of standard operating reports reflect the emphasis of the
operations managment & performance meausres appearing on summary reports
represent the most important control focus. As far as power management
is concerned, in the operating summary statistics (Report B in the
- Appendix), the only power related performance index is Locomotive
Availability (total fleet vs. available fleet). The potential
deficiency of such a reporting system on power management will be
discussed in Chapter 7.
[*] It certainly also provides the opportunity for the senior managers
to patch-up. disputes as well as nurse damaged egos among their
subordinates, if any.
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Daily Operating Conference in Practice. Exhibit 6-2-2 shows a typical
scenario of dialogue sequences of the daily operating conference in
chronological order. For a relatively small railroad like Railroad B, a
telephone conference would be an efficient medium to accomplish the
multi-functional and multi-divisional coordination. However, for larger
railroad face-to-face meetings may be necessary. In Railroad A, the
meeting is chaired by AVPT; Division Train Dispatchers in the Operating
Control Center, the Power Superintendent, General Manager-Terminal
Operations are the key participants. The typical agenda is as follows.
First, each division dispatcher, in turn, briefly reviews the past
24-hour performance of his division and proposes contingency operating
plans for the coming 24-hour if necessary. Then the whole group's
attention focuses on the discussion of various contingency proposals.
After all opinions have been expressed, the AVPT makes decisions
regarding each proposal. The meeting usually takes 20 to 30 minutes.
In summary, due to the high degree of interdependence of
railroading processes, decision makers in each functional and divisional
area require a relatively large decision base (Information regarding
goals, criteria, constraints, system states, etc.) to make coordinated
decisions. The daily operating conference is a particular mechanism
devised by railroads to facilitate the up-dating of each individual
decision base at the beginning of each day. The locus of the
interpersonal communication indicates the input and output relationships
between the decision bases. More detailed discussion is provided in the
later sections.
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Exhibit 6-2-2
RAILROAD DAILY TELEPHONE OPERATING CONFERENCE
Chronological Dialog Scenario (Railraod C)
TERMINAL
DIV. DIV. POWER POWER SUP.
SUPT. DISPT. SUPT. DISPT. (TRAIN MASTER)
inquiry ge
situation7"
neral information
report, special requests
,uL-rder
DIVISION
MASTER
MECHANIC
Iinquiry power status (present and future)
nform situation and special requests
inquiry
-ower requirement
ifpecial requests
·.-
coordinate train/powe
operating proposal
IT I
inquiry, |
review s ecial order
atus re or t ,
peical request
Is'atus reportview,special orderquest
status report, special request
approve. train proposal
pprove power proposal
SA NI r-i-
AMN V
lorderd ACTION
Tntify ACTION
ACTIONSI ACTION
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6.2.2 Real-Time Control of Road Power Distribution
Given the general setting concerning the control of real-time rail
operations, we are ready to examine the steering-control of road power
distribution.
A. The Function of the Power Control Center
Development of Daily Working Plan. The control of real-time road power
distribution is the primary task of the Power Control Center. Power
Dispatchers, under the supervision of Power Superintendent, give
instructions to each terminal regarding the numbers of units to be
coupled to trains. Since the task is well-defined, there are
identifiable procedures to accomplish the task. The general procedures,
according to our interview and observations, can be described as
follows.
At the beginning of each shift (three shifts per day), the Center
contacts each division by phone to assess the situation in various areas
and routes, and to formulate tentative working plans for the shift - the
morning shift may be responsible to sketch a working plan for the day.
Conceptually, the working plan is a plan which indicates how to develop
a sufficient power pool for each outbound train at each terminal.
Then, using the previous power inventory status, train schedules, power
maintenance schedule, tonnage rating guidelines, as well as the specific
operating orders brought back by the Power Superintendent from morning
operating conference, the Power Dispatcher calculates, explicitly or
implicitly, detailed power demand and supply relations on a per-train
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basis. When a chance of power shortage is identified, the original
working plan must-be adjusted, i.e., some redistribution or coordination
effort must be incorporated into the plan. After the adjustment, the
working plan is finalized and ready to be executed. However, further
revision may still be necessary in case of unexpected operating
contingencies. It is not unusual that approximately 60% of a power
dispatchers' duty time is devoted to communication with local officers
to get real-time data and to issue instructions [RSMA, 1964; AAR, 1978].
These procedures can be summarized into a problem-solving framework
which comprises of a series of decisions and their corresponding
premises as shown in Exhibit 6-2-3.
Decision Aid Device - Information Display Board
Although the task of power distribution is a well-defined one, the
execution of this task is rather complicated and usually characterized
by heavy time pressure, massive data and ever changing operating
contingencies. Quality of power distribution is thus dependent upon how
effciently the power dispatcher can process information.
Since the 1960's centralization of power control (which followed
dieselzation) [RSMA, 1964], railroads have gradually evolved an
information display device - from original pencil-and-paper to current
power status magnetic board - to enhance the power dispatcher's
decision-making capability.
Because the inventory of power at various terminals accross the
system is the essential information for real-time control of power
distribution, in most major railroads' power control centers (like our
host railroads A and C), one can usually find a wall-wide magnetic board
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Exhibit 6-2-3 POWER DISPATCHER'S PROBLEM-SOLVING FRAME
Operative Decision Premises
(Higher level constraints
are not included)
GENERAL PROBLEMrSOLVING FRAMEWORK
START OF WORK SHIFT
s 
uoiverP 
Power
Inventory/Terminal
Inbound/Outbound
_r rain Schedule
"l-Maintenance ScheduleJ
Horsepower per Ton
-Policy -"
Productivity/
•-Util ization
Standards
Servicing Quality
'Standards
Overall Power Fleet
Size
A. SKETCHING WORK PLAN
Power Pool/Train/Terminal
B. ADJUSTING WORK PLAN
Redeploynent of Power:
Power Pool Too Small/Large?
C. FINALIZED WORK PLAN
Power Deployment/Distribution Plan:
Power pool/Train/Terminal,
Power Distribution Timing and O-D
Operational Contingency--ý REVISING WORK PLAN & EXECUTION
Operational Contingency REVISING WORK PLAN & EXECUTON
GURN-OVER TO NEXT SIIFT)
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with a schematically drawn rail network to display the power status
information. Colored chips, each of which stands for a particular power
unit, are placed at the appropriate location on the board. By
attaching different labels to the chips and arranging or grouping the
chips in some particular ways, the Power Dispatcher can show which units
are being serviced, repaired, or stored, and which are available for
linehaul service. In principle, the information shown on the board
represents a snap-shot of the power status in a rail system at a
particular point of time. In practice, for inbound and outbound units,
the corresponding chips on the board are moved as events occur; but for
units detained in terminals, their status is up-dated only on a
per-shift basis.
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B. Real-Time Control in Practice
The real-time control of power distribution involves a group of
operating officers. The participants and task roles enacted in a
particular power dispatching process depend very much on the context of
the process. For instance, when the normal schedule is followed, the
process of power dispatching is a simple routine communication task; the
involved actors can also be maintained at a minimum level. However,
when emergencies occur, e.g., to dispatch an extra train from a
power-deficit area, an extensive search and coordination effort may be
required; actors involved in the process will also be much more involved
than that in routine situations. The following are two typical
scenarios which characterize the above two distinctive problem contexts.
Routine Process. The dispatching of power is a part of the process of
train dispatching. In this process, at least four major actors from
different organizational units are directly involved: the Division Train
Dispatchers at the Operating Control Center and the Power Dispatchers in
the system Power Control Center, as well as the Train Masters and the
service station foremen at the local terminals. In addition, there are
two groups of persons playing action-taker role, namely, engine hostlers
and the train crew, who actually move the engines into, around and out
of the terminal.
The process of dispatching a-train is usually triggered by the
Terminal Train Master. When a particular set of car blocks is assembled
and ready for departure, he calls the Division Train Dispatcher in the
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general office and asks for permission to run the train. After
receiving the request from the terminal, the Division Train Dispatcher
checks, among other things, with the Power Dispatcher in the central
power control office to ensure the availability of power at the
originating yard. The Power Dispatcher then examines the display board
and check his record books or even calls the local maintenance foremen,
to determine the power status and replies to the Division Train
Dispatcher regarding the power situation. When the availability of
power is confirmed, the Train Dispatcher can then permit the terminal to
run the train.
Given the train dispatching decision, according to the operating
requirements and distribution considerations, the Power Dispatcher tells
the service station foreman how many units should be put on the train.
Given this information, the foreman then directs the engine hostlers to
pick up an appropriate number of engines from the power pool at the
dispatching tracks and assemble them into the desired power consist.
Meanwhile, after receiving the dispatch order from the control office,
the Terminal Train Master guides the engine hostlers in coupling the
power consist with the right cars and calls the train crew to depart the
train.
The above process can be summarized into a communication locus
diagram as shown in Exhibit 6-2-4. The response time of the Power
Dispatcher in confirming a Train Dispatcher's inquiry, which corresponds
to the length between node 4 and 5 in the diagram, is primarily
determined by how well the Power Dispatcher outlines his work plan as
294
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well as how reliable he perceives his power status information to be.
If he is not confident about his information, before confirmation he has
to call the local service forman to assure the power situation.
However, if the train is a scheduled one, the Power Dispatcher will
usually ascertain the power status before Train Dispatcher calls.
Emergency Handling Process
Due to the variability of traffic volume, railroad usually has to
run extra trains[*]. Therefore, the Power dispatcher may have to handle
some emergemcy situation once in a while. The following is such a
typical scenario.
Situation:
Move extra car blocks from terminal H to terminal S, and there
is no extra power available at H.
Exhibit 6-2-5A gives a partial network of the railroad.
Required Decisions:
l)search and choose source of extra power;
2)search and choose appropriate trains to carry the extra power
consist to terminal H (if no appropriate train can be found,
the power consist has to be deadheaded to H);
3)search and choose appropriate trains to move the extra traffic
from H to S with the extra power .
[*]: There are at least two ways to run extra trains: 1) conditional
train, i.e., the schedule is predetermined, but to run or not to run is
conditional upon the size of the load; 2) ad hoc train - run the train
on needed basis. The first strategy is less flexible from the service
point of view, but is preferable from the operating point of view,
since it is more predictable as compared with the second strategy.
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Before getting into the detailed problem-solving process triggered
by the above situation, we should realize that the communication net
maintained by a power dispatcher is usually quite large and complex -
Exhibit 6-2-6 gives such a typical net. The decision processes are
complicated by the wide-ranging possible combination of various power
sources, alternative trains to pick up power and to carry the extra
traffic.
Exhibit 6-2-5B shows one of the possible outcomes of the choice
process: the power source is located at terminal M and some units of
power will be coupled to a train (not shown in the Exhibit) heading from
M to P; at the intermediate terminal D, the power will be set off and
wait to be connected to train A which runs from P to M; when passing by
terminal H, train A (with the extra power consist) will pick up the
extra car-blocks and carry them to terminal G; at G, both the extra
power and the extra car-blocks will be transferred to train B which runs
from G to destination S. Exhibit 6-2-7 is the communication locus which
would take place in parallel to the decision making (search-and-choice)
process as well as the execution process described above.
C. A Team-Support Systems' Perspective
The examination of various problem contexts (e.g., regular case vs.
emergency one) provides a broader perspective concerning the managing of
the control task. Exhibit 6-2-8 is a generalized view concerning the
real-time control of power distribution. Power distribution is a
progressive decision process. The dynamics among the actors are
manifested by the exchange of information - upstream's decisions are
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EXHIBIT 6-2- 5 EXAMPLE OF MOVING EXTRA TRAFFIC
Division Line
A. Partial Rail Network
H,S: Traffic O-D
M: Power Source
D: Power Pick-Up
G: Train Connecti
B. Traffic Flow and Vehicle Flow
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usually the downstream's decision premises or action guidelines;
downstream's status usually constitutes constraints to the upstream's
feasible solution space.
To amplify, the process of power dispatching [Exhibit 6-2-7] can be
divided into at least four highly interrelated sets of subprocesses,
namely, the process trigger, the focal subprocess, and the upstream and
downstream subprocesses. Each subprocess is taken care by different
organization units. Their interrelationships can be analyzed, among
others, through the transaction processes of the decision bases employed
by the involved actors. For instance, in normal situation, downstream
actors may take the information (regarding the state of the system, the
confirmation or notification of mutually concerned plans or actions)
passed from the upper stream as given, update their decision base and
make subsequent decision accordingly. However, in some particular case
(e.g., an emergency), a downstream actor may tend to intervene in
upperstream decisions, so as to release the constraints or change the
premises of his action or choice space. Given the decision-net, the
effectiveness (in terms of coordinability) of such an intervention, from
team-support systems [Section 2.2.3] perspective, is determined by the
following factors: 1) the availability and efficiency of the
communication media, 2) the bases for mutual influence and 3) the skill
of influence. Given the same context, a more skillful role player will
perform more effectively than a nonskilled one - provided that the
decision heuristics (discussed later) of the skilled actor is as good as
the nonskilled one.
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The study of different decision contexts also gives us insights
into the nature of the decision in question, e.g., regarding the
criteria to judge the appropriateness of decision rule, performance
measure and so forth. Moreover, from the above analysis, we can easily
recognize that, in order to have effective utilization of power, the
power dispatcher's abilities to develop an appropreiate work plan as
well as to search out and select an efficient contingency plan under
heavy time pressure play a critical role. These abilities relate to the
nature of the power dispatcher's cognitive process applied in his
problem-solving procedures. In the next section, we shall study this
cognitive process through some introspection analysis methods [Section
3.2.2.1, and the goal is to identify the potential strengths and
weaknesses of the process, as well as their implications to the design
of decision support systems.
303
6.2.3 Decision Heuristics Analysis
In this study, the goal of the heuristics analysis is to describe
analytically the decision behavior in the form of flow diagrams that
reflect the level of expertise found in highly experienced power
dispatchers. To construct the data base, the introspection approach is
applied - one particular power dispatcher was asked to think about and
describe on how he made his decisions involving in his day-to-day
practices. The key is to specify his various problem-solving frames and
to identify the intermediate stages of information-processing and
decision-making.
A. General Problem-Solving Procedures
The overall problem-solving procedures employed by the sample power
dispatcher can be represented by the flow diagram as shown in Exhibit
6-2-3. The fundamental idea is to develop a standing plan for each of
the anticipated outbound trains in the system. In each of such plans,
the available power pool is carefully checked to ensure that it is
sufficient to serve the anticipated power need. Whenever the power pool
is perceived as inadequate, an adjustment procedure is triggered. For
instance, when a power pool is perceived as too small, the power
dispatcher has to search for more power. Several strategies are in
order: he may check whether there is any stored power in the concerned
terminal; he may ask mechnaical personnel in the same concerned terminal
to speed up the servicing or repair operations so as to obtain more
serviceable power from an originally unserviceable group; he may
dispatch extra power from other power surplus area before the shortage
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occurs; he may also intervene in the train dispatching operations by
asking the train dispatcher to hold the train until sufficient power is
available. On the other hand, if several consecutive power pools
appeared to be too large, then he may choose to do nothing, to consider
temporary storage, to notify mechanical personnel letting them have
certain slack time or to distribute extra power to some potential power
deficit areas. In either case, no matter which strategy the power
dispatcher actually chooses, that strategy will become part of the work
plan for his shift. This kind of adjustment is carried out for all the
outbound trains in each terminal within his responsible region. Exhibit
6-2-9 is a diagram which summarizes the above heuristics.
From a performance control point of view, two questions are of
particular importance regarding the general problem sloving heuristics
described above. The first is how the power dispatcher judges the
adequacy of a power pool, i.e., in what situation will he consider the
power pool as too small or too large? The second is when some
adjustments are needed, how will he select among the remedy strategies?
Both questions have vital implications on the design of the team support
systems as well as the decision support systems. We will return to
these in Chapter 7.
B. Algorithms for Estimating Power Pools
One sub-process which was not explained clearly in the above
general framework is the detailed procedure concerning the estimation of
the available power pool for each outbound train. The principle for
calculating the power pool is relatively straightforward, namely, the
available power pool for a given outbound train is the previous
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inventory of the pool power plus the inbound consist, minus those
inbound units which are due in maintenance, and plus the unit back to
service from previous maintenance work. In practice, since the
assignment of power is not necessarily first-in-first-out, the
estimation process could be very delicate. Some dispatchers, in order
to save the effort of decomposing and reassembling power consist, may
tend to retain the inbound consist as it is ( or by adding/detaching
units to/from the original consist), when such a consist may fit the
need of the subsequent outbound train. This practice in fact represents
a favor that a power dispatcher can do to the servicing crew; and such a
favor is usually the primary basis on which a dispatcher can win the
coorporation from the mechanical personnel.
Exhibit 6-2-10 shows a typical algorithm that was used by a power
dispatcher in Railroad C to develop his locomotive assignment and
dispatching plan in one terminal area. In actual practice, as mentioned
above, a dispatcher may have some ideas, implicitly or explicitly,
regarding the assignment priority of the units in each power pool -
sometimes he may ask hoslters to line up the locomotives at the dispatch
tracks according to his planned dispatching order, or may just line the
chips up on the magnetic board for his own information. When timing
becomes critical, a more detailed estimation is required to include the
turnaround time of the servicing operation (which is not shown in the
above flow diagram).
The above analysis reveals a critical issue in the capacity of
human information processing. For small railroads like Railroad C, with
few major terminals (or power interchange points) and some two hundred
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Exhibit 6r2.9 POWER DISPATCHER'S PROBLEMISOLVINGT-'HXERSTICS
General Prob1emaSolving Frame
START OF WORK SHIFT
A. SKETCCIING WORK PLAN
Power Pool/Train/Terminal
8. ADJUSTING WORK PLAN
Redeployment of Power:
Power Pool Too Small/Large?
C. FTNALIZED WORK PLAN
Power Deployment/Distribution Plan:
Power pool/Train/Terminal,
Power Distribution Timing and O-D
REVISING WORK PLAN & EXECUTION
REVISING WORK PLAN & EXECUTION
Detailed P roblemnvolvng Heuristics
A
Terminal 1 .................Terminal N
Power Pool/Train ........ Power Pool/Train
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TUBN-OVER TO NEXT SHIFT
EXHIBIT 6-2-10
ALGORITHM TO DEVELOP DAILY LUCOMOTTVE A.SSIGNMENT AND DISPATCHING PLAN
(FOR ONE TERMINAL)
Previous Day Previous DayPrevious Day
*
Surplu-
Next Day Next Day308
ith irain
power units, the execution of the above algorithm with pencil-and-paper
may be tedious *but still manageable. For larger railroads with more
than a thousand power units, the calcuation may quickly become a mess
without machine-aid - a situation of information overload. In other
words, unless the responsible region of a power dispatcher can be cut
down to a reasonable size, the algorithm described above has no way to
be executed. Unfortunately, the situation in Railroad A is such an
example. When the systematic algorithm breaks down, to play it safe the
power dispatcher naturally tends to maintain large power pools at all
locations all the time, if possible. We hypothesize that this is one of
the major reasons to explain the low power utilization rate ( 38% ) on
Railroad A. In fact, this situation is not unique to Railroad A,
according to Martland et al [1977, P.98]: the majority of Class I
railroads have a locomotive utilization rate of less than 50%.
C. Search and Choice Processes
In the above two sections, the analysis was primarily concerned
with the development of standing plans which deal with the anticipated
demand. To uncover the underlying search-and-choice heuristics, one
effective way is to ask the power dispatcher to describe his decision
procedures in dealing with emergency situation (as the one presented in
Exhibits 6-2-5 thru 6-2-7). Exhibit 6-2-11 is a generalized
transcription of a variety of the introspections regarding the process
in search of extra power to serve extra trains. The process basically
can be divided into two major steps: one is the identification of
candidate locations of power source and the formulation of action plans
in correspondence to each candidate location; the other is the
309
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evaluation of the consequences (or attributes) of each alternative
action plans. However, before the actual search takes place, a choice
on the alternative search rule will be made, usually implicitly. In an
operating environment, situations usually require immediate response
based on limited information. It is unlikely that a dispatcher can
generate an exhaustive choice set (under a given search rule) before he
makes the final choice. Moreover, an experienced dispatcher usually has
clear ideas regarding the locations where some surplus power can
normally be found and which trains normally have the space to
accommodate extra traffic and so forth. All this knowledge, in a sense,
constitutes certain prototype solutions in his memory. Once he
encounters a power shortage situation, he will zero in quickly on a
small number of prototypes and let these pototypes drive further
information search - aimed primarily at the elimination of invalid
prototypes. Evaluation about the attributes of alternative action plans
is an implicit process. Sometimes the search and the formulation of a
feasible solution is already very exhaustive, yet the evaluation may be
still defaulted. The first feasible solution may become the natural
choice.
There are several vital and pragmatic implications which can be
drawn from the above analysis. First of all, the choice of search rules
often introduces significant bias. Some decisionmakers may never
recognize the existence of alternative search rules. Whether a single
search rule can be used to solve all cases, both effectively and
efficiently, is indeed highly questionable. Therefore, how to assist
the power dispatcher in exploring alternative search rules operatively,
311
before he commits himself to one particular rule in a practical search
process, is essential to the improvement of his decision quality.
Second, the application of prototypes, although minimizing
information-processing efforts, can also result in significant bias or
even be misleading. The essential issue here is how to efficiently
formulate (generate) feasiable action plans. Third, in principle, an
appropriate evaluation is the basis for an appropriate choice; without
sensible evaluation, no meaningful control can be exercised. Therefore,
to improve the overall quality of the power distribution decision, one
important element is to enhance the evaluation capability of the power
dispatcher and to require him to evaluate in accordance with a desirable
set of criteria.
6.3. Summary
This chapter's focus is on the management of power operating cycle.
The analysis of the technological system is primarily along two lines,
namely, the linehaul operations and the terminal operations. The key
determinants and process components of both operations are examined.
The control task concerning power operating cycle is comprised of two
interrelated sub-tasks. One is the coordination of power and train
dispatching so as to serve the scheduled demand and to protect the
unexpected demand. However, the success of the above task depends upon
the effective control of power inventory at each individual terminal.
To accomplish these two tasks successfully, both the competence of the
distribution planning and the effectiveness of the coordination with
mechanical operations (servicing and repair) are the primary factors.
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On the organization system side, we start from the analytical
description of the steering control settings, including the engaged
actors, the mechanism of daily operating conference. Then we examine
the real-time control of road power distribution through the analysis of
power control center's function, as well as real-time control practices
(both the routine and emergency procedures are documented). The above
team-based control processes are then put into a team-support system's
perspective, to highlight the processes of coordination and role
influence.
The final section of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of the
decision heuristics of power dispatcher, because he is the ultimate
ihndividual responsible for the real-time performance of power
dispatching. The analysis starts from the identification of his general
problem-solving procedures, then the detailed computational algorithms
as well as the search and choice heuristics.
In this chapter, we further show how to apply the communicaton
locus analysis technique to describe more detailed processes carried out
by decision-net. We also show how to analyze individual person's
decision-making process. The insights gained from the above analyses
are essential to the further diagnosis of both the task team and the
individual decision-maker's performance (see Chapter 7).
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APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 6
1) Vehicle Motion Dynamics
Balancing Speed condition (zero acceleration condition): a condition in
which the net tractive force produced by the power consist is exactly
equal to train's total resistance force. i.e.,
Total Tractive Force = Total Resistence Force
= total car resistance +
total power consist resistance
1-1) Davis Formulas --- empirical formulas calculating various vehicles'
rolling resistance forces:
rolling resistance/ vehicle = aT + bN + cTV + d AV**2
where: T = vehicle weight;
V = speed;
N = number of axles per wheel truck;
A = cross section area
a,b,c,d = coefficients
[ remark: W. J. Davis, Jr., 1926, " Train Resistance Formulae", GET-3,
November, General Electric Company, Railway Engineering Dept.]
1-2) Grade Resistance, G:
G = 20 (lbs) * grade
where grade: 2.5% = 0.025
1-3) Total Car Resistance
Car Rolling Resistance: When running speed is within 10-20 mile range,
the train resistance curves from the Davis formulas are clustered
together and can be approximatly taken as a straight line, i.e.,
rolling resistance per car
= 122 (lbs/car) + 2.2 car weight (lbs/car)
Total Car Resistance
=rolling resistance + grade resistance
=car rolling resistance*train length + G*total car weight
=122*train length + .(G+2.2)*total car weight
where: train length = number of cars in train
total car weight= train weight excludes locomotive
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1-4) Total Tractive Force
308 * P
Total Tractive Force =
V
where: P = total nominal horsepower of locomotive;
V = speed (mph);
308 = conversion factor from HP to tractive force)
1-5) Net Tractive Force
Net tractive force = "drawbar pull" = DBP
= total tractive force - total locomotive resistence
(where the total locomotive resistence can be obtained
from Davis formulas.)
2) Practical Operating Guidelines:
2-1) Tonnage Rating
DBP 122
= * train length + total car weight
G+2.2 G+2.2
TONNAGE CAR
RATING FACTOR
Tonage Rating >= ( Car Factor + Car Weight) * Train Length
( In the above formula, the left hand side should not be
less than the right hand side.)
2-2) Ton per Horsepower Ratio (W/P Ratio):
308
W/P Ratio = ton/hp
K* V
where: K = 20 * grade + 122/ (car weight) +2.2 + m
m = ratio of [locomotive resistance / train weight]
train weight = total car weight + locomotive weight
V = speed in mph
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Exh-iit 6A-2-A EXAMPLE OF MORNING EXCEPTION EVENTS REPORT
'.Prepared by General Superintendent uEf Trat.wor Lation)
.DAIL_ L 1Z 7_" 'Y
tlessrs. "-J ke li. . JR . F .'t l , 17 L ,. , WG5 JL:. .F L
11TII VIIA PJ JID . ~ TPF -.K L... LtiA uJS CI'r .5)
SYIOPSIS OF SYSTIlH
EiItGINE SHORTAGE:None
ADVERSE WEATIIER: None
Y&T ;IEEDING ATTUIhTIOI:None
DERAILMENTS BLOCIKIIG MAIN TRACKS:None
: DEitRAI.:IITS AND UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES
fJip r1t,
CTIL,,.I
1130a.m. July 6, .. :.n Yari, . ; , ... ..- 3 derailod aind or overturnod 5 c:ars cf :o-n
blocking Southwurd vain track aril switchlinC lead. !:o por.-enal i.-jr'is. Cure of d~ec:ai.::t ,
switch~ point utrup bolt brokan arAd the i.uua of bolt lodgod et.oe n -.'tt S~itch poii:t .:. 8t;:
rail causin:g tention to throw switch under cut of car%. Cars tr.i.slcsdeod and clear of rain
trac:k 945p.m. July 6,.
2/.0a.:. July 6, ,urat puwor auttch, : .q;ol]d, .. ITS No. 10' dermilod amd or overtr,.
the elth, throu(,h the 18th. cars ah,'nd of caboose. No personal injuries. !:o da:'r. ;s
cora.,cdlitien. Cause of derai.ront, slack action rear 17 cars in train accouu:t er.0ir.neer using
'indorex.cent bra.o. hi.. I-::.: :....'o arrived 715'a.m. Cars clcr andl r-:in tr:.-•k o%'n:
245p.. July 6.
235p.m. July 5, M.P. - . ... ., . . Dit. - 11 :I-A- dor•ileri tL
'or ovrtura.-d tl.o '7th. throupti Ll.t, .:i.: hwad, c10. which Itruck ' t he'u. t ::hte •l.th..
,North cars standing in East rass blocking ranin trnck, East jus ard '.est ,.::. ::o r.':o 'r'.
.injuriua. No dancurous cotinwdiltlts. Cau:. of dur.2iltuent, bu-';lc.l tr'c;:. C:~i- -r',.ie. .  :. s•:
'track opon 5),.m. July 5. Wlo:t Fuas open 850s.n. July 5. Trains ablo to ':ri t'$.r'.,n:. .,¢•t t
ill.m. July i, Grac lad,.........
into Grace Chem. Co. dorailed 2 omlty box
Causn of dier dtilnt not role.rtod. ... ... ' s
and Southwulan track opon 5.Op.m. July 5.
I -k switcher sn.rv:ng 27 cars t , .rl ' ,± crs ove.
blonkir.g bith main trace;s. U:o parsra.n a n•r:ecs.
.. -,1.k arriveod 315p.n. ;orthward tr-ac: ^;.'. -•'.
1040a.m. Julj; 5, Yard, 11. Extra 635 South reported tlh re=aims of.. '- eG:-r• e, 27,
Iayin; ncrs 3 1r:.whbrn b otunon tho /.:'n•. auri 4n. hand' . cn... Y:•:i job 16 ottieLi t6 oyo y•
while pas;in; the coal train arnl notified crew on Extra 635 South. pecial Agent ani
Police and Firo Dept. notified and investigating.
Enginoor '.. r'. t.-rs, train 381-03 rc, ortai flat spots on diosol 235 l e , ,vin•, ... S -t n.
On arrivi•l . :•,n, wheal i1-1 found to have 23,'4" flat spots, uwhtol L-1i 1/-" :"la stotis,
whoula R a.d L 3 2" t'lL auoL~o . Diusol returned to C.ia'ago doadh•ud, s;poo r.'.trictlin 4.0 ,.
'
8 30p.a. July 3, : '. Yard,.. .,, -. JFM leaving yart derailed 5 ca.s ir. cr'.ssover North
sad of " "''. Yard blocking both main toacks. No personal in.juries. I:.cluhde in derailed care
2 L.P. ga and .2 ezaonia nitrate. No loakage reported. Cause of derailmont, broken switch pol
Care zerailed 8a.a. July 4. Crossover is out of service.
No. 59 left , .-
2 diesols, 12 cars to , .aio, 10 to . .-
diesel 721 doad from
No. 58 left . - 51" 2ate;
2 diesels, 13 cars to " .-, 15 to '. ý.
03"
07"
4'4
02"
16"1
10"
12"
27"11
03"
09"
08"
07"
05"
Horne:w >, j:r-.L::C-rs
bloc:; 3-2o.,O roed
( - ;is. co••ire cver-peed set too I
r,·n work cn d.~.sel 721
" 2;, "assen;ers
*. 1 ., Dist. s2••r
-'. .. n Dist. - •t• or, run, 1 diesel de
-. Dist. slc'
Cu.l. ., clean cLrs
b) 31.3-1 dark
S Dist. lost or. run, 1 diesel dead
L.... 'i st. slow
. .c.: Dist.. sloJ
s,. ., Di;st. 1 dieeal d!ea
j vork on diesel 721, uabhle to
re;air.
.... a Dint. s ow
., ~, Dur's.t ani 'hinona, passengers
"--- ", water cars
Dist. slow
dirT. slw
i .as, rod six*nal
I --" le, p!c!: up 2 curs
-- e, clean car3
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Exhibit 6A-2-C EXAMPLE OF OPERATING CONTROL CENTER'S TURNOVER REPORT
(Prepared by General Superintendent of Transportation)
July 7, I,..
Ct , shr,,l l '. . .. Ltjut '.,im with 7a /2 i7Ll 41•/i W "41 .,, one
r' - to ;,r  rr (, t . ? tif .:. I ': '. , "'. A ; r, r.; r . ' J f r . I' at 0.1an. i, Coal
train re. ,rtd .i:-i' ht lI .';.;i , r.t 1 ,ifr ; ,.. lur.j r M : . a n' I
'Jiur i I ...':iiW , L(. l 1 t I, .., li ', 1'/1 i '.1 2/4; It. .I.',, UNI l ft
Ia 'erl Is 1 . i: *! s /ŽI, ;%/ li-t:: -W* u 'ivrl(is, '.,,at i .1 ./?I, cp/. trlw
at Ft. -,1,i. tj ,rr,. t liPi , .rra (c o .t - i llt a , It.: I :.Le ,  .: l l30pi
wi'.h l2; r..-, :- r.arc  ". tr7 l .i ',i ht,4 :r. !,. .-r. to tOrI for lo0
to':ay, 1,, r..: huj:er, r n ,I lrf. (  ,, n..o,, in? 'I . h,,•:r o n rwiin line &
'Iort , o 3rd track -r., wv,,rl in r. d l, t t r ik .r .. ,r.ir.l,1 :d
Cl .n Le. i lohadlinij stor:n f.ode-l and ., l.adirg graij trail, I left 2'Oar ti
40/24, 10tt 325il;., "ith 40 e::.onis, 1Yankak-.e ,rt. zr h.an, yard in got
shape, tight or ifCrth crews
a. 3 cars for i no other cars lined up to move
/: l1 F .. rs and 11/2. I. p his for 1M7, 6/15 McCr .'h for 'N3 acct CtlS too he..
0/i Pady, .5/l Cert ir.:I 4/4 shorts, 1/2 NOth car: ir..1l /0 ., 2/0 Maty
aj.c 30/1• li-rIJ'sj on hand
S .. 2 resteJ crews aitn ad "' enoute, got . .. and Cockrell grain train cot
ES.CIL 60 Chgos will go ti c)uquoin on local this am, . 2 be listed 11a'i with about)101. Chgos, lea.es .;0 C!.; , on J:.3, r'est of yaro liitj, one rested crew wit;
APL onroute, ' i sted 245a," with 54 cars
Cu " ::. CRE listed 5am ,i itn 66/'6 incl 9/0 S ' ., 30/2 F . and 27/13 Columbus
all conr'.iLions i. e, ,•rh loIl listed .45a . i,.h 122 cars ircl 35 cars o
WeiJed rail train 'or L .:hich include: 117,
16 umempiis, cr..;s 3i, for the I.orth
i L , RCA205 listed 305azi, P~C listed on crews rest at 6.10am, no other crews in t,
C.. . To ,': PFC's cree. to c;ver CUP later tolay
To .oan: one cre., jutting rest with -in anid ecll grain trains may
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Chapter 7
ASSESSMENT OF POWER MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOLUTIONS
The specific goal of organization diagnosis, from a dual-system
point of view, is to: 1) understand the characteristics of both the
system being controlled and the controlling system; 2) improve the
controlling system through the enhancement of the control linkages
between the dual systems, and appropriate allocation of the controlling
capacity to tasks to be controlled. The material presented in Chapters
4 through 6 accomplishes the first goal, namely to develop an
understanding of the complex characteristics involved in power
management activities. In this chapter, we focus on the development of
improvement plans for the controlling system , with
particular emphasis on: 1) the effectiveness of the general task
management structure; 2) the coordinability of multi-functional
activities; and 3) the efficiency of the individual decision-making
process concerning the control of power dispatching.
To integrate the individual organization units in the controlling
system and to articulate the controlling and the controlled systems,
information is an essential linking element, thereby, in this chapter we
also provide an analysis of the existing management information systems,
focusing particularly on thier current and potential capability. Then
corresponding to each of the three specific foci identified in the
preceding paragraph, three interrelated improvement proposals are
presented: the refinement of the power dispatcher's decision-support
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systems, the development of multi-functional team-support systems, and
the reconstruction of the general meta-control structure. The key theme
here is to demonstrate the validity and practicability of the theories
and methodologies suggested in Chapter 2 and 3 as well as to illustrate
how to apply the descriptive and analytical data documented in the
previous three chapters (4 through 6) to undergo organization diagnosis,
assess system performance, and to develop change plans.
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7.1 Assessment of the Power Management Problems
7.1.1 Problems with the Meta Control Structure
In Chapter 4, we argued that the system being controlled can be
characterized by a control-task hierarchy. Corresponding to this
hierarchy of control tasks, we identified a multi-level meta control
structure - represented by the general task-actor matrix shown in
Exhibit 7-1-1 (originally shown as Exhibit 4-2-7) - which integrates
various individual units in the organization to perform the controlling
function, and articulates both the formal and informal aspects of
organizational structure and processes.
Given this document, we are able to assess the potential
dysfunction of the controlling system in question by comparing the
descriptive structure and processes with certain normative arguments.
In the following diagnosis, our basic focus is on Railroad A, hereafter
referred as the host railroad.
A. Inadequency of Planning Support
Due to the characteristics of rail technology, maintaining the
daily operation of the system in the face of its complexity and
uncertainty requires a great deal of managerial energy. As a result, in
the host railroad predominant management attention is given to the
operating control process. In the context of power management, the
operating control responsibilities are primarily well defined and
usually can be traced as high as the AVP level. The planning
responsibilities regarding power operations, on the other hand, are not.
so explicit. For instance, in the host railrad, no one can really tell
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what their fleet-sizing process is. This is a situation not unique to
the host railroad. In a study of several other large railroads' power
utilization, Emerson [1975] observed the same phenomenon.
Operating Cycle and Service Cycle Planning
According to the General Manager-Terminal Operations (who plays two
roles - monitoring performance and proposing adjustment in operating
plans and standards if needed), the changes in power utilization pattern
will take place principally after the changes of train schedules. More
specifically, before the proposed train schedule change is finalized,
the Superintendent of Power Distribution will be consulted concerning
the feasibility of the intended change from power viewpoint; and after
the change is actually launched forth, the Power Dispatcher is presumed
to adjust the power cycling pattern accordingly.
The key point is that the above process is primarily
power-operating-cycle-oriented. The Power Superintendent may decide to
store some units subsequent to the revision of train schedule.
Nevertheless, this practice is not emphasized by management - more
specifically, the Power Superintendent may not have an incentive to cut
back oversized fleet even if the opportunity exists.
Maintenance Cycle Planning
The Mechanical Department's planning in maintenance schedule, as
described previously, is largely by "default". From our observation,
the major reason is that the generally perceived (but implicit)
responsibility of the Mechanical Department, to the -Senior
Vice-President-Operations in the host railroad is to sustain a less-than
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10% shop margin at all time, and as long as the shop margin remains in
that boundary, SVPO tends to leave the Mechanical Department alone;
therefore, the mechanical officers are not motivated to deliberately
improve the maintenance schedule. As a result, regardless of the
cyclical fluctuation of traffic level, an engine will be shopped for
only one of two reasons: either when mandatory inspection is due or for
road failure.
Fleet Ownership Planning
From the nature of the system being controlled and the
characteristics of the decision to be made, we may prescribe how
railroads should size their road power fleet by drawing inferences from
the aggregate power service impact model presented in Chapter 4. The
following function should be included in the calculation of a systematic
fleet ownership decision:
1) the amount of traffic projected in terms of GTMs by direction over
each major route during peak months,
2) the desired service levels during the peak periods expressed in GTM
per available horsepower-day in the most demanding direction of each
route,
3) the planned shopping margin of the system road fleet during peaks,
4) the expected net balance of horsepower with foreign railroads during
the peak periods, and
5) the change in utilization expected during the projected peaks
expressed as a percentage of previous time utilization ratio.
In reality, the decision on fleet ownership is the most
unstructured one. During the annual budgeting process, one implicit
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criterion employed is to maintain a relatively constant fleet size
(refer to the previous year's one as the basic standard). More
specifically, the heuristic is normally to equate the number of new
purchases to the expected number of retirements. Moreover, the
decisions on power retirement program are not usually made, until the
number of overaged units exceeds a certain "have-to-deal-with" limit.
In summary, due to the lack of formal procedures, deliberate
planning activities are not performed in the host railroad's current
power management environment. Incremental adaptation of the operating
cycle is usually less than sufficient to optimize power utilization.
Most importantly, in the absence of the explicit planning processes,
accountability for various levels' performance become vague and
"implicit. This drawback, in fact, significantly limits the efficiency
and effectiveness of the control function of the system.
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B. Absence of Effective Control Cycles
Due to the need to coordinate a set of highly dependent operations,
rail management is largely characterized by intensive means-control
activities which are embodied by a sophisticated hierarchical
steering-control mechanism( e.g.,in part, the operating document
priority system). In the specific context of power management, as
described in Chapters 4 through 6, the execution of daily operations is
closely monitored in minute-detail through both verbal channels and
computerized on-line information systems. However, the means-control
oriented supervision of real-time operations is only one facet of the
control function. Equally important is the end-control oriented
assessments of performance and the allocation of accountability, as well
as the detection of the need for replanning. Due to the sensitivity of
real-time performance to the operating variability, it normally requires
a longer time horizon to practice the end-control. Thus, the nature of
end-control is primarily a high level control function, and in effect,
it concludes the managerial cycle that begins with planning.
The major drawback of the current power performance review system
of the host railroad can be summarized into three categories: 1) the
specifications of performance indices, 2) the accountability for
performance, and 3) the replanning mechanism.
Performance Measures. As we will see later in this chapter, the data
bases of the existing computerized information systems of the host
railroad are capable of generating a wide variety of performance
indices. Therefore, the key problem regarding performance review is not
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lack of data but the handicapped information filtering process which
prevents management from getting decision-relevent information. For
instance, as mentioned in Chapter 6, regardless of the availability of
the extensive power performance data, there is only one measure -
serviceable fleet size - which appears on the operating summary
statistics (one of the two reports that most likely receives the senior
management's attention each morning). Of course, we are not suggesting
that more measures are better[*], but challenging the appropriateness of
the measure to meaningfully represent the performance of power
operations. Another example is the qualitative index - engine shortage
- shown on the exception events report [see Apendix of Chapter 6]. The
problem here is that it is a crippled measure. During the years with
growing traffic or during the peak seasons, engine shortage is certainly
an important signal to be received by the senior management. However,
when the traffic is declining or in the off-peak seasons, engine
shortage is no longer an issue. During these periods, the real issue
turns to engine underutilization instead of shortage. According to the
host railroad's SVPO, he realized that their power fleet had excessive
idle time incidentally through a fuel saving campaign as mentioned in
Chapter 5. This story reveals two problems: 1) the formal reporting
system, including daily and periodical summaries, failed to signal
symptoms which merit senior management's attention - either the signals
may not be produced at all in the system or too weak to be received by
the senior management;
[*] To higher level management, few carefully designed indices are more
valuable and useful than a large number of unselected measures, because
the latter may cause the problem of information overload [Section 2.3.3;
Ackoff, 1967].
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2) management failed to integrate certain effective performance review
mechanism as the complement to the formal reporting system and
performance review session during the daily operating conference. This
complementary mechanism can include standardized off-line analysis,
special reports on specific performance areas and so forth. The common
premise to solve the above two problems is the need for a set of
appropriate indices which balancely cover the major
performance areas and are capable of gauging the potential symptoms.
Accountability Assignment. There are two issues involved in this
category. The first is the failure to explicitly assign the
accountability of performance of the real-time routine operations. The
decision processes of power real-time operations are well-structured,
thus in principle the assignment of performance to the responsible
individual should be relatively straightforward. However, in reality,
the host railroad's control over the real-time power operations, in a
sense, is largely effort-oriented rather than result-oriented. For
instance, referring to the progressive decision process depicted by the
communication locus given in Exhibit 6-2-4, the consequences of the
decisions are not measured by the railroad in the first place (the arc
between nodes 4 and 5 is not adequately evaluated); second, without an
identifiable decision process regarding the higher level power cycling,
there is no ground to explicitly assign the performance accountability.
Although the immediate train performance associated with power
dispatching is measured, this single measure is less than sufficient to
reflect the contribution a power dispatcher is presumed to make. Other
equally important measures, such as the time utilization of the fleet,
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and the productivity of each horsepower hour are not routinely reported
in Railroad A, let alone the assignment of their accountability.
The second issue is that, due to the vague planning procedures, it
is difficult to assign accountability of high level power cycles.
Replanning. Effective replanning relies vitally on the explicit
accountability assignment concerning the system performance, because
only with well-known performance responsibility, can the feedback
information on system outcomes be appropriately received by the
accountable officers and properly used to direct their future planning.
Without clear performance accountability (let alone the incentives
system [*]), the host railroad, in effect, not only fails to conduct
adequate performance review, but also misses the opportunities to adjust
its power management through replanning.
C. The Need for an Explicit Meta-Control Structure
Meta-control, in a sense, refers to the learning capability of an
organization. In response to changing operational premises, the
meta-control mechanism utilizes the feedback signals from both the
internal and external sources, adapts the performance standards, the
operating plans as well as the controlling procedures and structure.
Most importantly, the meta-control is based on lower levels' control
mechanism; it can function properly only if the lower levels'
controlling function performs well.
[*] In principle, a completely effective adaptive system further
demands certain incentive components which motivate the engaged managers
to behave as desired in response to the feedback information.
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From the preceding discussion, it is evident that the host railroad
is handicapped in its meta-control function by the malfunction of the
lower level control practices[*]. One of the most fundamental causes of
system malfuntion is that the railroad fails to explicate their
meta-control structure, to direct planning and control activities
concerning power management and without such a conceptual framework, it
is difficult for management to effectively inquire, digest and utilize
the available information as well as the knowledge for diagnosing and
adjusting the function of the controlling system. For instance, as
remarked by the General Manager-Terminal Operations concerning the
utilization of the massive information produced by their computerized
information systems: "We don't know how to use it yet," - despite the
fact that the information systems have been adopted and evolved for at
least a decade in their railroad.
The value in making the meta-control structure explicit is more
than technically enhancing management in information transaction. Most
importantly, a clearly spelled-out meta control structure reveals the
whole spectrum of options at management's disposal. In a discussion
with the host railroad's SVPO, after we mentioned that there was room
for improvement in certain current maintenance practices, he commented:
"I have never thought about that before!"
In conclusion, the lessons learned from the diagnosis of the
general management of power operation are clear. Planning, execution
and review are the integral parts of a complete controlling cycle. Without
[*] We may say that the meta-control system in the host railroad does
exist but in a rudimentory and implicit way.
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identifiable decision-making procedures for planning, it is difficult to
allocate performance accountability. Without explicit accountability,
performance feedback can hardly be received properly and utilized
effectively to direct replanning. Moreover, effort-oriented steering
control is less than sufficient to accomplish the control demanded in
the system. Without clear result-oriented goals, there is no ground for
developing operational indices and standards as the basis for
performance evaluation. Without deliberately designed performance
indices, adequate controlling-relevant information can hardly be
generated; as a result, the system becomes handicapped by the
malfunction of the controlling mechanism.
In the context of power management, various symptoms in line with
the above pathological causes have been found in the host railroad. To
overcome the deficiency of the controlling mechanism regarding the
management of the general task, the key is to develop an explicit Meta
Control Structure and use this Structure to guide the various planning,
execution and performance review activities and to diagnose as well as
to adjust the function of the controlling system. We shall amplify this
later.
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7.1.2 The Impact of Inadequate Multi-Functional Coordinability on the
Maintenance Function
The maintenance function is an essential module in the overall
power management task. The drawbacks concerning the general management
structure of the host railroad identified in the previous section are
commonly shared by the maintenance function. For instance,
effort-oriented control consumes the mechanical officers' energy;
maintenance planning is an implicit process (one may note that the
planning responsibilities shown in Exhibit 5-2-12 are not specific), and
consequently the higher level accountabilities (such as fleet
reliability) are difficult to assign to specific individual (except to
the VPM); a number of fundamental performance indices are either
problematic or not measured at all; feedback either does not exist or is
not effectively used to guide future planning in many primary
performance areas; and as a whole, the adaptation function of the
maintenance system does not perform well. In this section, we shall
investigate more closely and specifically the above symptoms in the
maintenance area. In addition to the above relatively macro-level
issues, problems concerning the more detailed operating coordinability
between the maintenance function and the general transportaiton function
will also be examined.
A. Planning and Control of Mechanical Service Policies
The power mechanical service policies, as defined in Chapter 5,
refer to: 1) the inspection period, 2) the critical level for the
controlled parameters which reflect the conditions of an engine's major
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components, and 3) the stopping rules regarding the use of engines.
Among these policies, the controlled parameters' tolerable range and the
stopping rules are largely determined by the engine's inherent
mechanical properties. To these two policies, the planning issue is
related to the choice of engine type and model and/or the need for
engine modification, both of which are primarily one-shot decisions,
while the control issue is concerned with the implementation of policies
which is essentially an on-going task and crucial to the fleet
reliability. As to the policy of inspection period, i.e., the
maintenance schedule, however, both the planning and control issues are
recurrent in nature. On the planning side, in principle, the inspection
interval and the inspection level of each unit is at management's
disposal as long as the decision is not conflicting with the federal
mandatory framework. For instance, mechanical officers can schedule the
power fleet's higher level inspection - biennial, annual, semi-annual
etc, (which usually take longer shop time) - to off-peak months, so as
to reduce the shop margin of the fleet and leave more shop capacity for
taking care of unscheduled operations during the peaks. On the control
side (execution and review), the fundamental task is related to the
actual shopping assignment and the balance of shop work-loads. Given
the above notion, we have found that there are a number of shortcomings
in the current conduct in the host railroad regarding the planning and
control of service policies which are discussed below.
Serviceable Fleet Is Not Geared to the Traffic Level
In current practice, the creating of maintenance schedule is
primarily the product of a straighforward "bookkeeping" process
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conducted by the Manager of the Information Systems in the mechanical
department. There is no explicit decision involved in such a process,
nor the consideration of transportation requirement. Exhibit 7-1-2
shows the relationships among traffic level, serviceable power fleet,
W/P ratio, and power time utilization. Because the serviceable fleet is
not coordinated with the traffic level, to accommodate high traffic
level, an average unit must both work harder and turnaround faster. The
major problem concerning the above practice is that, because the
operations during the peak months are normally the real challenge to
rail management, strategically speaking, to perform their task
efficiently, management should take every opportunity to maximize its
controllability over the situation. In the maintenance context,
unscheduled maintenance is the major uncontrollable element in the
system. To minimize the adverse effect of this uncontrollable factor on
both the system shopload and the fleet serviceability, during the peaks
it is preferrable to: 1) reduce the need for unscheduled maintenance by
reducing the engine's work-load, and 2) reserve more shop capacity to
take care of the unscheduled repairs so as to shorten their shop time.
A key to achieving above two goals is to make a deliberate effort to
reschedule certain peak periods' preventive maintenance work to
off-peaks.
Ideally, a well managed power fleet should exhibit behaviors as
shown in Exhibit 7-1-3. More specifically, the serviceable fleet size
is properly geared to the demand level; despite the traffic level, the
work load (in terms of W/P ratio) is relatively constant - closely
follows the desired W/P policies; the turnaround time is also relatively
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Exhibit 7-1-2
THE INTERPLAY AMONG TRAFFIC VOLUME, SERVICEABLE POWER FLEET,
TON/HP RATIO, AND POWER TIME UTILIZATION
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constant despite traffic level. By this token, a stable stand-by time
pattern can be upheld and in turn a more reliable train service can be
maintained throughout the year. Of course, the notions of constant
workload and stable turnaround time do not preclude the need to search
for a more efficient power utilization patterns (while providing the
same service quality). However, such an effort should be directed to
upgrading the average utilization pattern but not the peak utilization -
technically speaking, the goal to change power utilization pattern is to
-shift upward both the W/P ratio and time utilization lines shown in
Exhibit 7-1-3 as a whole, but not to change their slopes.
However, we cannot totally blame the Mechanical Department for the
current inefficient conduct. Without the necessary antecedent
transportation planning process, no delicate maintenance planning effort
can possibly be motivated and properly guided. It is then conceivable
for the mechanical officers to strictly follow the well-known mandatory
frame as their maintenance schedule. By this token, they can avoid any
responsibility for "rocking the boat" and can stabilize both
expectations of the shop operators regarding their workload and the
transportation officers concerning the maintenance requirements - the
latter expectation is particularly important in the absence of a formal
coordination mechanism for the planning of a serviceable fleet.
To improve the current situation, two steps must be taken: the
first starts from the development of a formal transportation planning
process and subsquently a maintenance sub-process to direct the planning
of the serviceable fleet; the second is the reorganization of the
existing planning function in the Mechanical Department by designating
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Exhibit 7-1.-3
A HYPOTHETICAL INTERPLAY AMONG TRAFFIC VOLUME, SERVICEABLE FLEET,
TON/HP RATIO, AND POWER TIME UTILIZATION
(A) More responsive adjust-
ment of Serviceable
Power Fleet to the
Traffic Volume.
(B) Relative constant power
workload (TON/HP),
regardlessof Traffic
Volume.
O
o
(C) Higher but relatively 0
constant Power Time HM
Utilization, regarless of.H
Traffic Volume.
l GTM/Mon.
GTM/Mon.
P GTM/Mon
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certain units specifically to deal with the scheduling of preventive
maintenance and developing certain procedures for the planning of the
serviceable fleet.
The Hidden Cost of Fleet Unreliability
Referring to Exhibit 5-1-7, from 1979 through 1980, (due to road
failures), each unit in the host railroad exhibited unscheduled visits
to the shop 0.76 times every month, while the scheduled visit is
conducted every 45 days, or equivalently, 0.66 times every month. The
consequences of the high fleet unreliability are devastating.
Reliability and Power Assignment. First of all, it causes the collapse
of transportation personnel's confidence on power reliability. For
instance, a Divison Superintendent remarked: "As soon as a train leaves
our terminal, we start to worry about a road failure." In response to
our question regarding their low W/P ratio (which is approximately 0.7
from 1977 through 1980),the General Manager-Terminal Operations
commented: "A stall on the road because of engine failure is too
expensive to afford; therefore, we usually 'overpower' the train to
prevent the stall from occurring." As a result, the host railroad had
to use part of its road fleet unproductively as "insurance" power; and
despite a train's length, the minimum standard power assignment was a
two-unit consist. The direct impact of such conduct is reduced
productivity of power. In Railroad C, one serviceable horepower-day
produces 170 gross-ton-mile, while in Railroad A, the same
horsepower-day only produces approximately 100 gross-ton-mile, there are
a number of factors which can cause the above difference, e.g., train
speed and power time-utilization; nevertheless, the W/P ratio was a key
factor. In Railroad C from 1977 to 1980, it was approximately 0.9,
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while in Railroad A, it was about 0.7.
Reliability and Shop Operations. Fleet unreliability not only causes a
high frequency of shopping but also long shopping time, and both affect
the shop operations significantly. Exhibit 7-1-4 shows published
locomotive shop productivity standards. Comparing these standards with
the actual performance represented in Exhibit 5-1-6, we can conclude
that the actual average scheduled maintenance time (20.3 clock hours)
was much. longer than the documented standards for two reasons: one is
because approximately 60% of scheduled shoppings were 45-day (standard:
6 manhours) and 30% are 90-day (standard: 18 manhours) inspections
during the surveying period, the average scheduled shopping time was
supposedly to be much shorter than 20 hours; and the other is that
normally more than one craftman were assigned to work on a unit,
therefore, if there were no delay for whatever reason then, in terms of
clock time, the scheduled shopping time should be much less than the
man-hour standards. According to a Shop General Foreman, the shop
performance we observed was not atypical, and the main reason which
causes the undue maintenance time was the large amount of unscheduled
maintenance - from time to time, he felt he needed more workforce and
larger material stocks.
Reliability and Operating Control Effort. Referring to Exhibit 5-2-6,
the process for handling engine failure is relatively complicated. For
a 1000-unit fleet with 0.76 road failure rate per-unit each month, there
are approximately 25 road failures every day. This was indeed a
remarkable extra burden on the Power Control Center, Division Master
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Mechanic and Shop Coordinator. Coordination is usually costly in terms
of time consumed by all the engaged actors. Moreover, because a
decision-maker's attention is a limited resource [Simon, 1973], the more
the attention of a power dispatcher, for instance, is oriented to the
handling of emergency, the less for the decision making with respect to
normal operations. In effect, the decision quality regarding the normal
operations could be jeopardized significantly.
In summary, the symptoms concerning the unreliability of the road
fleet and its devastating effects on many areas are evident. The key
sources of troubles are the unsuccessful planning and implementation of
service policies and the lack of control over maintenance quality.
However, there is no straightforward solution. For instance, we should
keep in mind that the notion of accountability can hardly be applied to
the individual labor level, because unions prohibit the management from
assigning the responsibility of equipment performance to any specific
worker. The best the management can do is to take an entire shop in
whole as a responsibility unit, adopt the home shopping principle
strictly and incorporate some formal incentive mechanism (and possibly
associated with certain MBO procedures) with a refined performance
review system.
B. Shop Performance Control
Shop margin, as described in Chapter 5, is the single index
emphasized by the host railroad for the evaluation of shop performance.
In principle, any single-measure control system can easily result in
unbalanced performance. Unfortunately, the host railroad's maintenance
performance is exactly such a case. For instance, the remarkable fleet
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unreliability is one of the direct consequences of the biased control
mechanism. Despite the counterproductive side-effects, the shop-margin
measurement procedure per se is also problematic.
The current shop margin is defined as the sum of the 5 a.m. shop
count over the entire system. However, Exhibit 7-1-5 gives a daily
shop-count profile of a major repair shop in the system [Mao and
Martland, 1982], which clearly indicated that the 5 a.m. count is below
the mean and among the lowest points of the profile. In other words,
because the only performance measure is calculated merely on one
specific moment of time, it is conceivable that the shop operator could
intentionally make the performance at that moment look good. This would
make the current measure calculated from the 5 a.m. shop count an
underestimate of the true shop margin and an overestimate of shop
performance. Because shop performance information is an important item
on the agenda of the morning maintenance conference which is ususally
held at 9 a.m., to obtain a shop count measure, the turnover report
between the third and the first work shift is a convenient source which
is practically prepared around 5 a.m.; therefore, the 5 a.m. shop count
becomes institutionalized as a fleet shop margin measure for the system.
However, given the modern computerized on-line information processing
capacity, the preparation of multi-point shop counts is no longer a
difficult job. Therefore, to avoid the pitfall of the current counting
procedure, a per-shift or per-hour based counting system should be more
desirable and able to produce more accurate shop performance indices.
Moreover, to improve *the situation caused by the current
single-index control system, a set of deliberate indices, which must
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Exhibit 7-1-5 Shop Count Profile
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include reliability measures and service quality measures (such as train
delay account for mechanical operations, etc.), should be introduced to
refine the existing system. Such a refinement of the existing
performance evaluation system is aimed not only at providing more
accurate information on shop performance, but also to guide the shop
operations adequately toward more balanced performance.
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C. Maintenance-Transportation Coordination Problems
Due to the high degree of mutual-dependence, rail power management
is characterized by the interwoven decision nets involved in various
tasks. In the real-time operating control context, the dynamic aspect
of the decision net, particularly the timing and the sequence of contact
of the involved actors, becomes critical to the eventual outcome of the
process. The actors activated in those processes are very much
contingent upon the nature of the situation and choice of the antecedent
actors. For instance, referring to Exhibit 5-2-6, let us consider the
following alternative scenario: if the Division Master Mechanic in
question was rejected by all the shops he had been negotiating with, or
anticipated the difficulty at the outset of finding an available repair
shop, a most likely solution he may choose, then, would be a report to
the General Superintendent-Mechanical. As a result, one more actor was
activated, the decision chain became longer; and more importantly, the
key decision-maker of the process was now shifted from the Divison
Master-Mechanic to the General Superintendent-Mechanical. The problems
of our real concern are: 1) Why and When a particular decision net is
evoked? 2) What makes it function?
Evocation of A Decision-Net
According to the theories suggested in Chapter 2, there are at
least two ways to explain why a particular decision-net is evoked.
First, a decison-maker may act on his own if he perceives his routinely
received information sufficient to make the decision; otherwise, he has
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to search actively for the needed information, and in effect a
decision-specific communication net is thus evoked. The individuals
involved in the net must stand for information-points which are relevant
to the decision. The above notion explains partially when a
decision-net will be evoked and why a specific net will be selected.
The second is following the notion of controllability derived from
March and Simon's observation regarding the search sequence of the
"problem-solving program" [1958, pp.179-180]. If a decision problem is
perceived by a decision-maker as a problem that can be solved
effectively by mobilizing resources under his control, then presumably
he will act on his own to solve the problem. For example, if the
Division Master Mechanic was sure that his division can take good care
of the failed engine, then the bottom half of the communication locus
shown in Exhibit 5-2-6 would certainly be defaulted. However, if the
desired solution of the problem is considered already beyond his
control, then the decision-maker has to intervene in other operations.
For instance, he may pass the problem to someone who is presumed capable
of solving it, e.g., the case represented by Exhibit 5-2-6. In many
other situations, he may also intervene in either downstream or upstream
operations, e.g., if for whatever reason an engine is unable to be
released to serve a train in time, the responsible Master Mechanic can
ask the Division Train Master to either hold the train, underpower the
train, or leave certain car blocks behind. When all of the above
methods have not worked and the problem still cannot be successfully
solved, the decision-maker may seek to influence the higher level
indirect decision-maker to alter the decision premises, i.e., decision
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criteria or task goal. However, in case of the breakdown of the control
function, decision maker may simply abandon the decision criteria or
goal by following his own rule. An unfortunate example in this regard
can be found in the host railroad: because the shop productivity
standards, as shown in Exhibit 7-1-5, were considered hard to follow,
many foremen never even knew such standards existed. In summary, the
notion of controllability not only explains the reason when a
decision-net is evoked, but also explains more specifically the way in
which the net is evoked.
Basis of Mutual Influence and Intervention
The power control center is operated around-the-clock in three
shifts, and there is observational evidence that some power dispatchers
can get along with mechanical personnel much better than others; and
more importantly these dispatchers are usually considered performing
better than the latter ones. In theoretical term, the former have more
competent role skill than the latter. Among other influence stategies
mentioned in Chapter 2, in the context of power management, the
sensitivity toward the mechanical person's work-load is critical. The
favor that a power dispatch can offer to the servicing personnel by
saving their effort in decoupling a power consist is just one typical
example.
To assess the coordinability of a decision net, it is necessary to
examine the basis for mutual influence and intervention. Due to the
professional specialty and the nature of the task, the Mechanical
Department is a distinct social group from the Transportation
Department. According to a mechanical officer, in many cases the
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situation is: "If we do well, it is our duty; if anything runs into
trouble, we are the first to blame." In such an operating environment,
morale becomes a critical issue, and recognition and appreciation of
their contribution are eagerly sought by the maintenance personnel.
In addition to the above perception problem, an inherent conflict
eiists between the power dispatcher and the maintenance officers, in
term of their respective daily operating concern. For the power
dispatcher, the major driving force of his on-going decision effort is
to satisfy the power need derived from train operations. The
maintenance operators however, could care less about how the power
demand is satisfied; for them, the priority is how to perform their
maintenance job smoothly and easily. Two points can be made then, 1)
between the above two parties, the power dispatcher has more influence
and is in a better position to offer favors which may be appreciated by
his counterpart; and 2) the most effective approach for winning the
cooperation of the counterpart is to take their decision concern into
account.
D. Team-Support - A Summary
The issue of coordinability concerning the maintenance-
transportation interface activites can be examined along various
dimensions and levels. Based on the data collected from the host
railroad, we summarize bur diagnosis as follows.
Real-time decisions are usually pressing problems. The routine
procedures which are a part of the existing organization design can
usually bring together the information and the efforts from various
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relevant, actors and work out a solution. As we illustrated above, the
evocation of the decision net is very much dependent on the key
decision-maker's perception of the sufficiency of information as well as
the controllability of the problem. Therefore, two questions are in
order: What is the likelikhood that the decision-maker will make a
premature decision because 1) of his miscalculation regarding the
information requirement? or 2) of the barriers to communication either
making him reluctant to request further information or causing him to
consume too much time in obtaining the information thus making the
process inefficient?
The first problem is essentially related to the nature of the
performance control system, as well as the competence of the decision
maker. As we stated earlier, no manager will seriously take into
account those factors which are not included in the formal or informal
performance control system, no matter how important in principle the
factors are supposed to be. On the one hand, this problem restresses
the importance of refining the performance control system. On the other
hand, as illustrated in Chapter 6, an individual's decision heuristic
vitally determines human information processing characteristics; a
biased heuristic could constantly mislead the judgement on the
information requirement. The solution to this problem is through
training and/or the provision of certain delicate decision-support
systems (DSS). More detailed examination of the problems related to the
individual decision heuristics is provided in the next section.
As to the problem concerning the multi-departmental communication
barriers, it is a challenge to the design of an organization
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coordination mechanism. Given the stereotype perceptions between the
mechanical and transportation officers, the need for effective
coordination between these two parites is urgent. To improve
coordinability, the railroad should develop certain mechanism for
productively utilizing the potentially conflicting interests of these
two parties (by identifying those practices which will benefit both
sides as well as the organization as a whole), devising mutual
intervention channels, as well as providing a balanced basis of
influence to facilitate the exchange of favors for each other. A more
detailed discussion on the design of such a mechanism, referred to as
team-support systems, will be discussed in Part 3 of this chapter.
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7.1.3 Problems Within the Steering Control of Power Dispatching
In the preceding section we assess the performace of a
multi-functional decision net. In this section, we examine in detail
the individual decision process concerning power dispatching.
The power dispatcher is the first line manager in charge of the
control and coordination of the power operating cycle which is
interdependent upon two sets of tasks. First, all the higher level
power cycle's control decisions constitute the decision premises of
power dispatcher - either as goals, criteria or constraints of his
decision. The train dispatching and maintenance execution are the
second set of tasks closely related to the control of power operating
cycle, which demand coordination through real-time control effort.
Intensive information transmission will take place among the actors
involved in the above three operations so as to update their respective
decision bases continuously to support their decisions. Given this
concept, we shall probe in detail the following issues: 1) How are the
far-reaching policy decisions (e.g., service guidelines, if any)
actually implemented by the first line power dispatcher, i.e., to what
extent, and how the high level policies become a built-in part of the
power dispatcher's decision heuristics? 2) How do the decision
heuristics of the power dispatcher as well as the information utilized
by him influence ultimate power performance?
The approach to the above two problems is to examine 1) the nature
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of the formal communication channels which routinely furnish information
to the decision base of power dispatcher, as well as the decision
triggers which is the mechanism (as an implicit or explicit result of
the organization design) that conditions the timing of the power
dispatcher's decision; 2) the forces which motivate the dispatcher to
request more intensive or exentsive information with an aim of making
better quality decisions and the availability of such inquiry media.
Through such an investigations, we intend to identify the problems
presented in the current practices as well as the opportunities for
improving the decisions of the power dispatcher.
A. The Decision Base of the Power Dispatcher
Routine Information Receiving Channels and Decision Triggers. Refering
to Exhibit 6-2-3, the power dispatcher needs to receive routinely a
variety of information which includes train schedules, maintenance
schedules, horsepower per ton policies, productivity/utilization
standards, service quality standards, power fleet size, home shop list
(if any), and power status. Using the data from the host railroad, we
can identify the sources for each item of information as shown in
Exhibit 7-1-6. One can see that several performance related guidelines
are not formally furnished by the system. In fact, the above finding is
not surprising, it is merely additional evidence of the lack of a
clearly defined performance control system in the host railroad. The
major drawback of such an incomplete decision base is that it may
respond to effort-oriented pressing issues well, but is insensitive to
performance-oriented planning issues.
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To support the above arguement, refer to the general problem
solving heuristics summarized from the observation of the power
dispatcher given in Exhibit 7-1-7 (a merger of Exhibits 6-2-3 and
6-2-9). Without an explicit time utilization standard, when there is an
anticipated power surplus in a certain terminal, "most likely we would
choose to do nothing, if there was no obvious shortage anticipated
elsewhere" as remarked by a Railroad C's dispatcher. Any deliberate
effort to redistribute surplus power is not rewarded by the system, so
there is no incentive for the power dispatcher to utilize the surplus.
A more subtle reason could be that whether the power pool as an
excessive surplus is a judgement based on some estimation of demand;
given the high variability of rail operations, the redistribution of
surplus power may likely result in a power shortage if the demand level
is underestimated. Taking such a disincentive into account, it is
unlikely that the power dispatcher will do anything about the oversized
power pool. In other words,in terms of the flow chart given in Exhibit
7-1-7, all elements related to the identification and utilization of
surplus power will be constantly defaulted. From the railroad's point
of view, such a practice: 1) makes the fleet utilization suffer, 2) also
loses the opportunity to obtain prompt feedback from the power
dispatcher concerning the overage of the fleet particularly during the
low seasons, and 3) consequently loses the opportunity to strategically
adjust: the active power fleet size. As a result, according to one
mechanical officer, "The surplus power sometimes may be kicked back and
forth across the division lines, when there is not enough room at the
dispatch tracks in either division."
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Exhibit 7-1-6 ROUTINELY RECEIVED INFORMATION FOR POWER DISPATCHER
INFORMATION ITEM
TRAIN SCHEDULE
MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE
HORSEPOWER PER TON POLICY
PRODUCTIVITY/UTILIZATION
STANDARDS
SERVICE QUALITY STANDARDS
POWER FLEET SIZE
HOME SHOP LIST
POWER STATUS
SOURCE
PUBLISHED TIME TABLE;
TRAIN ORDER (THROUGH DAILY OPERATING
MEETING)
WEEKLY COMPUTER READOUT
(NO FORMAL DOCUMENT)
(NO FORMAL DOCUMENT)
("TRAIN DELAY CAUSED BY POWER" MEASURED,
NO FORMAL STANDARDS ESTABLISHED)
POWER ROSTER
SHIFT TURN-OVER REPORT
(POWER CONTROL CENTER)
ON-LINE MONITORING CHANNELS
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Motivation and Media for Active Inquiry
The preceding assessment emphasizes the coverage of the decision
heuristics on different categories of the problem. In addition, we
should also be concerned with the quality of the decision in a given
problem category. To examine this problem, we can systematically probe
the search process for extra power as a response either to the need to
serve an extra train (as the example given in Chapter 6), or to the need
to replenish an undersized power pool identified during the development
of the daily working plan.
Search Rule. The choice of search rule is usually implicit and
habitual; nevertheless, it determines the subsequent solution space as
well as the characteristics of the potential solution. Without any
particular control emphasis, a tendency which follows from the
discussion with two power dispatchers is to search for extra power
primarily through a location-oriented rule, i.e., start from the
location which is closest to the deficit terminal. Certainly, in
practice, the dispatcher may only consider large terminals and exclude
small ones from his choice set. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the final
choice is usually the first feasible solution the dispatcher can find.
The dilemma here is that such a choice is likely to be a prematured one,
while a delicate solution is usually too time-consuming to develop.
Because the search for a better solution is a heavy information burden
for the dispatcher, and the marginal gain in decision quality may not
seem to compensate the loss of timing for decision as well as the cost
associated with the extensive search effort, in current practice, it is
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conceivable that the timing wins the priority. However, the question to
consider is: Is there any possible way to improve the saticificing level
of the solution,.without reducing the timeliness of the decision through
certain deliberately designed information processing aides? Before
reaching our conclusion, we shall further examine other critical
problems concerning the search process in question.
Evaluation of Solution Attributes. Referring to Exhibit 7-1-8, two sets
of attributes to a solution need to be considered in the decision: one
is design-phase attributes, the other is the perceived consequences.
The former set of attributes is determined largely by the design of the
solution. The example of searching for extra power given in Chapter 6
illustrates that many delicate choices may be involved in the solution
design phase, e.g., the selection of the host trains, the power pick-up
point, the traffic switch point, etc. Therefore, the contents of the
design-phase attributes could vary from solution to solution, e.g., a
plan could be with or without a traffic switch point. The power
dispathcer has to sketch out this set of attributes explicitly.
Although some stereotype solutions may be adopted, intensive on-line
inquiry as shown in Exhibit 6-2-7 is usually necessary to varify the
feasibility of the stereotypes. Moreover, the coordinability also comes
into play in this phase of the decision process, and it could
significantly. affect the quality of the eventual decision. For
instance, in a highly coordinated system, a power dispatcher may be able
to obtain from the shop in some nearby engine terminal the required
units which are not shown as serviceable on the current status board;
while in a less coordinated system, a dispatcher may only be able to
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choose surplus units from the existing power pools which could be far
away from the deficit terminal.
In short, the quality of the design of a solution is determined by
at least two factors: the stereotypes adopted, and the effort of an
active inquiry. In many cases, because the design phase is too time-
and effort-consuming, the dispatcher simply chooses the first feasible
solution and defaults on the subsequent evaluation of the consequences.
Nevertheless, the real issue of concern is not the relationships -
e.g., sequential or simultaneous - between design and evaluation
practices, but the underlying criteria implied by the choice. Making
these criteria explicit enables us to assess the potential bias of the
choice. An in-depth analysis of the choice criteria employed by the
power dispatchers implicitly or explicitly exposes two issues. First,
some dispatchers normally ignore certain criteria which are potentially
important to power performance. For instance, one dispatcher emphasized
that his priority duty is to maintain a situation in which no train is
delayed by power and that he could care less about the power
productivity or time utilization. The second issue is related to the
calculation capability. In normal conditions, according to his
experience, a dispatcher is usually able to predict quite confidently
the patterns of power deployment on the network resulting from different
dispatching decisions, and to choose the.most desirable one accordingly.
However, for many non-routine situations, one dispatcher with a rather
strong system-sense expressed his uneasiness concerning the relationship
of his immediate choice to the subsequent power depolyment pattern - he
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wondered from time to time, whether his choice was the most desirable
one when taking the next few dispatching tasks into account. The thing
preventing him from solving the above puzzle was that such a
verification usually required an extensive search and comparison of a
large number of alternatives. Given the time-pressure and the limited
information-processing aid devices - pencil-and-paper and the power
status board - it is normally impractical for the power dispatcher to
have a try at it.
In Chapter 6, we argued that, due to the lack of appropriate
decision-aid devices to support the massive information processing
requirement, systematic algorithm is difficult to apply, in the
development of daily overall working plans by a power dispatcher who is
in charge of a large geographical area involving the movement of several
hundred power units. The resulting power performance, in term of
time-utilization, is normally low because of high power idle time. The
above discussion further indicates that the problem of information
overload can also discourage power dispatchers from searching for higher
quality decisions because of the difficulty of practicing more
sophisticated search-and-choice rules.
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B. A Prevailing Myth about the Locomotive Assignment Scheduling
Searching for a better solution to improve power utilization is an
old issue faced by rail operations management. Because in theory, the
dispatching of power is normally perceived as a routine mechanistic
task, rail systems analysts have long intended to develop optimization
models to generate locomotive assignment schedules of which the
performance, in term of certain specific criteria, is presumed to be
better than that of the conventional power dispatchers' intuitive
heuristics [*]. However, despite the issue concerning single versus
multiple criteria, as well as the problems resulting from the massive
computer memory space required by the application of algorithms involved
in those optimization models to an ordinary size rail network in
practice, one of the most critical difficulties regarding the attempts
to use the predetermined optimal power cycling plans in the day-to-day
operations is, as reported by a major U. S. railroad after their
serious but unsuccessful experiment: "...various factors such as late
trains and peak load conditions prevent rigid adherence to the operating
plans" [McGauhey, et al, 1975, p. 1-075]. When the cycles broke down,
the control center personnel have to reassign power units by following
their own heuristics.
Unfortunately, the occassions in which the optimization model fails
to function (e.g., the above mentioned late trains and peak loads) are
exactly the time when a power dispatcher needs some external
------------------- me----
[*] A brief review of articles in this area is given in Mao, et al
1980.
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decision-aids the most. The key reason which caused the above
experiment [ibid] a failure was that the model builders failed to
recognize the applicability of the analytical technique to the context
of the problem and failed to undertake a deliberate diagnosis of the
real problems before they developed the solution. More specifically,
they overlooked the fact that power daily operations are performed in
the general frame of the operating document priority system [Chapter 4]
which allows the railroad to promptly adjust the plans to the
unpredictable operating contingencies. Therefore, without a rigidly
followed train schedule and predetermined car scheduling plans, it is
impossible to implement any predetermined power cycling plan produced by
prescriptive optimization models. Furthermore, in the real-time
operating environment, we have shown that the power dispatcher can care
less about the optimal power cycle plan in discharging his
responsibility. The real issue is how to enhance his decision
capability to cope with the operating contigencies.
C. The Need for Decision-Support Systems
The following conclusions can be made concerning the decision
behavior of a power dispatcher.
1) Due to the lack of productivity goals, in the host railroad, the
power dispatcher's attention is normally focused on pressing and
effort-oriented problems - servicing trains and avoiding the
responsibility for train delays. Deliberate planning aimed at higher
power productivity is not rewarded by the system, and in effect no
dispatcher is really concerned about the long power idle time and low
achieved W/P ratio. In other words, the dispatcher's decision
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heuristics are unbalanced; under the existing organization performance
review mechanism, it is difficult to motivate the dispatcher to actively
search for better quality decisions which are able to balance both goals
of service quality and productivity.
2) Time pressure and massive volumes of information characterize the
decision context of the power dispatcher. Information-overload is a
critical problem for the power dispatcher. In addition to the existing
status display board, certain decision-aid devices, which are able to
expand the dispatcher's information-processing capactiy, such as
computer-based DSS, are essential to the improving the performance of
power dispatching task. Those devices should be capable of minimizing
premature decisions, advancing the "satisficing level", and facilitating
more extensive inquiry into decision-relevant information.
3) Power dispatching, in the rail freight context, is primarily a
continual decision process which demands timely input of up-dated
information concerning the upstream and downstream processes. The
blue-print type predetermined power cycling plan produced by
-conventional optimization models is normally impractical in the
real-time power dispatching process. In other words, the legitimacy of
the conventional optimization models must be examined with great care
when it is applied to the real-time power dispatching problem. Due to
the multi-criteria nature of the problem (and many of those criteria are
usually unquantifiable, e.g., implication on coordinability), in
principle, a descriptive model - which only presents the nature of the
attributes of alternative solutions, and leave the choice to the
dispatcher - should be more appropriate to be adopted in the
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decision-aid systems for the power dispatcher.
4) To benefit the on-line dispatching decision, the design of
computer-based decision support systems must be geared to the nature of
the actual heuristic applied by the power dispatchers, as well as
tailored to fit the input/output patterns of information flows.
However, the merit of decision-support systems is not limited to
supporting an existing decision behavior; it can also be designed to
offset the potential biases of the current decision heuristics by
integrating certain normative elements into the systems which are able
to improve and reinforce the decision rationality. More detailed
discussion on this issue is given in the next section.
7.1.4. Information Systems of Power Management: Problems and
Potentials
According to the dual-system paradigm, information is viewed as
essential linkages between the controlled and the controlling systems,
as well as among the units in the controlling system, therefore, to
improve the three levels performance - organization, team and individal
- it is important to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the
existing operating-information systems including both the on-line
inquiry capacity and the off-line analysis potential.
A. Problems of the Current Systems
The backbone of the operating information systems in the
Transportation Department of the host railroad is an on-line
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computerized train reporting system capable of providing fairly detailed
data on the movements of trains through all terminals in the road.
Complementing to the main system is a terminal management information
system to take care of the detailed car transactions within each
terminal area. In the Mechanical Department, an on-line power
maintenance information system has been used since 1969, which provides
information concerning each unit's inspection due date and its
maintenance history (such as failure record, work being done, etc.) for
management at all levels, and accessible by the field officers through a
dedicated telex system.
As concluded in the previous section, due to the lack of a clearly
specified planning and control framework, the design of these
information systems was driven by the available data rather than by the
understanding of the decisions to be made. More specifically, those
systems in effect are designed to record the transactions for the clerks
rather than to extract decision information for the managers. As a
result, the volume of data available is expanded but few managers can
actually benefit from it because of the already existed
information-overload situation. A typical example is the readouts of
daily train performance details, both by train symbols and by divisions,
as shown in the Appendix of Chapter 6. Each of these reports is usually
some 50 pages; and no one in the system is ever able to read them, let
alone to use them. Although some summary reports are produced in
conjuction with the detailed reports, the essential question is: What
are the criteria or guidelines used in producing those summaries? The
major problems in this aspect are at least twofold: 1) the summary
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indices are usually unbalanced, for instance, the train delay summary
(Exhibit 6A-2-D), is the only index that extracted from the train
performance details; and 2) most of the aggregated data are too general
for any management use, for instance, the summary statistics shown in
Exhibit 6A-2-B. As a result, to accomplish their work, managers are
normally driven to favor verbal channels, such as telephone inquiry and
face-to-face meeting, and to neglect documented sources of information.
In many situations, they are likely to be forced to take action
superficially based on inadequate and abstract information. A rather
astonishing example in this regard is that the SVPO of the host railroad
used to believe that they had a problem of power shortage; however,
according to our analysis, we found the fact was just the opposite - in
their system, the power was normally waiting for the train, rather than
the train waiting for the power [Mao and Martland, 1981].
B. Potential Capability of the Existing Systems
From the notion of information-overload, we argue that managers
normally suffer from cognitive limitations that restrict the amount of
information they can consider in complex decision procedures. Given the
potential power of information technology, what the existing
computerized information systems have missed is clearly the opportunity
to enhance the capacity of human information-processing systems so as to
pursue more rational and sophisticated organizational decision-making
processes.
To refine the existing systems, we should first investigate what
the contents of the systems are and what can potentially be produced.
Exhibit 7-1-9 is a summary of the elementary relevant power-operations
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source data which are principally available either in the Transportation
Department's train reporting systems, or the Mechanical Department's
maintenance information systems. The available data bases are rich
enough to produce indices concerning all primary components of the power
cycle - Exhibit 7-1-10 gives such example. Exhibit 7-1-11 further lists
the power performance measure which is able to be generated from the
existing systems. It is clear that the existing computerized
information systems are capable of supporting a power performance
control systems which embodies the concept of power cycle. The key
problem left is how management should use these data bases efficiently
and effectively in power operations? We shall amplify this issue in the
next section.
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Exhibit 7-1-9
POWER STATUS VARIABLE SOURCE DATA
g OPERATING CYCLE
A,Time Based Data 6 Sourcel Train Reporting System
1) Time Arriving Terminal - Scheduled and Actual
(associated data: train type, number of car loads, O.D mileage,
gross-tons)
2) [Time Arriving Servicing Area (Time Beginning Servicing)]*
3) [Time Finishing Servicing (Time Entering Dispatching Tracks)]*
4) Time Called (Time Calling Crew or Time Leaving Dispatching Tracks)
5) Time Depart Terminal - Scheduled and Actual
*a not included in the Train Reporting System but available in servicing
foreman's working diary
B. Event Based Data r S6urce4 Power Maintenance Information System"
1) [Fuel. Issued or "Consumed]
2) Other Service Done ITWater, Sand], Oil
9) Running Repair Work Done (date, type of work done in code number)
to Power cycle status(per unit information)could include:.
General Information -Engine ID, Class, Currenq location, maintenance historyj
Specific Information- Position in The Consist, Direction (Head Facing).
:[]1 Data Unavailable or Not Sure Its Availability.
I MAINTENANCE CYCLE
A. Time Based Data (Sources Maintenance Information System)
1) Time Arrive, Maintenance Shop
(Associated with information of units' due date of scheduled inspection
or project)
2) [Time Expect to Leave the Shop]
3) Time Leave Maintqnance Shop (Return to service)
B. Event Based Pata
1) Tests Done (Oil Sample Taken and Test Results, Oil Change DAte)
2) Repair Work Done (Engine, Car Body, Trucks, Parts)
3) Enroute Malfunction and Location
4) [Defects or Critical Symptoms Detected (Pruing Daily Inspection or
Scheduled Maintenance]
5) Shopping Reasons (Project, Preventive Maintenance, or Remedial Maintenance)
6) Special Status (e.g., awaiting Material)
C. Shop Status
1) Matefial Inventory and Consumed
2) (Man-Hour Available / Craft)
3) Man-Hour Consumed / craft /unit
4) Operating Expense
I SERVICE CYCLE (Sources Train Reporting System, Power Dispatcher's Notes Book)
Time Based Data
1) Time Taken Off-line (time leased or stored)
2) Time Return to Service
Remark:[] indicates information may not available currently in the
formal information system. It normally requires pred4ction which is not
usually done explicitly at shop floor level. Hovever, t*ese pieces of
information can be acquired through oral communication.
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EXHIBIT7-1-40 DETENTION COMPONENTS OF POWER CYCLE
AND THEIR TIME MEASUREMENTS
1EASE .ý...M.NTTS
COMP?ONENTS OF POWER CYCLE
IN TERIM:S OF TIME
TIME
SET.-OFF TIME 4
----TIME
SERVICING TIME
T ME
MAINTENANCE TIME [
( May Be 0 ) TIME
STAND-BY TIME I
TIME
PICK-UP TIME TIME
TIME
REQUIRED DATA
ARRIVES THE TERIIINAL
ARRIVES ROUNDHOUSE
COMPLETES SERVICING/INSPECTION
COMPLETES REPAIP/MAINTENANCE
DEPARTS DISPATCH TRACKS
DEPARTS THE TERMINAL
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Exhibit 7-1-I1 INVENTORY OF POWER PERFORMANCE MEASURES
A. Effioiency Measures --- Power Cyole Based
(I)soope (2)time interval (3)measurement (4)measured events
network-wide units off line
(storagolloase)
terminal-wise day horsepower out-of-service
(maintenanoce)
fleet type or unit-hour available
Glass month . (wlth servloing)
HP-MR servloeable
Individual (wlo servioing)
unit % of fleet utilised
(line or yard
% of time per operation)
unit otand-by
(serviable
not used)
$the actual measure used could be any combinations of the elements in the
about table---following sequenoe (1)-(2)-(3)-(4).
B. Stervice quality
numerator denomitor
train terminal delay amount power
traffio left behind
train enroute delay aooount power C22)
UNIT HOUR
enroute under power
enroute failure stop
enroute failure under power HP MILE
ear cycle time
yard time
total transit time
orew dead-heading (t23
l* could be ratio measure or straight numerator termihnal case no.
denonminator except the unit idle time is used.
*2 no terminal-wide measure
C. Productivity Measures --- Power Cyole Based
numerator denomitor
unit-mill I
HP available HP-HR (or -day)HP-milJe
utilised unit-HR (OR -DAY)
gtm
TOTAL EXPENSE
ntm
nrtm
. Erpsnse
D.
numerator denomitor
fuel cost
maintenaneos labor ost nit
maintenanoe material cost HP mile
train crew cost
E. Potentially Capable Off-line Analysis
Snetwork-wide I distriot-wise geographical distribution of power:
distribution pattern of power requirement
distribution pattern of power overagelshortage
*MTer
NMTFITP (from inspeotlon to failure)
o serviceable dayslshopping time
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7.2. Three Approaches to Improve the Controlling System
7.2.0 An Organization Information-Processing Perspective
Problematic symptoms are merely stimuli that usually direct
attention but do not necessarily cause action, therefore to formulate a
coherent set of change plans, the nature of the problems must be stated
in a way that arouses ideas about the needed corrective actions. The
diagnostic assessments given in the above sections - which not only
identifies the symptoms of problems concerning the host ralroad's power
management, but also explains how they have arisen - greatly facilitate
the development of change plans.
Due to the complex dynamics involved in the organizational process,
effective intervention usually demads multi-dimensional strategies that
are capable of creating the desired momentum to bring about an
organizational change [Section 3.0; Huse, 1980]. However, in this
study, we do not intend to develop comprehensive change plans; instead
we choose one particular intervention dimension, namely, the
organization information-processing perspective, to demonstrate how to
derive the change plans based on the diagnostic results. More
specifically, to put the chage planning into perspective, our goal is to
formulate a set of plans capable of bridging the gaps between the
information-processing capacity of the controlling system and the
information-processing requirements derived from the nature of the
system being controlled.
Based on the concept of problem-conversion, in Chapter 2 we argued
that there is a qualitative difference along the vertical dimension of
the organization hierarchy in terms of the nature of decisions to be
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made. Following this arguement, we further infer that no single
decision-oriented information system can satisfy the needs of management
at all levels. Taking these notions as the premises, in this section we
are going to demonstrate how to use the existing formal computerized
information systems (train reporting systems and maintenance information
systems) as a general data base [Nolan, 19711 to construct three
distinctive information-processing systems to bridge the gaps between
the information-processing requirements and the existing
information-processing capacity in three particular domains of power
management: individual decision aid, team process support, and overall
meta-control structure. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, we
shall not consider any specific detailed design problems, but will
outline the key design considerations.
7.2.1 Power Dispatcher's Decision-Support Systems
As diagnosed in Section 7.1, the problems concerning the power
dispatcher's decision are: 1) the potentially unbalanced solution search
rules resulting from biased stereotype solutions; 2) the premature
choice due to lack of explicit planning and evaluation within allowable
decision time frame; and 3) the lack of performance-oriented search and
choice activities due to a weak linkage between the organization
policies and the choice criteria of the dispatcher's decision
heuristics.
To solve the above problems,'the basic task is to use the power of
computer technology to enhance human information-processsing capacity.
To do so we should first clarify the respective roles played by human
and computer in the decision process of power dispatching.
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The Role of the Computer
- Power dispatching is a real-time decision, and to support such a
decision, not only the availability but also the age of information
become critical. According to the General Manager-Terminal Operations,
the information in the train reporting systems is less than one hour
old; as to the maintenance information sytem, the information is
normally updated on a daily basis as described by the Manager of
Information of the Mechanical Department.
In order to support real-time power dispatching, neither of the
existing systems can satisfy the requirement for current information.
In other words, either 1) the current field data-entry procedures should
be revised to meet the dispatching decision needs; or 2) some kind of
"man-machine system" should be adopted, e.g, the formal computerized
system only finishes the primary information to the decision base of the
power dispatcher, and the dispatcher updates it as needed through
real-time communication channels.
The major problems associated with the first approach are the
amount of capital investment required on the hardware (local data-entry
terminals) and the data transmission network, the amount of training
necessary for the local personnel to familiarize themselves with the
system, the amount of monitoring requried to check field respondent's
data entries as well as thier willingness to complete the needed
entries. All these are not easy problems.
The second alternative is in fact very close to the current
practice, the key difference being that a dedicated or shared processor
is required to handle the operations of a decision support package which
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assists the power dispatcher to accomplish the following funcitons: 1)
generate the daily working plan, 2) adjust and finalize the working
plan, and 3) generate contingency plans as needed. More specifically,
such a program should at least include the following modules (model
bases, see Section 2.2.3):
1) a power pool development routine represented by the flow diagram
shown in Exhibit 6-2-10, which can estimate the power pool for each
outbound train at each terminal for a particular work shift; any pool
which is too small or too large as compared with certain standard should
be automatically flagged to indicate the need for adjustment,
2) an interactive search routine which can display design-phase
attributes as well as the key consequences of available alternatives
generated from a variety of search rules (Exhibit 6-2-11 provides such
an image). This routine will be used for the adjustment of the daily
working plan to indicate the need for power redistribution and for the
generation of contingency plans to serve unexpected traffic. The most
important design guideline in this regard is to build in some normative
elements so as to balance the potentially biased search rules as well as
the normally overlooked choice criteria.
In short, taking the advantage of well-structured nature of the
power dispatching decision, the potential of the computer
information-processing capacity can be well exploited through a
deliberate modeling effort to translate the power dispatcher's decision
heuristics into computer programs to enhance his decision-making
capacity. Moreover, the design of decision-support systems can
effectively embody the desired ends into the available means and offset
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the potential decision biases.
The Human Role
Given a computerized decision-support environment like the one
described above, the power dispatcher primarily plays two roles: 1)
making the choice in each search process, and 2) furnishing updated
information into the system. To facilitate the conduct of the second
task - furnishing updated information - one additional module (a data
base with dialog interface) should be included in the decision-support
systems, namely, an inquiry routine capable of displaying the relevant
data as well as their age. Then it is at the dispatcher's disposal
regarding whether a particular data should be updated.
It is important to note that the power status data in such an
inquiry routine is nothing but a computerized version of the magnetic
display board. Therefore, the adoption of a computerized display system
causes minimum change in the dispatcher's general operating procedure,
i.e., instead of removing the chips on the magnetic board or updating
the record on his notes book, the dispatcher keys in an entry into the
computer. However, the advantage to have computerized decision-support
systems (in which the display program is a part) is vital. Most
importantly it allows the dispatcher to be released from the burden of
information overload and enables him to spend more time and energy in
planning and coordination activities with longer time horizon and larger
geographical space that could seldom be concerned in the past.
Moreover, because well designed DSS can explicitly display the predicted
consequences of alternative actions as well as indicate trade-offs among
alternatives to an extent which can never be done by the ordinary human
379
mind in the same time frame, more innovative plans can be explored and
new insights could obtain. The above effects collectively will lead to
the improvement of the power dispatcher's decision quality.
Performance Review
The installation of the DSS with the above described features
should significantly improve the capacity as well as the quality of the
power dispatcher's decision. Nevertheless, to completely support the
power dispatching function, one more element must be integrated into
the systems, that is a feedback component which allows the dispatcher
and his supervisor, the General Superintendent-Locomotive Distribution,
to review the performance of the power operating cycle.
As illustrated in the preceding section, the existing information
systems are capable of generating a fairly comprehensive array of
performance indices including both measures of power productivity and
service quality (Exhibit 7-1-11). Therefore, to build a feedback
function into the proposed decision-support systems is to design an
inquiry module associated with the historical performance data base
which enables the dispatcher to trace the actual consequences of his
decision, and possibly to make self-correction through learning process.
As to the Power General Superintendent, he concerns with the average
power performance over a period but not the decision by decision
performance, thus he should have the access to certain inquiry packages
able to generate periodical performance measures and ideally also able
to do some analyses, e.g., the trade-offs of productivity and service
quality implied by different dispatching patterns. Based on this
knowledge, he can give solid guidance to the power dispatchers and
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better control over their performance.
To conclude, we should recognize that no matter how deliberately
the decision-support systems are designed for the power dispatcher,
there is a limit that the systems can do about the control of power
performance, because what the Power Dispatching Center can control is
only a subset of the factors which determine the overall performance of
power operations. To really put power performance under control, the
power dispatchers have to intervene in other mutually dependent
operations (to coordinate the "uncontrollables") or to change the
general operating premises (to change goals, criteria and operating
plans). These are the issues discussed in detail in the following
subsections.
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7.2.2 Multi-Functional Team-Support Systems
Power operations are multi-functional activities. Centered around
the task of real-time power dispatching, there are at least three
interwoven decision-nets surrounding three task teams [Exhibit 7-2-11].
The first has already been discussed, i.e., the line-authority team
consisting of power dispatchers and the Power General Superintendent
(the P-P link in Exhibit 7-2-1). The second may be called a real-time
operations task team which comprises the power control center, the train
dispatching center and field mechanical officers (the P-M, P-T links).
The third is the team that is in charge of the coordination of
multi-functional planning, which includes officers holding line or staff
positions from the Transportation, Mechanical and Marketing Departments
(the C-M, C-P links). We should note that the first two teams are
easily identifiable in the existing organization of the host railroad,
while the third team is a novel one to take care of the currently poor
planning function. The purpose of this subsection is to illustrate how
to design proper mechanisms to enhance the coordinability of each task
team. We call these mechanisms the team-support systems [Section
2.2.2].
To facilitate our discussion, by using the Task-Actor Matrix
technique, a diagram can be constructed which indicates the ideal
control and coordination structure for each of the above tasks as well
as the desired interrelationships among the actors (Exhibit 7-2-2). The
loops shown in the diagram correspond to the heavy arrows shown in
Exhibit 7-2-1. Their implications are amplified below.
Line-Authority Team
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The ideal control procedure for this team is indicated by the P-P
loop in Exhibit 7-2-2. The essential media to support this team's
activities are the power dispatcher's decision-support systems and the
performance inquiry analysis package (i.e., his DSS) used by the Power
Superintendent. In this team, the dispatchers are accountable for the
short-term power performance; they use the DSS to assist them to
effectively and efficiently choose the dispatching patterns which
satisfy the criteria imposed by their supervisors. Since the power
superintendent is responsible for long-term performance, he uses his
inquiry/analysis package to control the dispatchers' performance. It is
important to note that one critical role for the superintendent is to
identify when the structure or the built-in parameters of the
dispatchers' DSS should be revised. This means that, in time of change,
certain decision rules (such as power assignment rule, weights for
different consequence measures) should be revised to maintain a
desirable level of performance. In case the required modification is
beyond Power Superintendent's allowable discretion range, then he should
flag the need for change of higher level decision as indicated by the
vertical dot line shown in the Exhibit 7-2-2. By and large, the process
involved for this team is relatively straightforward.
There is a mechanical counterpart line-authority team and its
process is shown by loop M-M. Since the issues concerning the design of
an individual DSS, the team sapport media, as well as the functioning
procedures are, in principle, the same as those involved in the power
group, we shall not discuss them in detail here.
Real-Time Operations Team
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Two processes are involved in this team's activity: one is the
power group to train dispatchers (as indicated by the P-T loop in
Exhibit 7-2-2), the other is the power group to mechanical officers (the
P-M loop). In the following discussion, we take the second process as
an example.
In the earlier part of this study, we mentioned that the power
dispatcher may make deals, implicitly or explicitly, with the servicing
foreman in order to acquire the needed serviceable power. In this
regard, the critical factor for success is basically communicational,
i.e., channels for easy and friendly communication should be available.
However, the real leverage of this team's activity does not soly lie in
the above microscopic interaction. A more significant power performance
improvement which can be achieved in the real-time operation is through
the deliberate coordination between the two groups to reschedule the
engine shopping time during the week, as reported by one mechanical
officer of a railroad:
"We will particularly aim early in the week; which is our light
period, to get as many units in as possible. We will have a large force
to accommodate the greater number of units. As we reach our peak usage
-period toward the end of the week, our changing needs are taken up by
the difference in number of relief people. We will handle 10-15% more
when the through demand is down, and our own capabilities are geared up
to accordingly." [RSMA, p.82]
By following the above practice, both goals of transportation (high
power availability to serve surge demand) and mechanical (even shop
workload) can be attained. To effectively implement this strategy in
the host railroad, the Power General Superintendent and the Mechanical
General Superintendent should work closely. Certain computerized
systems (DSS) can be designed for the mechanical GS which is capable to
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display the existing shop conditions across the system and predict
workload under various rescheduling plans. As to the power GS's DSS, in
addition to the inquiry/analysis package (used for performance
evaluation) mentioned before, one more module should be designed and
integrated to enable him to predict at least the weekly power demand
pattern. Given these two respective DSSs, two general superintendents
can then talk, in solid terms, on how to shop engines most efficiently.
Multi-Functional Planning Team
Real-time operations are performed within a framework determined by
higher level planning decisions which define their ends (goals,
standards, criteria) and their means (plans, policies, schedules).
Following the principle of the operating document priority system,
although the discretion range of real-time operations is relatively
large, the allowable adjustments still have their limits. How to devise
a mechanism to identify: 1) when such limits have been reached and 2)
how to design a procedute to trigger and accomplish the needed
replanning accordingly, are the two issues vital to the viability of
rail operations. In the power management context, due to the highly
multi-functional nature of the operations, a large group of rail
officers from various departments should be involved in taking care of
these two issues.
Triggers for Replanning. The railroad should explicitly define a set of
performance indices (such as those susggested in Exhibit 7-1-11) which
reflect the rationality of the system. Second, the standards for these
performance measures should be reasonably assigned (available tools to
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establish these standards will be discussed later). Third, the
performance accountability and reviewing responsibility should be
allocated to specific personnel such as shown in Exhibit 7-2-2.
Given the above conditions, taking the power active-fleet sizing as
an example, there are at least four ways to trigger the replanning
process: two are through the planning staff and the other two are
through the operating officers as shown in Exhibit 7-2-2. The
advantages of having a set of multiple process triggers are as follows:
because the operating officers are responsible for accomplishment the
standards, in case the performance is below the standard, they are
expected to initiate replanning, either to lower the standard or to
revise the operating plan so as to bring the situation back into
control. The planning officers are responsible for pursuing higher
level performance; if opportunities for better performance are
identified through the review process, they are expected to initiate
replanning, either to develop a better plan or to set higher performance
standards. Therefore, to devise the replanning triggers in both line
and staff units, a balance between the reactive and proactive forces,
which drive the replanning activities, can be achieved. Moreover, from
departmental perspective, due to the conflicting interests concerning
power performance (e.g, mechanical personnel prefer to having a larger
shop-margin standard, while transportation personnel normally prefer
higher fleet availability), some balance- can also be attained - in terms
of the emphasis of the plans - due to the functioning of the replanning
triggers in both departments.
Media of Replanning. In multi-functional operationssuch as the power
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management, the causality of the underlying physical processes is very
complex. To facilitate coordination and to provide a solid base for
communication, certain models which are able to produce objective
projections concerning the consequencies of alternative acitons are
necessary. A good example in this regard is the case of the MIT
Service/Planning Model (SPM) [McCarren and Martland, 1980]. The design
philosophy of that model is based on a theory that the legitimate
process for formulating a rail operating plan (including blocking
strategy and train schedules) should be a collective decision process
participated by all the concerned departements (Transportation,
Marketing, Labor, and Mechanical) and by both line and staff personnel.
The model is used to generate certain quantitative indices concerning
the consequences of different proposals to facilitate further discussion
and refinement of plans. In fact, any model with the above nature can
serve as an ideal medium for multi-functional planning.
Therefore, it is deserable to develop a power operations planning
model by following the same design principle as applied to the MIT-SPM.
The model should have sufficient detail to address all the major issues,
and have the prediction capability to generate reasonable performance
indices. Given such a model, the railroad should then institutionalize
a multi-functional planning process with the participants (as minimum)
and their roles as indicated in Exhibit 7-2-2. The alternative
proposals formulated through such a process serve as input to the power
operations planning model, and the output from the model are used to
guide further refinements of the proposals until some non-inferior plans
are crystalized. Those plans are then recommended to senior management
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for final choice and approval. In such a planning process, the AVPT
should act as a coordinator and the General Manager-Terminal Operations
as the technical supporter to operate the model.
Within the above planning framework, maintenance planning is a
sub-process which can operate separately but interactively to provide
either input (shop margin constraint) to or receive output (shop margin
standard) from the main process, depending on how we initiate the
process. Because the active fleet size is, in principle, geared to the
traffic level, following this planning process, the serviceable fleet
can also be geared to the general transportation requirements.
To illustrate, let us assume the railroad adopts a two-mode
operating strategy - one is for peak seasons, the other is for non-peaks
- and the planning issues are: 1) When to shift from one mode to
another, and 2) Which part of the operating plans should be revised and
how. As discussed earlier in this study, facing the coming of the lower
season, the mechanical officers may propose to raise the shop margin
level, i.e., to shrink the serviceable fleet, to enable them to have a
longer time to perform heavy repairs or to give their crew time for
vacations, while the exact timing for change and the change extent are
determined by the collective decision process proposed above.
In conclusion, following Cyert and March's arguement [1963, p.119],
different units in an organization usually can work together to deal
with the pressing issue-well but not with longer-run strategies. To
overcome this drawback, a creditable model, which is capable of
addressing the multi-functional issues and creating certain desired
feedback-react environment, could be an effective facilitator for the
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communication and coordination of the multi-functional planning. Of
course to make such a model a really sensible tool to the organization,
some institutional arrangements discussed earlier in this section must
be carried out. Only by doing so can the higher level planning and the
day-in-day-out operations be integrated as a whole, and a more
responsive operations management pattern be presumed.
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7.2.3 The General Meta-Control Structure
Developing An Explicit Meta-Control Framework
Alfred Chandler used to say [1962, p.19]:
The failure to develop a new internal structure, like the failure to
respond to new external opportunities and needs, was a consequences
of overconcentration on operational activities by the executives
responsible for the destiny of their enterprise, or from their
inability, because of past training and education and present
position, to develop an entrepreneurial outlook.
To avoid the above pitfall, we suggest the controlling mechanisms
outlined in the previous two sections should function within an
organization-wide meta-control framework which takes care of the
organizational strategic planning. By imposing a meta-control block
over the functinal and steering control tasks (the later two have been
discussed in the previous section (7.2.2), Exhibit 7-2-3 depicts in part
the image of such a framework (only the part relevant to the power
management is shown). In short, at this (meta-control) level, the
infrastructure, the task controlling structure and incentive system,
fleet ownership, operating economic and financial goals, as well as the
market and service orientation, should all be treated as variables -
they are subject to change in the organizational strategic planning
process. In other words, the Exhibit represents a conceptual framework
which the senior managers have to bear in mind for appropriately
discharging their power management responsibility. Hereafter, the
discussion is based on a premise which assumes the existence of a
general strategic planning process, and our focus is then on how to
design the power component within such a process and how to make it
function.
392
0Cu cu CoC
0 r-
5
-rO.
- 00 4 0
u a
0 ccU C .0)
*'*4
"--- co 0 r Cu
C6o
C44CO Cuo Cu3Oo CV U cCO uC
L1 OCX 22 r
0) OC: I~)
3 - rCOWO
oa C.·~C.
0
Hz
>0.Q
I-4
ii
C,
H
H
H'H.
cISi
H
0'l
cn
Z
Cu
Ce-
0
U
W
X
CZr
0)
UCu
Cu
Cu
0)
Cu
LA
0)
:3
0
C.
I ____
CO
M) -Hla *~0 *0:3_q
LA.C CuU0. L) cV--0
Cu O = C
cO 000 -H0
I-s >'4. " 4 -
W.) cc0)
o >~ CW
IF4 C:V
CuO :0I
u ua ~c0A a.- 0))0 (3 0)0 (V 04-0 6 0.) C O n
occh
z - rC. C r.U
0000W0CCC CuCu.4 4- C CCu 1S )Q
-.. CO CO W 2 CO CO
Cu -4 O~4-
4) - FE -H
u pa 30 0
Uo 'Cam oQ) Vý 0-)O
U=I
0 ) u . -
(1 (A P. -4 0C* .Cu)1 C .
C W) wWC C/20..Cu 0)0) ) m
cU CJU Wc uCr .uCO C0 Q
'J C:Cu Cc
a) Q) V)II V
-,4 41J~ 4. -4o C O c r_:0 134
CA CC0 CC Cu CC
=u -,A-4 ru-A.,-i
', ") z~ Q) C r
0 "- Cn >CC.cCOL a a t
19 1
El I
-4
CuCu0
uC C
"e
I cu r
- H Aj *H -ýI-s .Cu@
w 0 wa 0 o*
9C4 0 a. 0t >u C Cu
2W CO. CO 0
4.5) CO~ 0 O-
0000-0X- r * *rl
,"4
0
Cu0
Cu
-4nJ
",'4
rl
-4
r a
-4
Q4
: m
'.500
U01.4\
00~-
oc 4bC-
CU
-H -
>3
1-4 Q)
>C.
oc
a)
.u C
1m01-UCOCu1.'cc a
E-u to'-
co 0 moa
'.4 C:3)41.5
0)WoE
0c.cc.
0
0'
C
0
dv,
-4CO -
-4 -4
0 -
-Y-l
00
W -4
z 91OuC
sC.)
4CO4O
WA -
ZO..
-Jm
0
cc:
.. )J
0
0"
<r-4
CDC)Z
o
"-44a0E
CO
U>'
,0
lU
CO5u
Q) CO 1- -
3 to 0 04U) > 5 C
a) CO 004
j Q) Q)-- 0'.
w 44 u ra~p
*.] > 0) *0 4 W 0W
0 C bo CC OU I-4 U L'.
: 0 P *00' W 00 m jwV
I* P. r.0 0 4) "q :E--I Cu CO4 u I w Co0) w W 0 o m 0 0 A w0 0) 3 r ) "- 1A )u
A* > E > f- m C mS N 0 W r 4 44 M 0I C- O H) 40 <C. 0 uI u C 0 u a W-
4 1 C4 - C CW1 00 0 COe CO OCOWccnU I. W.5WCCOO -4 '5 2Cm
393
I
rr" °
-1 dr. •1
J
gI
.
I!
A
Meta-Control in Action
The highest organization unit responsible for power operations
management is the office of Senior Vice-President-Operations. This unit
may concentrate its attention principally on two areas. One is the
shifting demand resulting from changes in marketing or financial
strategies, the other is the analysis of the internal capacity and the
derivation of the managerial emphasis for the next operating period.
Let us take the latter area as an example to elaborate on the desired
functioning pattern.
The SVPO alone cannot handle the above function. He must be
supported by certain staff which serves as a think-tank. The major task
of this staff unit is to do certain off-line analysis (Section 2.1.2],
which distills intelligence from the massive information generated from
the operating information systems for the SVPO. In this sense, the
documents generated by the existing formal reporting system shown in the
Appendix of Chapter 6 are far too superficial and difficult to be used
by the SVPO. What the SVPO needs in his decision-base is not some
straightforward summary or aggregation from the on-line operating
information systems, but a set of off-line analysis results which
provide insights into the strengths and weaknesses of both the current
operating strategies and managerial practices. Therefore, the staff
unit should strive for a clear conceptualization regarding the
functioning of the total power operations management system, as well as
to seek operational approaches to uncover problems and opportunities
implied by current practices.
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Following the above line of thought, we argue that the analysis
contained in Chapter 4 of this study represents the first step - which
attempts to clarify the nature of the underlying power operating process
as well as the characteristics of the managerial tasks that the staff
unit in question should accomplish. Moreover, the Service Impact Model
illustrated in that chapter also stands for a typical analysis required
at this level. That model not only enables the SVPO to put a set of
complicated policies into perspective, but also allows him to asking
further questions. For instance: Is 40% time utilization the upper
limit the system can achieve? What are other railroads' performance
concerning this measure? What is the cost implication of this
performance level? Is there any organization change needed to improve
this area's performance? Is it worth doing?
In short, the kind of analyses that should be conducted at the SVPO
level cannot be well-defined. However, a clear overall conceptual
framework such as the one shown in Exhibit 7-2-3 should be a necessary
premise. Given such a framework, some analyses concerning certain
fundamental performance indices, such as power productivity, unit power
operating cost, etc. could be standardized (they should be presented in
terms of general trend and compared with the competing carriers'
performance), while many other analyses may have to be carried out as
special projects. The key is that all these endeavors be driven from a
motivation to actively search for a higher level of performance. To
create such an atmosphere is the critical challenge faced by the SVPO;
however, the achievement of fruitful results is dependent on the
qualification of the staff unit and its competence in selecting the
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right tools to analyze the problems handed down from the SVPO, or to ask
the right self-motivated questions and to crystallize practical
recommendations.
Summary
In response to the symptoms and the underlying causes diagnosed in
the power management arena of the host railroad, we have chosen the
refinement of the organization's information-processing systems (IPS)
for demonstration purposes, as the intervention dimension for
formulating the needed change plans. However, as evidenced by the
preceding discussion, our definition of IPS is rather broad - the
necessary elements concerning the structure and process of the
organization are also covered. Section 7.2.1 through 7.2.3 were
dedicated, respectively, to the description of three different sets of
information-processing systems which cover 1) the system to support
well-structured individual operating decision, 2) the systems to support
group decisions with various scales and different time-horizons, and 3)
the system to support organization-wide unstructured strategic
decisions.
We will also illustrate the interdependence between various
information processing systems. Basically, the proper functioning of
the higher level systems are relied on the proper functioning of the
lower level systems--higher level systems are primarily embodied in the
lower level system. On the other .hand, higher level systems provide
contexts within which the lower level systems perform.
To amplify on the above statement, considering the relationship
between the mechanisms of meta-control and functional control, without
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an explicitly assigned task responsiblility and performance
accountability, the functional level controlling mechanism
(planning-execution-performance review cycle) can hardly perform and the
decision authorities have no way of being delegated from above. In
effect, senior management will be trapped into monitoring the on-line
operations and as a result having little energy to take care of more
important strategic issues which is the situation the host system is
facing.
However, given a multi-level information-processing systems
proposed by this study, senior management to resume its meta-control
role and through the following two channels to control the functional
level activities: one is the power of approval or veto of the functional
plans, the other is its inherent capacity to restructure the lower
levels' structure and precedures. In other words, the meta-control
level holds another trigger of functional level's replanning; this
trigger is not only able to initiate a change in the operating plan and
performance standards, but also changes the framework of planning as
well as the roles of involved actors.
In our proposed Power Meta-Control Structure, the SVPO is the
person who provides the ultimate buffer function between a shifting
marketing demand and power operations. There are two intelligence
networks he should develop: one is outward linkages to the Financial and
Marketing Department as well as the external markets, the other is
inward-oriented linkages to the key internal performance areas (the
requried nature for the latter network has been discussed to some
details in Section 7.2.3). The key message which the SVPO seeks from
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both networks is the signal indicating a demand for change. However,
after receiving such a signal, in addition to the need for developing a
plan which can satisfy the required change, the eventual challenge the
SVPO has to face is how to implement the proposed plan so as to achieve
the benefit of the change (e.g., improved operating effectiveness), but
meanwhile to minimize the potential turbulence resulting from the change
which is usually devastating to operating efficiency, at least at the
beginning of the change process.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study is devoted to the development of a coherent theory which
fits the nature of transportation operations management. A dual-system
control paradigm is postulated. According to this paradigm, a
transportation operations management system is conceived of as a control
system which consists of two complementary parts: 1) the controlling
sub-system - the organizational aspect of the system which posseses the
controlling capacity, and 2) the sub-system being controlled - the
technological aspect of the system which defines the tasks to be
controlled and their interrelationships. The performance of the total
system is then determined by how well the controlling capacity is
matched with the characteristics of the underlying controlled tasks.
The key theme of this study is the developement of theories and
operational methodologies which collectively enable us to 1) understand
and describe the nature of both the controlling and the controlled
systems in the context of transportation operations management, 2)
diagnose and analyze the strengths and weaknesses, and problems of the
total system, and 3) identify desired directions of change and develop
alternative change plans for improving the performance of the total
transportation operations management systems.
To.test the theories and the methodologies developed in this study,
the management of the operations of railroad motive power - locomotives
(yard switchers are not included in the study) - is adopted as an
empirical case. The data are collected from three major U. S.
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railroads.
8.1 Conclusions
8.1.1 Theories and Methodologies
.A. The System Being Controlled
Theory. The key theme in analyzing the system being controlled is to
conceptualize the physical transportation process and to identify of the
tasks to be controlled. The analytical framework for the controlled
system is developed from the notion of resource cycle which consists of
a set of distinct status or time phases - interrelated by the natural
order of transportation operations - of a particular resource used in
the delivery of transportation service.
The resource cycle framework highlights the cyclic nature of
transportation work flows and the systemic mutual-dependence among
various core operations and operational buffers. Such a framework not
only provides the analysis with perspective, but also with effective
heuristics in deriving the hierarchy of control tasks along a particular
resource dimension as well as the control issues concerning other
interacting resources' cycles. The linkages between the controlled and
the controlling systems are established through the identification of
the controlled system's work units which are assignable (in terms of
task authority or accountability) to organization units (individual or
group of individuals) in the controlling system.
Mehtodologies. The notions of resource cycle and control task are
operationalized through the following procedures: 1) translate work flow
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into cycles of key resources, 2) break down the resource cycle into
components, 3) identify the hierarchical and horizontal
mutual-dependence among the components of the resource cycle, and 4)
construct the control task hierarchy through the identification of the
managerial tasks involved in the planning, execution and performance
review for each component of the resource cycle.
B. The Controlling System
Theory. The controlling system in this study is analyzed from three
different perspectives. The first views the system as a whole, i.e., an
organization is conceived of as a three-level problem-conversion
mechanism. The bottom level controls the physical process, operates in
a well-bufferred closed system and pursues production efficiency; the
top level responds to the external environment, determines the systemic
structure, and seeks organizational effectiveness; the middle level
mediates between the two extremes, provides the necessary buffers for
the lower level operations as well as the needed flexibility for higher
level adaptation. In a properly functioning organization, there should
be at least three major types of control cycles - steering control,
functional control and meta-control. Any failure of the above control
cycles indicates malfunction of the controlling system.
The second perspective empahsizes the organizational
decision-making processes. In the transportation operating context,
decision-making is usually a team process. The actors involved in the
process constitute a decision net of which the configurations are
determined by the mutual-dependence of the underlying control tasks. In
401
such a decision environment, because the individual decision-maker must
acquire information from and transmit his decision to other
decision-makers, communication and coordination are essential to the
quality of the interrelated decisions as well as to the behavior of the
controlling system. A well-functioning task team must be supported by
proper communication media and an adequate basis of mutual-influence.
The third perspective concerns with individual decision-making
behavior. The notion of human information-processing systems (HIPS) is
applied. Two issu of particular interest are 1) the problems resulting
from limited human cognitive capacity, e.g., information-overload and
bounded rationality, and 2) potential biases of individual decision
heuristics. The design of an external-aid system must thus aim at
enhancing the HIPS with the power of information-processing technology,
i.e., 1) expanding the individual's cognitive capacity and breaking
through his rationality bound, as well as 2) detecting and offsetting
the potential biases of the individual's decision heuristics.
Methodologies. Operational procedures and techniques are developed in
this study to support the diagnosis of the controlling performance from
each of the above three perspectives. The techniques suggested for
examining the general linkages between the dual systems lead to the
construction of a task-actor matrix which displays the relationships
between the control tasks and the authority / accountability of the
organization units. Inadequate linkages are explicated throughsuch an
analysis.
The diagnosis of team-based decision behavior is conducted through
the analyses of communication locus and the decision bases of individual
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actors involved in the process. These analyses allow us to examine the
adequacy of the support for the process of coordination, the
availability of a mutual influence basis and the effects of
means- / ends-control.
Decision heuristics are the focus in the diagnosis of individual
decision behavior. Protocol analysis and introspection analysis are two
alternative techniques. The key theme is to specify the requirements of
external aid systems capable of improving individual decision quality.
C. Summary
The research is conducted within an organization intervention
framework in which substantive theories guide the information search,
furnish a coherent construct for organizing the diagnostic data,
identifying strengths and weaknesses, as well as for developing
improvement plans; while the methodologies provide operational
strategies and specific techniques for collecting and documenting the
diagnostic data. To achieve the aim of improving the performance of the
total system, there are at least three interrelated approaches: 1)
refining the general task management structure, 2) devising or improving
multi-functional team support systems, and 3) installing or improving
individual decision support systems.
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8.1.2 The Power Managemnet Case Study
Chapters 4 through 7 of this study are concerning with the
application of the dual-system theories, and the diagnosis and analysis
methodologies to the context of rail motive power operations management.
The analysis is conducted progressively from macro-level issues to
micro-level issues. The findings are concluded as follows.
A. Acquisition of Diagnostic Information
To obtain a general picture of the nature of the overall task, in
Chapter 4, on the controlled system side, the resource cycle concept is
applied to the development of the power cycle hierarchy. The control
task hierarchy of power management is identified through the contruction
of a power cycle vs. management cycle matrix. On the controlling
system side, relevant organization units are identified through the
analysis of the organizational chart, job description and formal
reporting systems. A task-actor matrix is documented to show the
relationships between the organization units and control tasks. The
interplay between the freight car flow and power flow is presented to
demonstrate the potential of augmenting the power cycle framework to
address non-power issues.
Chapter 5 is devoted to the diagnosis of the power maintenance
function and its coordination with the transportation function. The
causality between the maintenance module and the general power
operations is examined. Communication locus analysis is conducted to
investigate the settings and the processes of coordination between the
maintenance and transportation operations.
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In Chapter 6, the context of steering control of power dispatching
is the focus. Determinants of linehaul operations and terminal
operations are examined through the development of the causal diagram
and decision flow diagram. Communication locus analysis is conducted to
examine the nature of the daily operating conference, and the power
dispatching processes (including both the routine procedures and the
emergency handling procedures). The decision basis for each key actor
engaged in the power dispatching decision-net is explicated.
Introspection analysis is conducted to document the power dispatcher's
decision heuristics.
B. Problems with Power Operations Management on the Host Railroad
From the above descrptive and analytical data, various symptoms are
identified in the current pratices of power operations management on the
host railroad system. They are summarized as follows.
I)Inadequacy of Planning Support and Absence of Effective Control Cycles
From the general task management structure represented by the
task-actor matrix, a number of problematic symptoms were found in the
planning- and review-phase's control tasks. In summary, a)
effort-oriented control rather than result-oriented control consumed the
management's energy, b) planning was an implicit process and
consequently higher level accountabilities (such as fleet sizing and
control of productivity) were not properly assigned to specific
individuals, c) a number of fundamental performance indices were either
problematic or not reported at all, d) feedback on performance either
did not exist or was not effectively used to guide further planning in
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many performance areas, and e) as a whole, the meta-control (adaptation)
function of the power operations management systems did not perform
adequately.
2)Impact of Malfunction of Meta-Control Structure on Maintenance
Performance
Maintenance is a modular task of the general power management. The
maintenance management structure exhibited the common symptoms of the
general task management structure. In effect, mechanical officers were
not adequately motivated by the current settings to maximize their
controllability over unscheduled maintenance, which produced adverse
effects on both the work-load of the maintenance systems and fleet
serviceability.
3) Unbalanced Power Dispatching Decision Heuristics
Because deliberate planning aimed at higher power productivity was
not rewarded by the systems, the power dispatcher was normally not
concerned about the long power idle time and the low achieved ton/HP
ratio.
4) Information-overloaded Power Dispatcher
Time pressure and a massive volume of data characterize the
decision context of the power dispatcher. Rational deployment
algorithms were difficult to apply to a moderate sized power fleet and
rail network. Information-overload was a critical problem for the power
dispatcher.
C. Proposed Improvement Approaches
To improve the performance of the total system, a variety of
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intervention dimensions are available. This study proposes three
interrelated approaches for refining the controlling function of the
system.
1) Installing. Individual Decision-Aid Systems
It is necessary to install a computer-aid decision support systems
which are geared to the actual decision heuristics applied by the power
dispatcher as well as tailored to fit the input / output pattern of the
information flows. The design criteria for such a system is that it
should be capable of overcoming the information-overload problem,
minimizing premature decisions, advancing the "saticificing" level and
facilitating more extensive inquiry into decision relevant information.
Normative elements should be integrated into the system as needed so as
to offset the potential biases of the current heuristics and improve the
decision quality.
2) Devising Team Support Systems
To support a wide variety of the decision-making processes in the
rail operating context, various team support systems are required.
Three different interrelated teams are discussed in this study:
line-authority team, real-time operations team, and multi-functional
planning team. The first two deal with the on-line control of physical
processes, while the third deals with the interdepartmental planning and
replanning issues with longer time horizon. The key to designing such
systems is to integrate the mutually-dependent individual decisions into
coherent decision teams, such that a) coordination within each team can
be achieved through well-developed communication channels and the
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provision of mutual influence bases, b) the buffering effect between
teams can be realized through planning, and c) adaptation can be
accomplished through replanning.
3) Refining the General Meta-Control Strucure
The meta-control structure provides the general context for power
management. To effectively develop and implement the various team
support systems as well as the individual decision support systems, the
railroad must define a set of balanced performance indices and allocate
performance accountability as well as review responsibility (which may
lead to replanning) to specific organization units, i.e., the missing
links between the control tasks and organization units indicated by the
task-actor matrix of meta-control structure must be established. In
addition, at the general system level, there is a need for integrating
an externally-oriented intelligence system, together with the above
internally-oriented controlling mechanism, to properly perform the
meta-control function.
D. Summary
The many symptoms diagnosed in this study are not unique to the
host railroad, as evidenced by many other reports cited in this study.
Theory-guided diagnosis enables us to put these symptoms into
perspective and to derive a coherent set of improvement plans. The
improvement approaches proposed in this study, to a large extent, should
have generic applicability to other U. S. railroads.
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8.2 Recommendations for Further Studies
8.2.1 On the Theories and Methodologies
Theories. The dual-system control paradigm is a relatively flexible
analysis framework to accommodate a variety of theories which are
relevant t:o transportation operations management. The many theoretical
constructs developed and synthesized in this study are only first-cut
results toward an ultimate theory of transportation operations
management. Elaberation and refinement on each module of theories
concerning both the controlling system and the system being controlled
are suggested.
Methodologies. The inventory of the techniques included in this study
is less than exhaustive. To advance the utility of the theories, the
development of operational methodologies is critical to the
transportation operations management. Further synthesis and refinement
of the descriptive and prescriptive methodologies from various
disciplines are recommended.
8.2.2 On the Empirical Applications
Power Management on the Host Railroad. The empirical case presented in
this study is a result of a relatively premitive diagnosis
ar prescription. Only the outlines and the design principles for the
improvement of power performance are developed. Further study on the
detailed design. issues concerning the three improvement approaches is
necessary to the host railroad.
Power Management on Other Railroad. The power management-specific
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diagnosis procedures developed in Chapters 4 thru 7 are equally
applicable to other railroad. Given the pilot experience on the host
railroad, further application of the theories and
methodologies to other railroads' power management issues could be more
structured.
Application to other Resource Classes and Transportation Modes. The
theories and methodologies proposed in this study are in principle
applicable to the general context of transportation operations
managment. The application of the theory and methodology to other
resources classes (besides the motive power) and other transportation
modes (besides railroad) are recommended so as to further test and
refine the analysis paradigm.
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